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Abstract
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) use networked control software to interact with and manipulate the
physical world. Examples of cyber-physical systems include smart buildings, power distribution
networks, and ﬂeets of autonomous agriculture vehicles. These types of systems are increasingly of
interest due to the signiﬁcant potential beneﬁt of automating and optimizing tasks in the real-world
and at large scales. However, before wide-scale deployment becomes a reality, two challenges must
be addressed: safety and cost. The contained research directly addresses these two challenges, in
the context of cyber-physical systems.
The second challenge of cyber-physical systems is their cost. Since cyber-physical systems in-
teract with the physical world, these systems are often inherently real-time systems. In real-time
systems, the correctness of a computation is not only a function of its result, but also depends on the
timing at which the result is produced. For example, an inherently unstable airplane, like the F-16,
needs a control system that can guarantee adjustments are always made dozens of times a second
in order to guarantee aircraft stability. Most commercial oﬀ-the-shelf (COTS) computing systems,
however, do not provide such real-time guarantees. Relying on custom-made components in order
to guarantee timeliness properties, however, leads to systems with an exorbitant cost. For aﬀord-
ability, we must make use of low-cost COTS components. In the presented research, we address the
primary problem with COTS components used in real-time systems: unpredictable interference, and
therefore unpredictable timing, when accessing a shared memory resource. Methods are provided to
mitigate both memory interference from external peripherals, as well as memory interference from
other cores in a multi-core processor.
Since cyber-physical systems interact with the physical world, the eﬀects of bugs in the design or
implementation are not necessarily quarantined in the cyber (software) part of the system. Software
written with traditional development practices will almost certainly contain bugs or unintended
interactions among components. In CPS, these bugs can result in uncontrolled and possibly disas-
trous physical-world interactions. The safety problem for CPS is addressed on two fronts. First,
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a technique based on selective command ﬁltering is provided to give safety to the high-level CPS
computation. This technique can guarantee distributed safety properties in the physical world, if
assumptions are given about the low-level controllers. Second, a method for guaranteeing assump-
tions about the low-level controllers is presented. This method, based on the Simplex Architecture,
allows safety invariants to be maintained in individual agents of the distributed CPS, despite the
presence of bugs in their control software. Combined, the two approaches provide safety for entire
CPS, without requiring complete formal veriﬁcation of the system.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Cyber-physical systems combine communication, control, and computation in order to permit cyber
components to directly aﬀect the physical world while using a network for coordination. While this
has the potential to create systems which eﬃciently perform precision operations in the real world,
it also requires solving several challenges. Two recurring challenges in cyber-physical system design
are the challenges of safety and aﬀordability.
In earlier military and aviation applications, safety and reliability are achieved through suﬃcient
redundancy and rigorous development and certiﬁcation processes such as the DO-178B [1]. Such
means and methodologies, however, are untenable for cyber-physical systems in other industries
including automotive, agriculture, and oﬀ-road vehicles, because of a product cost diﬀerence of
three orders of magnitude when compared with military and aviation applications. A low-cost
approach to safety is required for CPS to become widespread in larger application spaces.
Large application spaces for cyber-physical systems demand a system design that is veriﬁably
safe, and yet inexpensive. This important challenge is addressed directly in the contained research.
This is done in three parts:
• Chapter 2 discusses how to provide safety at the global level. This method assumes local nodes
have guaranteed behavior, but allows the network to be unreliable in terms of reordering or
dropping packets.
• Chapter 3 provides methods to create low-cost real-time system by allowing the unveriﬁed
majority of the system to be built out of commercial-oﬀ-the-shelf (COTS) components. The
main challenge with COTS in cyber-physical systems is that they do not provide timing guar-
antees, so we create, implement, and evaluate hardware and software methods to overcome
these intrinsic limitations.
• Chapter 4 addresses the issue of safety in the system in a formal manner. Based on prior
research into the Simplex Architecture, we elaborate on an automated approach to generate
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safety wrappers for untrusted components in order to reduce system veriﬁcation cost. Such
methods can provide the guarantees of local behavior necessary for global algorithm correct-
ness.
The research presented here is ongoing, and a concluding look as well as future directions for research
are outlined in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 2
Global CPS Safety
As mentioned in the introduction, safety is a paramount concern for cyber-physical systems. In
this section, we present techniques for addressing safety for a high-level algorithm controlling a
cyber-physical system.
We consider a CPS scenario consisting of several embedded computing components each interact-
ing and sensing the physical world and communicating with a central coordinator over an unreliable
channel channel capable of dropping packets or causing unbounded message delay. Examples of
such channels include wireless or the Internet. These embedded, low-level controllers attempt to
accomplish some task in a coordinated fashion. Since the physical world is being manipulated, it
is essential that the supervisory control logic is carefully designed and satisﬁes strict safety require-
ments. For example, autonomous vehicles may use wireless to communicate their positions and alter
their future routes, but vehicles should never collide despite the potential for an unbounded number
of message drops. This system is diﬃcult to reason about because both (1) the communication layer
can experience unbounded message delays and drops, and (2) the dynamics of the physical world are
represented by interacting relationships in a continuous space. This complexity creates a signiﬁcant
potential for errors in both the design and implementation.
In this chapter, we aim to create a system capable of mitigating the eﬀects of errors in the super-
visory control logic of a cyber-physical system. The key enabler of our approach is the realization
that, if the network is assumed to be unreliable, individual controllers must be able to maintain
global safety even if packets do not arrive. In our approach, we propose a Command Filter Safe-
guard which is interposed between the supervisory control logic and the network, as shown in Figure
2.1. If supervisory control logic attempts to send control commands which may jeopardize system
safety, the Command Filter Safeguard will selectively drop these packets, thereby maintaining the
safety invariant. A key technical challenge with this approach is to determine the exact behavior of
the Command Filter Safeguard for a particular system.
Since the network is unreliable, control commands which are sent may never arrive at the low-
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Low-Level
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Figure 2.1: In the architecture we consider, a supervisory controller sends commands to a distributed
set of agents over an unreliable network. The Command Filter Safeguard will ensure system safety.
level controller. For a system to be safe, therefore, it must account for this possibility of divergence
in behavior, and satisfy a safety invariant both in the case where the command arrives and the
new control strategy is used, and in the case where the command is lost and a previous control
strategy remains in eﬀect. We formalize a notion of compatible actions, and then we show that
the key to providing progress guarantees is to create ﬁnite compatible action chains which end at a
desired state. Since constructing these chains is the key to providing system progress, we provide a
algorithmic method to aid in their construction.
This chapter is organized as follows:
• We formally deﬁne an unreliable communication channel in cyber-physical systems. We then
prove that safety invariants can be preserved in systems with these channels by using run-time
checks to perform selective packet drops. (Section 2.1)
• Selectively dropping packets can, of course, adversely aﬀect system progress. We provide
suﬃcient conditions which provide progress guarantees from a control-theoretic view of the
CPS. This requires constructing compatible actions chains, as well as stronger guarantees
from the communication network. (Section 2.2)
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• We show how to apply both of these approaches in a coordinated vehicle ﬂocking system. If the
stronger assumptions hold, the system progresses towards detour points given by the operator
at run-time. If not, the system still maintains a collision-free ﬂock. (Section 2.3)
2.1 Safety using a Command Filter Safeguard
In this section, we use hybrid I/O automata to formalize the notion of a distributed networked
control system with arbitrary delays and packetloss. We then prove a general theorem which is both
a necessary and suﬃcient condition for showing safety of such systems. We then apply the theorem
by stating the runtime checks in order to maintain system invariants, which will be encoded into
the Command Filter Safeguard in the proposed architecture.
2.1.1 Hybrid I/O Automata
Hybrid input/output automata are general model for systems consisting of discrete and continuous
states, where the discrete states are governed by transition rules, and the continuous states evolve
according to diﬀerential equations. There is also input and output in these systems, which allows
easy composition of diﬀerent components into a larger system.
Rather than explaining the full semantics for hybrid I/O automata, we provide a brief overview
of only the most important aspects here, and refer an interested reader to a more comprehensive
review [8, 9].
A hybrid I/O automaton consists of four parts: variables, transitions, trajectories, and actions.
Variables are the discrete or continuous entities of an automaton, for example velocity or mode.
A state of an automaton is a speciﬁc valuation of the variables. Transitions provide the behavior
of the discrete variables in the system. These have an enabling precondition and an eﬀect. The
state after the eﬀect is applied is called the post state of the transition. Preconditions specify
when transitions can occur, but generally automata are not forced to take a transition, which can
create nondeterminism. Trajectories give the behavior of the continuous variables in the system
as time passes, typically using diﬀerential equations, and systems can also have nondeterministic
dynamics described by nondeterministic trajectories. The conditions under which time can not
advance are given as stop conditions, which can be used to force an enabled transition to occur.
Finally, actions indicate the interaction points for external communication with other automata.
An action will always have a corresponding transition in the automaton. An action can occur when
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both automata that have the action satisfy the corresponding transitions' preconditions.
Time passes for a hybrid automata when a trajectory is acting upon the continuous variables.
During the execution, there can be discrete jumps in state caused by the transitions. For two hybrid
I/O automata with compatible actions, say A and B, we denote their composition using A||B.
2.1.2 System Deﬁnition
We model our supervisory control system as a network of communicating hybrid I/O automata. In
this network, there is an automaton describing the behavior of each of the N agents in the system,
A1, A2, . . . , AN , and an automaton which models the communication channel. This model is slightly
more general than the one discussed earlier with an explicit supervisory controller. Here, we could
arbitrary choose one of the agents to be the supervisor.
In this section, we are concerned with checking for satisfaction of safety invariants for systems.
We do this by providing a predicate on the states of the agent automata. We say the predicate is
an invariant if it evaluates to true for all reachable states of the system from a given initial state. A
system is a composition of the agent hybrid I/O automata and the communication automaton.
For our unreliable network, we consider a communication automaton with weak guarantees about
message delivery, named Cweak, which can delay each message arbitrarily long, or drop it. Such an
automaton matches the communication properties of many networked or wireless communication
systems. The automaton description for Cweak is given in Figure 2.2. Here, there are two possible
send transitions, either of which can be applied when a message is sent out. The ﬁrst one assigns
a real-valued arrival time greater than the current time. The second one silently drops the packet.
We also will consider two other communication scenarios, Cdrop and Cstrong. In Cdrop, the ﬁrst send
transition of Cweak is omitted so all messages get dropped. In Cstrong, the second send transition is
omitted, so that all messages can only be arbitrarily delayed, but never dropped. A communication
automaton would be composed with each of the agent automata by connecting the receive transition
with destination i to Agent Ai. All the agents would invoke the same send transition.
2.1.3 Safety Theorem
In order to prove a predicate P is an invariant for a system given a deﬁnition for each agent
automaton and the communication automaton, a standard approach is to check that the invariant
is satisﬁed for every transition and every trajectory. During this process, the invariant may need to
strengthened in order for the proof to follow.
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automaton CommWeak(M : Type )
type Packet = tuple o f message : M, delay : Real , dest : Nat
variables
bag : Bag [ Packet ] := [ ] ,
now : Real := 0
actions
send (m: M, dest : Nat ) ,
r e c e i v e (m: M, dest : Nat )
transit ions
send (m, dest ) // not in CommDrop
e f f ect
bag := i n s e r t ( [m, now+rand ( ) , dest ]
send (m, dest ) // not in CommStrong
e f f ect
/∗ dropped ∗/
r e c e i v e (m, dest )
precondition
conta ins ( bag , [m, 0 , dest ] )
e f f ect
remove ( bag , [m, 0 , dest ] )
tra jector ies
stop when
∃p : Packet p ∈ bag ∧ (now = p . dead l ine )
evolve
d(now) = 1
Figure 2.2: The Cweak communication automaton assigns messages arbitrary delays and can drop
messages. Here, rand() returns a nonnegative real number.
The standard approach for proving invariants, however, can be diﬃcult to apply. Since reasoning
is done ahead of time, the analysis must be applicable to all states which can be encountered for
each rule.
The approach advocated in this paper is to use a combination of static reasoning done ahead
of time along with runtime checks. With this approach, we can sometimes guarantee an invariant
in an easier manner than by using the normal, static approach. Rather than reasoning over sets of
possible values, we instead move part of the reasoning to runtime, and can therefore use a speciﬁc
value in a speciﬁc message. In order to do this, however, we need a prove a theorem which provides
an equivalent condition for verifying invariants.
We will now state the theorem formally and provide a proof outline. A system is described by
a composition of the automaton for each of the agents (AN = A1||A2|| . . . ||AN ) and the automaton
for the communication channel. A property P is the predicate we are trying to show is an invariant,
and is a predicate on the states of the agents, P : AN →{true, false}.
Theorem. A predicate P is an invariant for a system S = AN ||Cweak if and only if (1) P is
an invariant for the system S′ = AN ||Cdrop, and (2) from any post state of a receive transition
in S, P is preserved by the system ANpost||Cdrop, where ANpost is the composed agent automata AN
starting in the post state of the receive transition.
Proof outline. First we show the direction that if conditions (1) and (2) hold, the invariant is
satisﬁed by the original system.
The proof of this statement is based on the observation that at every point in time, either no
messages have been received, or there is a most-recently received message by one of the agents. As
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Time
m1
received
m4
received
m3
received
Condition 
(1)
Condition (2)
applied to m1
0
Condition (2)
applied to m4
Condition (2)
applied to m3
Figure 2.3: For every trace, at each time instant, either no message has been received in the system,
or there is a most-recently received message.
shown in Figure 2.3, for every possible trace there will be some amount of time where no messages
have been received by any of the agents in the system, followed by a intervals of time where there
is a most-recently received message.
Our proof proceeds by contradiction. Assume ti is the ﬁrst time at which P is evaluates to false
in S. If ti occurs before the ﬁrst message is received, this means that P would also evaluate to false
in S′ at time ti, since up to this point the behavior of S and S′ is identical. This violates condition
(1).
Therefore ti occurs at or after a message has been received and processed. Let tm be the time
of the most-recently processed message before time ti (the time at which the receive transition
was invoked in Cweak). We apply condition (2) of the theorem at time tm and take A
N
post as the
composed agent automata in the post state of the receive transition in S. Since in S, P evaluates
to false before any further messages are received after tm, this would mean it also evaluates to false
for the system with agent automata ANpost and a communication automaton which does not receive
any messages. This is exactly the case checked by condition (2).
Next we show the other direction, that if a predicate P is an invariant for S, conditions (1) and
(2) will hold. Again, we proceed by contradiction.
Assume condition (1) does not hold but P is an invariant of S. The behaviors of Cdrop can be
exactly simulated by Cweak, which means that P can not be an invariant for S.
Next, assume the second case that condition (2) does not hold but P is an invariant for S. In the
context of the false case of condition (2), let time tm be the time at which the receive transition is
invoked. Now consider a communication automaton which produces an identical behavior as S until
tm and then no longer receives messages. This behavior can also be exactly simulated by Cweak (by
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taking the dropping send transition for messages which would originally have an arrival time after
tm), which means that P can not be an invariant for S.
Since both cases yield contradictions, if an invariant is satisﬁed in the original system, conditions
(1) and (2) must also hold.
The two conditions of the theorem are therefore both necessary and suﬃcient for proving an
invariant is satisﬁed for a system with unreliable communication over all time.
2.1.4 Application of Theorem to Runtime Checks
From a static-time analysis perspective, the theorem does not gain us very much since condition (2)
needs to be evaluated every time any message can be received, which is diﬃcult to reason about.
However, at runtime, condition (2) may be easier to verify. This is the approach advocated, to
check condition (1) at system design time and condition (2) at runtime, which by the theorem will
guarantees that P is an invariant of the system.
One challenge of this approach is that the necessary runtime analysis needs to be automated in
software, which is done in our architecture in the Command Filter Safeguard. Since there may be
nondeterminism from the dynamics of the agents, and since in general this may involve an inﬁnite-
time reachability computation, this may easy or hard depending on the speciﬁc system.
Another challenge is to specify the action to take if the analysis for the speciﬁc message indicates
condition (2) is not satisﬁed at runtime. The system can not be allowed to take action based on
the message, since it may lead to a state which violates the invariant. In our proposed design,
these messages are actively dropped by the sender (never sent out). This preserves condition (2)
for the system (since no messages will be sent out unless (2) is satisﬁed) which guarantees that P
will continue to be an invariant for the system. Of course dropping messages can adversely aﬀect
system progress, but it will only be done to maintain safety (if the predicate captures a notion of
safety). In Section 2.2, we present suﬃcient conditions to guarantee progress which require, among
other things, a stronger communication automaton, where messages can be delayed arbitrarily but
not dropped.
Since we are proposing to drop messages at send time, we need to reason about possible system
states when the packet will be received (since condition (2) deals with the system state upon message
reception, not sending). This also may be challenging because it involves reasoning about which
messages may be sent out in the future before the arrival time of the message, and possible message
reorderings. For example, in Figure 2.3, message m4 arrives before message m3. The runtime
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analysis at the send time of message m3 needs to take this possible reordering into account. Also, in
an unrestricted system, these messages can be sent from and arrive at diﬀerent agents (for example
m3 may be from Agent 1 to Agent 2, while m4 is from Agent 3 to Agent 4).
For speciﬁc systems, however, this analysis may be simpler. For example, systems which maintain
sequence numbers in messages and only take actions on the most-recent messages received, do not
have to consider reorderings. Systems like the supervisory control system we are considering have
a single entity which sends command messages, and therefore we do not need to reason about
command messages exchanged between other agents.
One advantage of doing these checks at runtime, however, is that we are able to adapt systems
where the desired predicate is not actually an invariant in an unmodiﬁed system. Therefore, this
approach can be used to help design systems where we want a P to be an invariant. This runtime
check and selective message dropping is exactly the behavior encoded into the Command Filter
Safeguard. In this way, the system will maintain P , even if the original supervisory control logic
does not, due to bugs in the design or implementation.
2.2 Guaranteeing Progress with Compatible Action Chains
We will now describe a manner in which we can guarantee system progress without violating safety.
We assume a more speciﬁc CPS model here where each agent is running a stable closed-loop con-
troller.
First, we discuss the distributed control system architecture that we consider more speciﬁcally
in Section 2.2.1. Section 2.2.2 deﬁnes the notion of compatible actions in the context of the dis-
tributed control system and proposes methods of checking compatibility. In Section 2.2.3, we then
show scheme of coordinated control that guarantees safety according to our earlier result from Sec-
tion 2.1. Finally, Section 2.2.4 proves progress of the system under a stronger assumption of the
communication layer.
2.2.1 Controller Architecture
As before, we consider a distributed control system consisting of a collection of N agents with
a central coordinator. We assume that each agent receives commands only from the central co-
ordinator. Each Agent Ai has a local controller and a variable set point Si. The set point of
Agent Ai can be changed through communication with the central coordinator. In general, a set
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point indicates a single or a sequence of (i) actions Ai will take, or (ii) goal states Ai moving
towards. For simplicity, in this section we will assume Si is a single goal position of Ai. That
is, the local controller of Agent Ai drives the agent's continuous variables to move towards the
set point Si. When agent Ai reaches an -ball around the set point (for some ﬁxed ), agent Ai
will report its arrival to the central coordinator be sending a progress update message. The cen-
tral coordinator will then, upon receiving arrival messages from all the agents, send each agent
its next set point. An execution of Agent Ai can therefore be viewed as a hybrid sequence
ηi = waiti[0] y receive[1] y τi[1] y send y waiti[1] y receive[2] y τi[2] y send y waiti[2] . . . ,
where (i) each τi[k] is a trajectory moving to a particular set point Si[k], (ii) send is the Agent
sending the progress update message, (iii) waiti[k] is a trajectory when waiting for next set point,
where agent Ai stays within the -ball of Si[k], and (iv) receive[k] is an action invoked by the central
coordinator's send action, during which the set point of agent Ai is changed from Si[k− 1] to Si[k].
In each trajectory τi[k], the initial state and the ﬁnal state of the trajectory are within -balls of
successive set points of Ai. A global set point is deﬁned as a collection of the local set points for
each of the N agents, and is denoted as SN .
We are interested in two properties of the system, safety and progress. Safety is deﬁned in terms
of a predicate PS and the progress property is deﬁned in terms of a global set point SNfinal. The
system's goal is for each agent to reach within an -ball around its set point in SNfinal, while keeping
PS as an invariant.
2.2.2 Compatibility and Stability
As we have shown in Section 2.1, for safety the central coordinator needs to reason about future
states of Ai, and will therefore issue set points according to what states Ai can reach. Reasoning
about future states of Ai can be done using reachability analysis. We denote Reachi[k] as the set of
reachable state of Ai under trajectory τi[k]. The reachable set of the global system (the composed
behavior of all the agents) is denoted as ReachN . For safety of the system, we need to verify that
ReachN satisﬁes the safety predicate PS . Recall that a trajectory τi[k] of Ai depends on two set
points, Si[k − 1] and Si[k], of Ai. For a speciﬁc set point Si[k], we check whether PS remains true
over the composed ReachN [k] by computing the reachable set of states for each of the other agents.
This property of safety for a new global set point captures the a notion of compatible actions.
Deﬁnition SN [k] and SN [k + 1] are said to be pairwise compatible actions if the global state
xN ∈ ReachN [k] always satisﬁes PS when every Ai moves along a trajectory deﬁned by Si[k] and
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Si[k + 1].
The notion of compatible actions can also be generalized to n-way compatible actions. That is,
given n collections of set points, we can say they are n-way compatible if the global state always
satisﬁes PS when every agent moves along a trajectory deﬁned by any pair of the set points. Due
the extra requirements, however, it is generally easier to construct chains of pairwise compatible
actions. For this paper we will use pairwise compatibility, and perhaps investigate applications of
n-way compatible action chains in future research.
For compatible set point synthesis and compatibility veriﬁcation, computing the reach set given
the two global set points is crucial. We consider two ways of computing the reach set or its over-
approximation: (1) direct computation using a hybrid system model checker, and (2) overapprox-
imation which leverages the local controller's stability guarantee. Direct computation is the pre-
ferred approach for checking for compatible actions, however this computation can often become
intractable. We therefore elaborate on the second approach which provides an overapproximation
of the reach set.
In many application of embedded systems, a controller is designed to be locally exponentially
stable with respect to a given set point.
Deﬁnition A controller is said to be locally exponentially stable with respect to a set point,
if there exist a neighborhood of the set point such that any trajectories starting from any state in
a neighborhood of the set point, eventually converge to the set point. In addition, the distance
between the trajectory and the set point decays exponentially over time.
The neighborhood is also called the region of attraction, which deﬁnes the maximum region from
where the set point will be reached. Even though the distance between a trajectory and a set point
is exponentially decaying, the set point may never be reached exactly in a ﬁnite amount of time.
However, any -ball around the set point will be guaranteed to be reached in ﬁnite time. We next
show how the stability property of the controller can help to compute an overapproximation of
reachable set.
According to the Lyapunov inverse theorem [10], if a controller of agent Ai is locally exponentially
stable with respect to a set point Si, there exist a Lyapunov function Vi such that (i) Vi is continuous,
(ii) Vi has value 0 only at the set point and is positive anywhere else, (iii) along any trajectory of
agent i in the region of attraction, Vi is decreasing.
We deﬁne sublevel set of function V as Lc(V ) = {x ∈ dom(V )|V (x) ≤ c}, which is a subset of the
domain of function V over which the value of the function is bounded by a constant c. By (iii), along
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any trajectory τi[k], denote x0 be the ﬁrst state of this trajectory, the value of Vi should not exceed
Vi(x0). Thus, the future states should remain inside the sublevel set LVi(x0)(Vi) of the Lyapunov
function Vi. Then we can use the sublevel set of Lyapunov function as an overapproximation of the
reach set of Ai.
We denote Li[k] as the sublevel set contains trajectory τi[k]. Recall that the sublevel set is
determined by the function Vi and value Vi(x0). Notice that (i) Vi is determined by Si[k], and (ii)
the initial state of τi[k] is determined by the previous set point Si[k−1]. Therefore, a useful property
of Li[k] is that it depends only on the set points being sent to Ai. From properties (i) and (ii) of
Lyapunov functions, by choosing Si[k] close enough to Si[k−1], the set Li[k] can be made arbitrarily
small. This property provides us with an important method to help design chains of compatible
actions.
Compatible Action Chain Algorithm. One approach to creating a compatible action chain
is as follows. Start with an action chain consisting of just the initial set point and ﬁnal goal set point.
Check if the two set points are compatible. If not, create an intermediate set point between the two.
By the reasoning above, the computed reach set will become smaller. By recursively splitting pairs
of set points, the reach sets can be made smaller and smaller, which increases the chance that the
pair of global set points will satisfy the safety predicate PS and therefore be a pair-wise compatible
action.
This method, however, may not always converge to ﬁnd a compatible action chain in a ﬁnite
number of steps. If it does converge, though, it solves the key problem to guaranteeing progress
(constructing chains of pairwise compatible actions) in an automated manner.
2.2.3 Safety Guaranteed Run-time Checking
We assume low-level controllers which are locally exponentially stable, starting from a safe global
set point.
We will now formally state the behavior of the supervisory control logic:
(1) Until receiving progress report updates from all the agents, indicating that each agent is
within an -ball of the current way point SN [k], the central coordinator will not send any new set
points.
(2) The server computes a new set of set point SN [k + 1] following conditions below, and issues
them to the corresponding agents.
(2a) The global set point SN [k + 1] should be compatible with the global set point SN [k]. That
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Figure 2.4: An execution trace in which Aireceives set points Si[k − 1], Si[k], and Si[k + 1] in
sequence.
is, the reach set or its overapproximation does not violate the predicate PS .
(2b) For each agent, the -ball of its way point in Si[k] should be contained by the region of
attraction of its way point in Si[k + 1], to guarantee that the next set point will be reached by the
low-level controller.
We now prove that safety predicate PS is an invariant of the system, using the theorem from
Section 2.1.
(1) If all packets get dropped at the beginning, the way points never change and PS remains
true.
(2) Suppose that after a packet get delivered, all follow-up packets get dropped. The server will
stop sending new set points since not all reports are received. No agent will further update its set
point since the coordinator will not send any new set points. Agent i's states will be remain in the
pair-wise compatible reach set, for the current way point, forever. By pair-wise compatibility, PS
will remain true.
By (1) and (2), we conclude that PS is an invariant of the system.
2.2.4 Progress Property
We will now discuss a suﬃcient condition to guarantee system progress. Formally, we want the
system reach a target global set point SNfinal in some ﬁnite amount of time.
To guarantee progress, we require three assumptions. First, messages in the network can only
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get delayed arbitrarily long, but can not be dropped. For this assumption we will use automaton
Cstrong, as described in Section 2.1.2. In practice, this can be done by having a low-level network
layer which keeps resending packets until an acknowledgement is received, assuming the connection
will eventually get reestablished. Second, there is a ﬁnite chain of pairwise compatible actions from
the current state to the target global set point SNfinal. Third, the local controllers for each agent are
exponentially stable for each set point in the compatible action chain.
We will now prove that the system AN ||Cstrong meets our progress requirement. Recall that
agent Ai's execution is a hybrid trace ηi = waiti[0] y receive[1] y τi[1] y send y waiti[1] y
receive[2] y τi[2] y send y waiti[2] . . . . First, τi[k] is a trajectory starting from an -ball of
Si[k − 1] to an -ball of the Si[k]. Since we assumed the local controller is exponentially stable, the
distance between the continuous state of Ai and the set point is exponentially decaying. Thus, any
-ball of the set point will be reached in a ﬁnite time. Second, a send action through Cstrong takes
ﬁnite delivery time to invoke a receive action of the coordinator. Since this is true for all agents, the
coordinator will receive all the reports of progress in a ﬁnite time. At this point the next set point
will be sent back to Ai. This sending also takes a ﬁnite time since it is done by Cstrong. Due to
this, the waiti[k] trajectory where Ai is waiting for a new way point has a ﬁnite duration. Finally,
since by assumption the chain of pair-wise compatible actions is ﬁnite, the target SNfinal is reachable
through ﬁnitely many of these steps. By this reasoning, we conclude that the execution of ηi will
reach SNfinal in a ﬁnite amount of time.
2.3 Case Study: Coordinated Vehicle Flocking
In this section, we describe a vehicle coordination case study, where a single operator controls
multiple vehicles over wireless. This is inspired by experimental oﬀ-road agriculture vehicle systems
currently being investigated [11]. Many agriculture tasks, such as plowing, seeding, and harvesting,
require a vehicle, or a ﬂeet of vehicles, to perform a covering of the ﬁeld. By using automation, the
operating cost of such a system can be reduced since less people are required to run the equipment.
Additionally, productivity and eﬃciency may also be improved since GPS-provided actuation may
be more precise than what humans would achieve on their own, and since a large number of vehicles
can be used at a time.
However, since vehicles need to use wireless in order to exchange control commands, care needs
to be taken to show that this unreliable component can not cause, for example, collisions. This
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(a) Desired Paths (b) Potential for Collisions
Figure 2.5: After entering a detour point (red circle) the desired paths (dotted lines in (a)) are
generated for each vehicle. If we naively sent the desired paths as a command update to each
vehicle, collisions could occur in the case of a packet drop, as seen in (b).
imposes a challenge since, with unreliable communication, coming to a consensus among all the
vehicles is generally not possible.
We consider the following system. A group of autonomous vehicles travel in formation along
a path. The operator in the center vehicle can, at run-time, attempt to modify the ﬂock's route
by inputting a point into the supervisory control logic, called a detour point. The new, desired
path takes the ﬂock to the detour point, and then back again to the original path, maintaining
the formation. Multiple detour points can be entered during operation. A simple case showing the
potential danger in such a system is shown in Figure 2.5. Here, the detour point is shown as a red
circle. If packets are lost, there are four potential locations where a collision can occur.
In the rest of this section, we will exploit the approaches described in the previous sections in
order to create the supervisory control logic for such a system with the following guarantees:
• Vehicles do not collide with each other under packet loss or arbitrary packet delays.
• Despite packet losses or delays, all the vehicles end up in a pre-agreed location called Pfinal.
• The ﬂock formation of the vehicles is maintained.
The central coordinator logic is physically on one of the vehicles which we call the leader. The
leader is in charge of interacting with the operator, and generates control commands for each of the
followers to be sent over wireless.
As described in Section 2.2, rather than immediately sending the ﬁnal path to the followers, the
leader will generate intermediate paths that are pairwise compatible and incrementally get closer
to the desired path, as shown in Figure 2.6. In this way, wireless can be lost at any time and the
system will remain safe, whereas if the wireless network works, the desired path will eventually be
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(a) interPath[1] (b) interPath[2]
(c) interPath[3] (d) interPath[4]
Figure 2.6: A compatible action chain is shown for a pair of vehicles. Dotted paths are the new
paths that are generated and solid paths are the ones whose progress update has already been sent.
Notice that in each ﬁgure, whether the vehicle takes the existing path or the new path, collisions
are avoided.
reached.
Every time new paths are generated by the leader, the Command Filter Safeguard will check
the reachable region of each vehicle. Here, the reachable states for a vehicle are all the points that
the vehicle can reach after it receives this new path. It therefore not only includes the new path of
the vehicle, but also all the area in between the old path and new path that the vehicle might enter
during the transition from the old path to new path. Once this region is calculated for each vehicle,
if there is no intersection between the reachable regions, all the new paths can be sent out. If this
check is false, we apply the method mentioned at the end of Section 2.2.2, where we generate a new
intermediate path that is closer to the original path of the vehicles, and rerun the checks.
This method provides safety because no matter if the new path is received or dropped for any of
the followers, the ﬂock not collide because all the possible regions that the vehicle can reach were
included in the reachable set and already checked for safety. At every step, the intermediate paths
that are generated for the followers will be sent out only if all the progress update reports from all
the other followers for all the previous paths have been received. As long as there is a vehicle that
has not sent the progress update, the leader will keep sending the same path to the vehicle which
has yet to report it is on the new path.
Next, we will forgo providing a formal automaton description of the leader and followers, and will
instead give the technical details for the generation of a compatible action chain which can guarantee
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progress while preserving safety. We ﬁrst describe the generation of the desired path (which goes
through the detour point), and then the computation of intermediate paths that form a pairwise
compatible action chain to reach the desired path.
2.3.1 Desired Path Generation
Upon receiving a new detour point from operator, the leader will generate desiredPathi which is a
path from the current position of the vehicle i to the detour point and back from the detour point
to the original path, which ends at the original endpoint Pfinal. For instance, the last path in the
Figure 2.6 generated for the leader and follower is their desired path. In our implementation, we
generate Bezier curves [12] to give a smooth path that transitions from the original path, touches
the detour point, and then smoothly transitions back to the original path.
2.3.2 Intermediate Path Generation
After generating the desired path for each vehicle, the leader can not generally send this path directly
to followers because, similar to the situation in Figure 2.5, the current paths and the desired paths
are not compatible. Therefore, we use a method similar to the one described near the end of Section
2.2.2 to generate a chain of compatible intermediate paths, formally described below.
The path desiredPathi consists of n segments with n + 1 way points in which desiredPathi[0]
is the current position of follower fi, desiredPathi[n] is the original endpoint Pfinal, and one of
the way points of this path equals to newly-entered detour point (or more strictly the point in the
formation where follower i should be when the leader reaches the detour point). When the leader is
to send out a new path, each follower will be following its current path, denoted by currentPathi
which also consists of n segments and n + 1 way points. Given this, a set of lines can connect
each way point on the current path with the corresponding way point on the desired path. We
deﬁne these lines as Li[0] to Li[n] such that for 0 ≤ p ≤ n, Li[p].startPoint = currentPathi[p] and
Li[p].endPoint = desiredPathi[p].
With these deﬁnitions, in order to generate the the kth way point on the mth intermediate path
for follower i, called interPathi[m][k], we take the following incremental approach: interPathi[m+
1][k] = Li[k].start+weight∗ (Li[k].end−Li[k].start) where weight ∈ [0, 1] is the size of incremental
step. By making the weight closer to 0, we can make the intermediate path is closer to the original
path. For maintenance of the formation, we could start with a lower weight value to make sure the
formation is not aﬀected too severely if some of the vehicles receive the new path and some do not.
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Figure 2.7: After new detour points are entered with the mouse (red dot), convergence of the ﬂock
can be observed in the simulator. The paths of each of the followers are shown in grey, the leaders
path is red, and the desired path of the leader is in orange.
Once interPathi[m+1] is calculated, we compute reachi[m], which is the reach set for follower i
upon receiving the path update. Alternatively, we could have used the Lyapunov function approach
described in Section 2.2.2 which would need information about the low-level controller used by the
followers. The reach set, assuming a controller which moves between way points exactly, is deﬁned
as the area between the current follower path and the potential new path (which includes all the
transitions from the old paths to the new paths), bloated by the size of the vehicle. If ∀i, j ∈ [0, n] and
i 6= j: Reachi[m+1] is compatible with Reachj [m], then interPathi[m+1] can be sent to follower i
as the new path. Otherwise the incremental step is decremented by taking weight := 0.9∗weight and
interPathi[m+1] is recalculated. This iterative recalculation will happen until an interPathi[m+1]
with a compatible Reachi[m+1] is found, or a maximum number of trials is reached which indicates
a chain of compatible actions could not be found.
The Reachi[m + 1] sets that are computed after calculations of interPathi[m + 1] are only
valid if all the followers have already received interPathi[m]. This is why the leader will only send
interPathi[m+ 1] to the followers if a progress update message for interPathi[m] has already been
received from each vehicle. If this is not true, the leader will not generate any new paths and will
keep retransmitting the current paths until a progress update is received from all vehicles.
2.3.3 Implementation
We have implemented the described algorithm on the mobile robot simulator for the StarL platform
[13]. StarL is a Java-based programming library for developing mobile robotics applications to
control Roomba robots communicating over WiFi. It includes a simulator that runs identical robot
logic code, but with simulated dynamics and network delays and drops.
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Figure 2.8: The ﬂock formation can not be safely guaranteed if the turn is too sharp, so the algorithm
prioritizes safety over progress, and will not converge to the desired path (orange).
The implementation consists of about 1300 lines of code on top of the base StarL platform,
including both the logic for the leader and the followers. In the simulator, the user can use the
mouse to click in the environment to enter new detour points. Since the StarL simulator is actually
transmitting packets with delays, the progress of the compatible action chains can be seen in real-
time. An example of this is shown in Figure 2.7.
We initially believed that the third progress property (a ﬁnite chain of pairwise compatible
actions) would always be true. However, we discovered in the simulator that it could actually
become false when the curve of the desired paths was sharper than the turning radius of the vehicle
ﬂock while in formation. If the another intermediate path was sent out, there would be potential
for collisions. However, due to our checks, no incompatible intermediate path was sent out in this
case, preserving safety. An example of this case is show in Figure 2.8.
We have prepared a video showing the execution of our algorithm on the StarL simulator [14].
2.4 Related Work
Networked control systems have been employed in a variety of industrial automation applications.
Recently, industrial wireless protocols and products have been developed as replacements for wired
control systems [15, 16]. These were made not only to reduce costs due to materials (wiring), instal-
lation and wire maintenance, but also provide beneﬁts in ﬂexibility by allowing easy modiﬁcation to
the existing communication infrastructure. One beneﬁt of using these solutions is that they strive
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to reduce (but can not eliminate) problems arising from communication delay and packetloss when
wireless is used in industrial control systems.
Rather than sending control commands inside messages, a diﬀerent approach to robustness with
wireless control systems is to perform control computation using linear combinations of the states of
neighboring nodes in a graph topology, where the neighbors will communicate using the unreliable
wireless channels [17]. This was applied to multiple-input multiple-output systems and shown to
be robust to limited failures of both communication channels and nodes. This approach provides
graceful degradation of the control algorithm as the communication breaks down, but will not solve
problems due to bugs in the high-level algorithm.
The Simplex Architecture [18] was developed as an approach to increase system safety for individ-
ual Linear Time Invariant (LTI) control systems, by ﬁltering commands from an untrusted controller
and switching over to a safe backup mode. This approach can compliment the one presented in this
paper, by providing safety in the low-level controllers in a CPS architecture [19].
A network extension of Simplex has also recently been developed [20]. This work extended the
Simplex approach to Linear Parameter Varying (LPV) systems, and incorporated network delays
into the design. However, the analysis requires having a ﬁxed upper bound on communication delay
with no packetloss, which can not be guaranteed under wireless communication. Our guarantees of
safety and progress hold without a ﬁxed upper bound on communication delay, and, in the case of
safety, we allow unrestricted packetloss to occur.
The described approach draws inspiration from the NASS framework developed to provide safety
for medical systems communicating over wireless[21]. This system uses discrete dynamics with formal
safety properties in a supervisory control system over wireless. Each command message includes
a backup command vector, which is used if no further commands arrive. A safety ﬁlter provides
protection from faults in the high-level control. This ﬁlter needs to reason about the worst-case
packet delivery combinations, which in the case of the considered discrete system involves model-
checking the possible combinations of packet reception and agent states. In our approach, we use a
more control-oriented approach to providing safety and progress which allows for continuous state
variables, and provide a method to help construct pair-wise compatible chains to guarantee progress.
Runtime approaches have been considered to create veriﬁed systems [22]. In this work, a time-
bounded reachability computation is performed during system operation in order to determine if a
controller should be disengaged. The advantage of this is approach is, since at runtime some of the
variables are known, only a smaller state space needs to be considered. This is also the argument
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we make when advocating the design of the Command Filter Safeguard.
For partially synchronous systems, where messages get bounded nondeterministic delays or
dropped, a suﬃcient condition for verifying convergence properties has been established [23]. The
suﬃcient conditions require that (i) messages get delivered inﬁnitely often and (ii) there exist some
invariant neighborhood topology of the system satisfying a Lyapunov-type property.
For asynchronous distributed systems, where messages get nondeterministic but bounded delay,
a static approach for reasoning about the convergence of an asynchronous system has been proposed
[24]. The approach shows that under under some additional assumptions about the shape of the
sublevel sets of the Lyapunov function, if convergence occurs in perfect communication, where mes-
sages get delivered instantly without dropping, convergence will also occur in the the corresponding
synchronous system.
2.5 Conclusions and Future Work
In this chapter, we have described an approach to increase resilience in a cyber-physical system
from errors in the high-level control logic. Our approach, selectively dropping packets in order to
maintain a safety invariant, is general and powerful, but comes at the cost of performing run-time
checks to decide which packets need to be dropped. We have proven a theorem which states the exact
condition that needs to be checked at run-time, in order to design the Command Filter Safeguard
component.
Furthermore, we have used the notion of chains of pair-wise compatible actions to provide
progress guarantees under a more reliable network layer. The challenge with this approach is the
application-speciﬁc task of creating a ﬁnite chain of actions, which take the system from its current
state to the goal state. We have provided an algorithm to help in constructing these chains.
As future work, we may investigate extending our progress mechanism from pair-ware compatible
action chains to N-way compatible action chains, which N consecutive actions of a chain can be sent
out without requiring the supervisory controller to wait for a progress conﬁrmation message. The
challenge with this direction is that it may be harder to construct an N-way compatible action chain,
and it would need to be justiﬁed by an application which requires the extra ﬂexibility.
We also believe our approach can be made applicable to hard real-time systems communicating
over an unreliable network. Assuming there are synchronized clocks across the distributed system,
we can include a timeout for each command message that is sent. If the command is received before
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the timeout it will be acted upon, otherwise it will not. The guarantee provided would be that
any command sent over the network will only be acted upon if it arrives within some time bound.
This could be used, for example, in a traﬃc control system for intelligent intersections [25], where
an autonomous car may be provided with a window of time during which it is allowed to enter
the intersection. If the network delays this command too much, the car will not try to enter the
intersection, and instead wait for a new command to be issued from the supervisory control logic.
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Chapter 3
Node Aﬀordability using
Commercial-Oﬀ-the-Shelf
Components
We now look further into the design of the individual nodes of the cyber-physical system. These
nodes are computing systems which directly sense and actuate the physical world. In this sense,
they are commonly embedded computing systems with real-time constraints. Real-time constraints
mean that the computation done on the nodes needs to be not only correct, but also occur with
guaranteed timeliness.
In this chapter, we will focus on the problem of aﬀordability in the implementation of real-time
computing systems. In order to reduce costs, we propose an approach which makes use of commercial
oﬀ-the-shelf (COTS) components.
Commercial oﬀ-the-shelf computer software and hardware are often not only more aﬀordable
and perform than their custom-made counterparts, but also generally have better performance. For
example, an inexpensive PCI Express bus [26] can transfer data three orders of magnitude faster
than the expensive real-time SAFEbus [27]. Unfortunately, COTS components are typically designed
paying little or no attention to worst-case timing guarantees required by real-time systems. Modern
COTS-based embedded systems include multiple active components (such as CPU cores and I/O
peripherals) that can independently initiate access to shared resources (like memory), which, in the
worst case, cause contention which leads to a lack of timing predictability.
Computing precise bounds on timing delays due to this contention is diﬃcult. Even though some
existing approaches [28, 29]can produce safe upper bounds, they need to be very pessimistic due
to the unpredictable behavior of arbiters of physically shared resources (like caches, memories, and
buses). As a motivating example, we have previously shown that the computation time of a task
can increase linearly with the number of suﬀered cache misses due to contention for access to main
memory [30]. In a system with three active components, for example, a memory-intensive task's
worst-case computation time can nearly triple.
Here, we propose minimal additions to COTS systems and modiﬁcations to current practice, in
order to make systems satisfy real-time computation requirements. The key idea for the approaches
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in this chapter is that, in order take advantage the high average-case performance of COTS com-
ponents without occasionally experiencing long delays being suﬀered by real-time tasks, we need to
control the operating point of each shared resource and maintain it below saturation limits. Since
COTS arbiters are typically work-conserving (meaning if there is a request pending they will grant
it), avoiding saturation will avoid the non-real-time behavior of these arbiters.
Our implementations in this chapter, however, should be regarded as prototypes. For deployment
applications, for example, one would not use FGPA development boards as we did. There is also
some eﬀort to be expected in order to apply the proposed approaches; they are not instant solutions
which make oﬀ-the-shelf components behave in a real-time manner. The fundamental techniques
that we investigate, however, are shown to be applicable to oﬀ-the-shelf hardware and software.
This chapter will elaborate on two approaches for making COTS systems more predictable,
organized as follows:
• First, we will discuss the Real-Time I/O Management System [3, 31], which manages peripheral
access to a shared memory in order to prevent contention both on the bus and at the memory
controller (Section 3.1).
• Second, we will describe the PRedictable Execution Model (PREM), which can prevent con-
tention between the CPU core and peripherals, as well as among CPU cores in a multicore
system with a shared memory (Section 3.2).
3.1 Real-Time I/O Management System
Before describing the Real-Time I/O Management System, we ﬁrst describe the way in which a
COTS system typically works. A COTS system may include several commercial peripherals, such
as video acquisition boards or network cards, plugged into standard buses, such as PCI or PCIe, on
a commercial motherboard. Data from these boards travels through a series of bridges and buses
(the speciﬁcs depend on the model of the motherboard), until it reaches main memory, where the
CPU can read it through the Front Side Bus (FSB). Alternatively, the CPU could write data into
main memory and instruct the COTS peripherals to retrieve it. For example, a network card could
be instructed to upload packets which are stored in RAM.
Our proposed Real-Time I/O Management System, shown in context in Figure 3.1, adds two
types of components to the existing COTS system. The ﬁrst type is called the reservation controller,
which implements the system-wide policy for accessing the bus. It can be thought of as a high-
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Figure 3.1: The proposed Real-Time I/O Management System adds a reservation controller and
real-time bridges to the COTS-based node.
level arbiter which instructs the real-time bridges to either communicate on the bus, or yield to
other devices. The other type of component we introduce is called a real-time bridge, which is
interposed between each peripheral and the communication bus. Each real-time bridge provides
the actuation mechanism to enforce peripheral bus access. For rapid development, we implemented
both of these components in hardware on ﬁeld programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), although an
industrial application would likely use an Application Speciﬁc Integrated Circuit (ASIC).
We describe the design of the reservation controller and the design of the real-time bridge, re-
spectively, in Section 3.1.1 and Section 3.1.2. Then, in Section 3.1.3 we demonstrate the eﬀectiveness
of the approach with bus-level traces of the implementation in operation.
3.1.1 Reservation Controller
Multiple peripherals must cooperate to prevent a timeliness reduction caused by mutual interfer-
ence while accessing a shared memory. The reservation controller centralizes decision making and
coordinates multiple real-time bridges by instructing them to either forward or buﬀer peripheral
traﬃc. Presently, we consider each peripheral as generating a single real-time I/O ﬂow. If we
were to allow multiple COTS peripherals to simultaneously access main memory we would have an
eﬀectively unpredictable bandwidth allocation (with a pessimistic bound), which is unacceptable
for real-time computation. For this reason, we allow only a single real-time bridge to transmit at
any one time. Therefore, we can consider the time allocated among all real-time bridges by the
reservation controller as a shared resource akin to a monoprocessor CPU. In this analogy, each I/O
ﬂow is equivalent to a real-time task, and each I/O data chunk in the ﬂow is equivalent to a job;
transfer times for I/O data chunks are equated to computation times and can typically be derived
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block0 := ¬(data_rdy0)
block1 := ¬(block0 ∧ data_rdy1)
block2 := ¬(block0 ∧ block1 ∧ data_rdy2)
block3 := ¬(block0 ∧ block1 ∧ block2 ∧ data_rdy3)
Figure 3.2: These logical expressions, implemented in hardware on the reservation controller, provide
a static-priority I/O scheduler for a four-peripheral system.
by dividing the I/O data amount by the achievable throughput of the real-time bridge.
Coordination between the reservation controller and each real-time bridge is achieved using two
physical wires. Each real-time bridge communicates one boolean value, data_rdy, to the reservation
controller. This value indicates that data is buﬀered and ready to be sent on the bus. In turn, the
reservation controller sends one boolean value back to the real-time bridge, block, which instructs
the bridge to either block I/O traﬃc or permit bus access. Real-time bridges instructed to block do
not attempt to gain access to the bus, mandating the bus arbiter grants the unblocked peripherals
access to the bus to send their data.
With only these two signals, many kinds of bus scheduling policies can be enforced. Consider, for
example, scheduling four real-time bridges according to a static-priority bus scheduling scheme, such
as rate monotonic (RM). Let blocki be the block command sent to the ith real-time bridge, and let
data_rdyi be the indicator of buﬀered data coming from the ith real-time bridge. Let the bridges
be physically connected to the reservation controller in the order of their priorities (in the order of
their rates for RM), from the highest priority bridge, i = 0, to the lowest priority bridge, i = 3.
In order to provide static-priority scheduling on the I/O bus, the reservation controller hardware
would implement the logical expressions in Code Block 3.2.
This setup, however, can also support a large class of monoprocessor scheduling algorithms which
handle sporadic and aperiodic tasks using real-time servers [32]. In our prototype, for instance, we
have implemented support for sporadic servers [33] under ﬁxed-priority scheduling. Notice that the
servers are implemented on the reservation controller and not on the associated real-time bridges.
This decision has two major advantages. First, it removes the need for precise clock synchronization
among real-time bridges and the reservation controller. Since all scheduling servers use the same
physical clock, server budgets can be precisely calculated without clock skew. Second, it simpliﬁes
the interface between each real-time bridge and the reservation controller by reducing the number of
physical wires to just two, data_rdy and block. This becomes a concern for algorithms like EDF,
where each server must communicate a precise deadline timestamp to the scheduling algorithm,
which requires dozens of bits of information. By centralizing all scheduling servers on the reservation
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en t i t y spo ra t i c_se rve r i s g en e r i c
(
PERIOD : i n t e g e r := 1000 ; −− microseconds
EXECUTION_TIME : i n t e g e r := 500 ; −− microseconds
CLOCK_FREQUENCY : i n t e g e r := 100000000; −− her tz
MINIMUM_EXECUTION_TIME : i n t e g e r := 20 ; −− microseconds
CEIL_OF_LOG_BASE_2_OF_PERIOD : i n t e g e r := 10 ; −− r e s t o r e r e g i s t e r data s i z e
EXECUTION_TIME_DIVIDED_BY_MINIMUM_EXECUTION_TIME_PLUS_ONE : i n t e g e r := 51 ;
CEIL_OF_LOG_BASE_2_OF_EXECUTION_TIME_DIVIDED_BY_MINIMUM_EXECUTION_TIME_PLUS_ONE :
i n t e g e r := 6 −− determines number o f r e s t o r e r e g i s t e r s ( address s i z e )
) ;
port
(
c l o ck : in s td_log i c ;
h igher_pr io r i ty_execut ing : in s td_log i c ;
sb_data_ready : in s td_log i c ;
s o f t_r e s e t : in s td_log i c ;
sb_block : out s td_log i c := '1 ' −− block by de f au l t
) ;
end spo ra t i c_se rve r ;
Figure 3.3: The sporadic server VHDL code is parametrized based on the desired minimum execution
time, which determines the amount of registers needed to store the server's replenishment times.
controller, the number of physical wires is reduced, simplifying the electrical design.
One implementation consideration is on implementing a sporadic server algorithm in hardware.
A sporadic server will consume the server's budget when an aperiodic task is active. Then, after the
server period elapses measured from the beginning of the task activation, the budget is replenished
by the amount that was consumed. This means that the replenishment times and replenishment
amounts must be stored somewhere. In addition, theoretically there are no restrictions on the
amount of execution performed by the aperiodic task. For example, in one millisecond, an aperiodic
task could be activated 10000 times and executes  time units each activation, requiring the storage
of 10000 replenishment times during that millisecond. This was overcome in the implementation by
enforcing a minimum execution time per peripheral, where access is granted to the bus for at least
that amount of time, regardless of if the peripheral uses the entire time slice or not. The sporadic
server in our implementation had a granularity of one microsecond, and VHDL generics were used
to select the minimum execution time which determined the amount of memory that would need
to be synthesized to store the replenishment times and amounts (as well as the server period and
execution time). The VHDL entity description, which shows the generics of the component as well
as the I/O interface is shown in Figure 3.3.
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Figure 3.4: The ML455 can be interposed between the PCI-X bus and a PCI-X peripheral.
3.1.2 Real-Time Bridge
In order to provide real-time guarantees on bus communication, bus access must be controlled
according to the policy dictated by the reservation controller. Since oﬀ-the-shelf peripherals are
unlikely to have such a mechanism built-in, we interpose a device between each peripheral and the
bus in order to provide this functionality to our real-time I/O management system. In addition to
restricting bus access, real-time bridges also provide an important additional service to connected
peripherals. Each real-time bridge provides a buﬀer which is able to store pending traﬃc while bus
access is prohibited. This allows high-bandwidth peripherals to be blocked from the bus for relatively
long periods of time without suﬀering from data loss due to full internal buﬀers on the COTS
peripheral. Combined with a communication guarantee provided by the reservation controller's
scheduling policy, this guarantees the I/O system will deliver all communication traﬃc by its I/O
deadline.
We envision a general real-time bridge using a setup similar to the ML455 [34], an FPGA
development platform which can be directly interposed between a COTS bus and a COTS peripheral.
As shown in Figure 3.4, this device contains both a PCI-X edge connector and a PCI-X socket slot
connected to the same Virtex 4 FPGA chip, which would allow various types of peripherals to use
the exact same real-time bridge if they have a PCI-X edge connector.
However, in order to rapidly develop a complete prototype, we focused our eﬀort on a real-
time bridge for one speciﬁc peripheral. We targeted a network interface card on the ML505 FPGA
Evaluation Platform [35]. This device features both an Ethernet hardware interface, as well as a
one-lane PCIe edge connector both connected to the same Virtex 5 FPGA chip. We now describe
the hardware components of the System-on-Chip (SoC) design.
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Figure 3.5: Our real-time bridge prototype is a System-on-Chip implemented on the ML505 FPGA
Evaluation Platform.
A logical outline of the important hardware components in the network interface card version
of the real-time bridge is shown in Figure 3.5. We now describe each of these in the order of the
dataﬂow through the real-time bridge during normal operation. Consider the case where a packet
arrives through the Ethernet connection.
First, the physical hardware interacts with theTri-state Ethernet MAC (TEMAC) hardware
block. This is a ﬁxed hardware block on the FPGA, and is the COTS peripheral that the real-time
bridge is managing. This block maintains a set of memory addresses where to place packets after
they are received. After the packet arrives to the TEMAC, it gets stored into the FPGA DRAM
and an interrupt is raised to the Microblaze Soft CPU[36] which provides information on where
the packet was stored and the size of the received data. The Microblaze processor is a soft CPU,
meaning that is implemented using the reconﬁgurable logic on the FPGA. We developed a driver
running on the Microblaze that will take the addresses and lengths of the packets and put them
into a download queue of data to be sent to the main system. This queue exists in two parts. The
potentially long tail of the queue is stored in software, whereas a bounded number of entries (say 128)
of the front of the queue are stored in hardware on the Bridge DMA Engine. The Bridge DMA
Engine, which is a hardware block we created speciﬁcally for the real-time bridge, manages actually
moving the data out of FPGA DRAM and transferring it into the host CPU's main memory. Along
with the queue of data needing to be transferred, the Bridge DMA Engine manages the block and
data_rdy signals on the real-time bridge. When block is asserted, the Bridge DMA Engine will not
transfer data out of FPGA memory. The data_rdy signal is asserted whenever any data is in the
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hardware queue. The DMA transfers themselves are abstracted as an address to address copy on the
Processor Local Bus (PLB). The PLB / PCIe Bridge handles the process of translating a write
transaction on the PLB bus to a write transaction on the PCIe bus. When the Bridge DMA Engine
is unblocked by the reservation controller and performs a DMA operation, the memory containing
the packet in FPGA DRAM is copied into the Host DRAM. After the transaction is complete,
an interrupt is raised on the Host CPU, which then takes the packet data and passes it to the
network stack for processing.
Sending packets out from the main CPU works in a similar way, but in the reverse order. The
main CPU stores the packet data in Host DRAM and then writes the addresses to an upload queue
which resides both in software as well as on the Bridge DMA Engine. When the Bridge DMA
Engine is unblocked, it transfers the packets from Host RAM into FPGA DRAM (the PCI / PLB
Bridge will again do address translation) and raises an interrupt to the Microblaze Soft Processor.
Our driver on the Microblaze then sends the TEMAC hardware block the addresses and lengths of
the packet data in FPGA DRAM. Finally, the TEMAC hardware sends the data over the physical
Ethernet medium.
An important detail of this implementation is that the (comparatively) slow Microblaze processor
does minimal processing (working with only the addresses and lengths) and no copying of the
potentially high-bandwidth packet data. This allows our prototype implementation to achieve a
network throughput of about 100 Mbps for upload and 80 Mbps for download, which coincides
closely with Xilinx's TEMAC performance benchmarks for our setup (ML505, 125 MHz Microblaze,
1500 byte Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU)) [37]. Performance could be further improved by
using a larger MTU. Additionally, without the Microblaze bottleneck, the Bridge DMA Engine
hardware was able to send data at 207 MBps, which approaches the theoretical limit of a single lane
PCIe connection (250 MBps).
It is worth noticing that the proposed real-time I/O management system introduces additional
latency compared with a COTS peripheral directly connected to the PCIe bus. This is one tradeoﬀ
that is made in order to provide control of peripheral bus access. We ran an experiment to get
an idea of the eﬀect of this additional latency by sending ping packets to the main CPU through
our real-time I/O management system (with the real-time bridge scheduled as the highest-priority
sporadic server) and sending ping packets directly to the FGPA's PetaLinux OS. Surprisingly, the
packet round-trip times through our bus scheduling prototype (2.40ms) were actually lower than the
round-trip times for the packets processed immediately on the FPGA's processor (2.62ms). Hence,
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it is faster to place the packet data in the Bridge DMA Server, assert data_rdy to the reservation
controller, wait for the block signal to be deasserted, receive access to the PCIe bus from the bus
arbiter, transmit the data into Host DRAM, process the ping on the host's 2.66 GHz CPU, and
reverse the entire process for the ping response, than to handle the ping packet directly on the slower
125 MHz Microblaze processor. This experiment demonstrates the eﬃciency of our implementation.
3.1.3 Evaluation
There are two goals for our evaluation of the Real-Time I/O Management System. First, we show
that there is a problem using COTS interconnect when a system has real-time requirements. We
present an I/O task set which results in I/O deadline misses when run on a standard COTS bus.
Next, we run the same I/O task set within our scheduling framework, and show that all deadlines
are met. This demonstrates the non-real-time nature of COTS interconnect, and validates the
correctness of our solution.
Performing direct measurements on a high performance COTS I/O system such as PCIe is
diﬃcult. The PCIe protocol implements point-to-point connections between each peripheral and
the rest of the system running at the very high clock speed of 2.5 Ghz, making it hard to directly
observe. In order to make the most accurate measurements, we instread used dedicated hardware on
the reservation controller. Our trace acquisition hardware module polls the state of the data_rdy
and block signals with a one microsecond resolution. Any changes in these signals, along with an
associated timestamp, are output over the reservation controller ML505's serial port where they can
be received by an external computer for processing. Even this is not always fast enough, since events
can be generated faster than they can be output over the serial port. If the send buﬀer in the debug
hardware gets full, an error message is printed instead of sending misleading data. The internal
buﬀers can also be reset over the serial port from the external computer, restarting communication
of trace events.
We performed experiments on a COTS PC platform with an Intel 975X system controller (north-
bridge). The selected motherboard has four PCIe slots, allowing us to connect up to four high-speed
peripherals. Using a PC platform permits easy access to all PCI slots, however, to derive meaningful
measurements, we changed the FSB clock frequency obtaining a theoretical memory bandwidth of
2.4 Gbyte/s, which is in line with typical values for embedded platforms.
To make our experiments more easily repeatable, we instructed the smart bridge prototype to
generate synthetic traﬃc instead of using traﬃc received by the TEMAC over the network. Our
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Board Data Size Transfer Time Budget Period
ML555 4.0 MB 4.4 ms 5 ms 8 ms
ML505 1.1 MB 7.5 ms 9 ms 72 ms
ML505 1.1 MB 7.5 ms 9 ms 72 ms
ML505 1.1 MB 7.5 ms 9 ms 72 ms
Figure 3.6: Our experiments use four real-time ﬂows.
Figure 3.7: This bus-level traces shows that I/O deadline misses can occur if all a standard COTS
setup is used.
periodic task generating drivers run on the main CPU, and since our I/O schedule uses periods on
the order of milliseconds, it is diﬃcult to exactly synchronize all synthetic tasks. For this reason, we
ran the tests for many hyperperiods, and show here the traces from the most closely aligned arrival
times, which correspond to the near-critical instants. The arrival times of the presented traces are
never separated by more than 0.8 milliseconds. Additionally, we implemented a traﬃc generator
using an ML555 PCI Express Development Board [38] with a faster 8 lane PCIe connection. The
synthetic traﬃc generator is programmed to send a constant amount of data to main memory every
period and obeys the I/O scheduling commands from the reservation controller.
The task set used in our experiments consists of four real-time ﬂows competing for main memory.
The task parameters (data size, transfer time, period) are shown in Table 3.6. The task periods are
harmonic, and the total utilization does not exceed 100%, so the task set is schedulable with the
rate monotonic scheduling algorithm.
In the ﬁrst experiment, the COTS bus is used without the reservation controller. Traﬃc gets
sent on the bus as soon as it arrives, increasing the execution time of the ML555's periodic task
from 4.4 ms to over 8 ms (an increase of 82%) when the tasks start at a near-critical instant. This
causes a deadline miss, as seen in Figure 3.7. In the second experiment, each peripheral is handled
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Figure 3.8: Using the Real-Time I/O Management System, priorities are obeyed and all I/O tasks
meet their deadlines.
by a sporadic server (whose corresponding budget and period are shown in Table 3.6) and all the
servers are scheduled according to rate monotonic with total utilization 58 +
9
72 +
9
72 +
9
72 = 1. By
using the Real-Time I/O Management System, the task set is now successfully scheduled without
missing deadlines because the I/O traﬃc is prioritized. A trace of one hyperperiod starting at a
near-critical instant is shown in Figure 3.8.
3.2 Predictable Execution Model (PREM)
In the previous section, we have shown how the Real-Time I/O management system can be used
to enable system-wide scheduling of I/O peripherals. In addition to I/O peripherals, however, CPU
cores will also access the same shared main memory resource. This sharing, and the associated
possibility for contention, is a necessary result of the intended way high-bandwidth peripherals
communicate with software: I/O peripherals directly write to main memory, and software running
on a CPU core directly reads the data that was written in the memory. For CPU cores, however, we
can not use the same type of solution that we used for peripherals and buﬀer memory transactions.
Not only is it likely infeasible to physically insert a buﬀering device between a COTS processor
and motherboard, but also CPU cores stall while waiting for memory access, so buﬀering would
negatively aﬀect software computation time, and therefore real-time schedulability.
This section takes a diﬀerent approach to provide high-level scheduling for CPU cores which we
call the PRedictable Execution Model [39, 40]. PREM proposes modifying user-level applications
in order to make explicit (and therefore schedulable) when programs can access main memory, and
when they will perform computation on previously-cached data.
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Figure 3.9: The modiﬁed I/O management system (compare with Figure 3.1) connects the peripheral
scheduler to the PCIe bus to enable coordination with the CPU.
Under PREM, the task code is divided into a set of scheduling intervals, which are executed
sequentially at run-time. The scheduling intervals are classiﬁed into compatible intervals and pre-
dictable intervals. Predictable intervals are further divided into two phases: a memory phase and
an execution phase. During a memory phase, the CPU accesses main memory to fetch into last-level
cache all the memory required for the rest of the predictable interval. Then, during the subsequent
execution phase, the task performs computation on the previously-fetched data, without incurring
any last-level cache misses. This allows a high-level scheduler to predict when the CPU core can ac-
cess memory during predictable intervals, and when it will perform computation on already-cached
data.
By using PREM, we can then enforce a high-level coscheduling mechanism among all the active
components (both cores and I/O peripherals) in the system. This allows us to coschedule active
components so that contention for accessing shared resources like memory is implicitly resolved by
the high-level coscheduler component without relying on the low-level, non-real-time arbiters.
In particular, we will next discuss the PREM system and programming model (Section 3.2.1),
and provide an evaluation of making real-time benchmark tasks PREM compliant (Section 3.2.2).
After, we will discuss PREM scheduling for multicore systems by presenting a feasible algorithm
to perform the scheduling which we have implemented and comparing the implemented multicore
PREM algorithm versus other possibilities using a multicore PREM system simulator (Section 3.2.3).
3.2.1 PREM System and Programming Model
As in previous sections, we consider a typical COTS-based real-time embedded system composed of
a CPU, main memory and multiple DMA peripherals. While we initially restrict the discussion to
single-core systems with no hardware multithreading, we will later describe a PREM-based approach
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for multicore systems. The CPU in the systems we consider can implement one or more cache levels.
We focus on the last cache level, which typically employs a write-back policy. Whenever a task suﬀers
a cache miss in the last level, the cache controller must access main memory to fetch the newly
referenced cache line and possibly write-back a replaced cache line. Peripherals are connected to the
system through COTS interconnects such as PCI or PCIe [26]. DMA peripherals can autonomously
initiate data transfers on the interconnect. We assume that all data transfers target main memory,
that is, data is always transferred between the peripheral's internal buﬀers and main memory.
Therefore, we can treat main memory as a single resource shared by all peripherals and by the cache
controller1.
System Model. The CPU executes a set of N real-time periodic tasks Γ = {τ1, . . . , τN}. Each
task can use one or more peripherals to transfer input or output data to or from main memory. We
model all peripheral activities as a set ofM periodic I/O ﬂows ΓI/O = {τ I/O1 , . . . , τ I/OM } with assigned
timing reservations, and we want to schedule them in such a way that only one ﬂow is transferred
at a time. Unfortunately, COTS peripherals do not typically conform to the described model. As
an example, consider a task receiving input data from a Network Interface Card (NIC). Delays in
the network could easily cause a burst of packets to arrive at the NIC. Since a high-performance
COTS NIC is designed to autonomously transfer incoming packets to main memory as soon as
possible, the NIC could potentially require memory access for signiﬁcantly longer than its expected
periodic reservation. In Section 3.1, we discussed a solution to this problem through a Real-Time
I/O Management System.
The architecture we will consider now, shown in Figure 3.9, is a modiﬁcation on the Real-Time
I/O Management System. We still include real-time bridges, interposed between each peripheral
and the rest of the system. Each real-time bridge buﬀers all incoming traﬃc from the peripheral,
and delivers it predictably to main memory according to a global I/O schedule. Outgoing traﬃc is
also retrieved from main memory in a predictable fashion. To maximize responsiveness and avoid
CPU overhead, the I/O schedule is computed by a separate peripheral scheduler, a hardware device
based on the reservation controller from the Real-Time I/O Management System, which controls all
real-time bridges. The peripheral scheduler in our architecture, unlike the reservation controller, is
connected to the PCIe bus, and can therefore also coordinate with the CPU.
Notice that our previously-developed I/O management system does not solve the problem of
1Note that while using a dual-port memory could potentially reduce contention between a single core and peripheral
interconnect, implementing a large external memory as a dual-port SRAM is impractical. Furthermore, such a solution
does not scale to multiple interconnects and/or cores.
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Figure 3.10: Predictable intervals consist of a memory phase and an execution phase. They have a
constant total execution time.
memory interference between peripherals and CPU tasks. When a typical real-time task is executed
on a COTS CPU, cache misses are unpredictable, making it diﬃcult to avoid low-level contention
for access to main memory. To overcome this issue, we now propose a set of compiler and OS
techniques that enable us to predictably schedule all cache misses during a given portion of a task
execution. The code for each task τi is divided into a set of Ni scheduling intervals {si,1, . . . , si,Ni},
which are executed sequentially at run-time. The timing requirements of τi can be expressed by a
tuple {{ei,1, . . . , ei,Ni}, pi, Di}, where pi, Di are the period and relative deadline of the task, with
Di ≤ pi, and ei,j is the maximum execution time of si,j , assuming that the interval runs in isolation
with no memory interference. A job can only be preempted by a higher priority job at the end of a
scheduling interval. This ensures that the cache content can not be altered by the preempting job
during the execution of an interval. We classify the scheduling intervals into compatible intervals
and predictable intervals.
Compatible intervals are compiled and executed without any special provisions (they are back-
wards compatible). Cache misses can happen at any time during these intervals. The task code
is allowed to perform OS system calls, but blocking calls must have bounded blocking time. Fur-
thermore, the task can be preempted by interrupt handlers of associated peripherals. We assume
that the maximum execution time ei,j for a compatible interval is computed based on static anal-
ysis techniques. However, to reduce the pessimism in the analysis, we prohibit peripheral traﬃc
from being transmitted during a compatible interval. Ideally, there should be a small number of
compatible intervals which are kept as short as possible.
Predictable intervals are specially compiled to execute according to the PREM model shown in
Figure 3.10. They are divided into two diﬀerent phases and exhibit three main properties. First,
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Figure 3.11: A system-wide schedule coordinates between I/O ﬂows and CPU access to memory.
during the initial memory phase, the CPU accesses main memory to perform a set of cache line
fetches and replacements. At the end of the memory phase, all cache lines required during the
predictable interval are available in last level cache. Second, during the following execution phase,
the task performs useful computation without suﬀering any last-level cache misses. Predictable
intervals do not contain any system calls and can not be preempted by interrupt handlers. Hence,
the CPU does not perform any external main memory access during the execution phase. This
property allows peripheral traﬃc to be scheduled during the execution phase of a predictable interval
without causing any contention for access to main memory. Third, at run-time, we force the time
length of a predictable interval to always be equal to ei,j . Let e
mem
i,j be the maximum time required
to complete the memory phase and eexeci,j to complete the execution phase. Then, oine, we set
ei,j = e
mem
i,j + e
exec
i,j and at run-time, if the predictable interval completes in less than ei,j , we busy-
wait until ei,j time units have elapsed since the beginning of the interval. This property ensures
that peripherals can transmit for at least eexeci,j time units in a time window of length ei,j . If we did
not enforce a constant interval length, the execution phase could potentially complete in zero time,
resulting in no peripheral traﬃc being sent during that predictable interval. Based on the constant
interval length property, hard real-time guarantees can be provided to I/O ﬂows [39].
Figure 3.11 shows a concrete example of a system-level predictable schedule for a task set with
two tasks τ1, τ2 together with two I/O ﬂows τ
I/O
1 , τ
I/O
2 which service τ1 and τ2, respectively. Both
tasks and I/O ﬂows are scheduled according to ﬁxed priority, with τ1 having higher priority than τ2
and τ
I/O
1 higher priority than τ
I/O
2 . We set Di = pi and assign to each I/O ﬂow the same period and
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deadline as its serviced task and a transmission time equal to 4 time units. As shown in Figure 3.11
for task τ1, this means that the input data for a given job is transmitted in the period before the job
is executed, and the output data is transmitted in the period after. Task τ1 has a single predictable
interval of length e1,2 = 4 while τ2 has two predictable intervals of lengths e2,2 = 4 and e2,3 = 3.
The ﬁrst and last interval of both τ1 and τ2 are special compatible intervals. These intervals are
needed to execute the associated peripheral driver (including interrupt handlers) and set up the
reception and transmission buﬀers in main memory (i.e. read and write system calls). I/O ﬂows
can be scheduled both during execution phases and while the CPU is idle. The described scheme
can be modeled as a hierarchical scheduling system [41], where the CPU schedule of predictable
intervals supplies available transmission time to I/O ﬂows, and is therefore capable of providing
hard real-time guarantees [39].
Executing a task according to the PREMmodel reduces its overall execution time because PREM
ensures that peripheral traﬃc in main memory cannot contend with and stall cache fetches. In the
worst case, the peripheral-induced delay can be very signiﬁcant. A possible issue in our approach is
that by deciding which cache lines to prefetch during the memory phase, we might need to prefetch
more cache lines than the ones that are actually used at run-time in the execution phase. Our
experimental evaluation in Section 3.2.2 shows that for several embedded benchmarks, this increase
in memory load is not signiﬁcant. A second possible issue is that by blocking I/O ﬂows during
compatible intervals, we risk reducing peripheral bandwidth signiﬁcantly. However, in Section 3.2.2,
we show that for a signiﬁcant category of benchmarks, the execution time of predictable intervals
dominates the total length of the job.
There are several necessary architectural considerations when using PREM in a system. We will
ﬁrst discuss cache eviction issues, and then write-back considerations.
Each time a cache line is prefetched with PREM, it has the potential to evict another cache
line. This can cause two types of problems. First, the new cache line may replace some other cache
line which was to be used in the upcoming execution phase (self-eviction). Second, it can evict a
cache line previously prefetched by another task that has been preempted (storage interference). To
prevent self-eviction, analysis of cache associativity and the cache replacement policy can be used
to compute an upper bound on the allowed memory footprint of a predictable interval [39]. To
avoid storage interference, several implementation solutions are available. In a single core PREM
implementation, this problem is solved solely by limited preemption. In a multicore system, we could
use an architecture where each core has an isolated cache. Another possible solution is to modify
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the operating system to use cache coloring [42] to provide cache isolation among tasks [43, 44]. In
a third solution, the last-level cache of each core can be partitioned directly among individual tasks
in the system [45, 46].
It is also important to account for write-back in the last-level cache. During the execution phase,
the task can modify cache lines in last-level cache. Since cache is partitioned, modiﬁed cache lines
can only be evicted and written back to memory during further memory phases of the same task.
There are two possible solutions to handle evictions. One approach, which we use in this paper, is
to extend the worst-case execution time of memory phases to account for extra time used to perform
write-back operations [39, 40]. In the worst-case, each fetch operation during a memory phase can
elicit a write-back to occur. In practice, however, COTS hardware mechanisms (write queues) are
typically very eﬃcient at hiding the latency of write operations, which means this approach can be
pessimistic. An alternative solution adds an explicit invalidation phase after each execution phase
in a predictable interval. In the invalidation phase, write-backs can be forced [47] for modiﬁed cache
lines that are not used in upcoming predictable intervals. In terms of scheduling, the invalidation
phase can be scheduled as a memory phase. Hence, the same execution model and general scheduling
results may be applied to both methods.
Programming Model. Our system supports existing applications written in standard high-
level languages such as C. Unmodiﬁed code can be executed within one or more compatible intervals.
We extend the source language with a predictable block construct that deﬁnes a single-entry,
single-exit region of code that should execute as a single predictable interval. In C, we deﬁne the
construct as the keyword predictable followed by a compound block of statements.
During compilation, the PREM real-time compiler transforms code within a predictable block
so that it ﬁrst prefetches any data and code required in the predictable block into the cache. Addi-
tionally, the compiler adds a busy-wait loop at the end of the predictable block to ensure that every
execution of the predictable interval takes the same amount of time. This ensures that no cache
misses occur during the execution phase and that the interval itself has a constant execution time.
In order to create a predictable interval, the programmer should ﬁrst proﬁle the code to determine
the portions in which the task spends most of its execution time. Since it is diﬃcult to compile
arbitrary code so that it does not induce cache misses, there are several constraints that the compiler
must place on code within predictable blocks. These constraints are:
1. Predictable code blocks should only access memory objects, arrays, and scalar values that are
capable of being referenced at the entry of the predictable block. There should be no traversal
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of link-based data structures (e.g., a binary tree) since the compiler cannot infer the memory
that would need to be prefetched.
2. The code can use data structures, in particular arrays, that are allocated outside the pre-
dictable code block2. For global or heap allocated arrays, the programmer must specify the
ﬁrst and last address that is accessed within the predictable code block and (if necessary) the
maximum diﬀerence between these two addresses if the compiler cannot infer this information
via static analysis. This must be done for the code in the predictable block and for code within
functions that are called (either directly or transitively) by the code in the predictable block.
The compiler needs this information to add correct prefetching code to the predictable code
block.
3. Code within a predictable block should not contain system calls, calls to heap allocators, or
stack allocations within loops. System calls enter the kernel and execute code not generated
by the PREM compiler, and the heap allocator executes code that can generate cache misses.
Stack allocations cannot occur in loops because the compiler will insert code to prefetch the
stack frame at the beginning of a predictable interval. Stack allocations in loops make the
stack frame size diﬃcult to predict.
4. Code within a predictable block should not make recursive function calls. Recursive function
calls can grow the stack frame to an diﬃcult-to-predict size, making it hard for the compiler
to prefetch the stack frame.
5. Code within a predictable block may use both direct and indirect function calls. The compiler
can use points-to analysis combined with call-graph construction [48] to ﬁnd all the targets of
indirect function calls. Since points-to analysis may yield conservative results, the compiler
may ﬁnd more function targets than are actually possible. If too many function targets are
found (making construction of a predictable interval impossible), the compiler may ask the
programmer to use annotations to specify the valid function targets.
The compiler employs several transforms to ensure that code within predictable blocks does not
cause cache misses during the execution phase. First, the compiler inlines all functions called (either
directly or transitively) by the predictable block into the predictable block (link-time optimization
can inline functions across compilation units). This ensures that all code used by the predictable
block is contiguous within virtual memory and uses a single stack frame. Second, the compiler inserts
2Note that heap objects must have been allocated during a compatible interval.
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code at the beginning of the predictable block to prefetch the code and data needed to execute the
interval; this prefetching is done during the memory phase of the predictable interval. Based on the
described constraints, this includes three types of contiguous memory regions: (1) the code for the
function; (2) the actual parameters passed to the function and the stack frame (which contains local
variables and register spill slots); and (3) the global and heap memory objects accessed within the
predictable block. Third, the compiler inserts code to send scheduling messages to the peripheral
scheduler as we will describe in the next paragraph. Finally, the compiler emits code at the end of
predictable block to enforce its constant, predictable execution time.
In our model, peripherals are only allowed to transmit during a predictable interval's execution
phase or while the CPU is idle. To compute the peripheral schedule, the peripheral scheduler must
thus know the status of the CPU schedule. Synchronization is achieved by connecting the peripheral
scheduler to a peripheral interconnection as shown in Figure 3.11. Scheduling messages containing
the amount of consecutive time in which peripherals are allowed to transmit are then sent by the task
to the peripheral scheduler. In particular, at the end of each memory phase the task sends to the
peripheral scheduler the remaining amount of time until the end of the current predictable interval.
Note that to simplify the discussion we will not consider here issues of message propagation delay 3
and clock drift in this paper, but the described scheme could be suitably modiﬁed by reducing the
time allowed for peripheral traﬃc compared to the value contained in the scheduling message.
Finally, to avoid executing interrupt handlers during predictable intervals, a peripheral should
only raise interrupts to the CPU during compatible intervals of its serviced task. As we describe in
Section 3.2.2, in our I/O management scheme, peripherals raise interrupts through their assigned
real-time bridge. Since the peripheral scheduler communicates with each real-time bridge, it is used
to block interrupt propagation outside the desired compatible intervals. Scheduling messages are
again used to notify the peripheral scheduler of the length of interrupt-enabled intervals. Note that
blocking real-time bridge interrupts to the CPU will not cause any loss of input data because the
real-time bridge is capable of independently acknowledging the peripheral and storing all incoming
data in the bridge local buﬀer.
Converting existing code to predictable intervals clearly requires some amount of manual work.
In particular, adding annotations to correctly split the code into predictable blocks requires some
knowledge of cache parameters (since cache size is ﬁnite, whatever is prefetched must ﬁt in memory).
While this might seem an undue limit on code portability, the type of data-intensive, real-time appli-
3In our implementation we measured an upper bound to the message propagation time of 1µs, while we envision
scheduling intervals with a length of 100-1000µs
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cations that we target in this work are typically already optimized based on hardware architecture.
In this sense, we believe that the beneﬁts of a more predictable behavior for program hot-spots,
decoupled from the low-level details of bus and memory arbiters, outweigh the burden of code an-
notations. Additionally, we can design our compiler to help the programmer create predictable code
blocks. The compiler can verify when the aforementioned restrictions are violated in a predictable
block (e.g., it can use static analysis to ﬁnd irregular data structure usage or use of system calls) and
issue warnings to help the programmer to correct them. Furthermore, given cache size information,
the compiler could verify that all prefetched memory regions ﬁt in last level cache and issue warnings
or errors otherwise.
A second possible concern is with regards to code constraints. In general, we believe that our
constraints are not signiﬁcantly more restrictive than those imposed by state-of-the-art static timing
analysis. Typical hard real-time applications already avoid recursive calls, stack or heap allocation
within loops, and indirect function calls that are not decidable at compile time. Furthermore, we
are not aware of any timing analysis tool that can provide WCET bounds if Constraints 3 or 4 are
violated.
Constraints 1-2 are more severe because they prevent using complex pointer-based data struc-
tures. However, existing code that is too complex to be compiled into predictable intervals can
still be executed inside compatible intervals. An alternative solution [49] is to statically partition
the cache, for example using the OS page allocator, into an area for predictable code and data,
and a second area for complex, unpredictable data structures. During a predictable interval, the
predictable area is prefetched while unpredictable data is handled by the caching logic. Static anal-
ysis can then be used to derive a (pessimistic) upper bound on the number of cache misses in the
unpredictable area. Ideally, most of the data would be placed in the predictable area, resulting in a
very small number of unpredictable misses. While we do not discuss it here, the PREM model could
be amended to tolerate a small number of cache misses in the predictable phase by using analysis
to compute the (limited) contention delay on both the task and I/O ﬂows [29, 50].
3.2.2 PREM + I/O Evaluation
In order to verify the validity and practicality of PREM, we implemented the key components
of the system. In this section, we ﬁrst describe our implemented testbed. We then discuss our
compiler implementation and analyze its eﬀectiveness on several embedded benchmarks. Finally,
using synthetic tasks, we measure the eﬀectiveness of the PREM system as a function of cache stall
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time.
3.2.2.1 PREM Hardware/Software Testbed
To support I/O ﬂow scheduling, we developed a real-time bridge and peripheral scheduler prototype
as described in Section 3.2.1. A full description of the implemented components is available [51],
but here we instead only discuss the critical components. Compared to the Real-Time I/O Manage-
ment System [52, 3], the new components exhibit two main diﬀerences: (1) there is an additional
interrupt_block wire between the real-time bridge and peripheral scheduler is used to control
interrupt propagation; (2) the peripheral scheduler is connected to the PCIe bus and exposes a set
of registers accessible from the main CPU. In particular, there is a yield register which is used
to receive scheduling messages, as described earlier. Both the real-time bridge and the peripheral
scheduler require software drivers to be controlled from the main CPU and interact with each pe-
ripheral. The driver for the peripheral scheduler is extremely simple, exposing to the CPU the
peripheral scheduler's registers. The driver for each real-time bridge is more diﬃcult, since each
unique COTS peripheral requires a unique driver. As with the Real-Time I/O Management System,
since we employ Linux (version 2.6.31), we can reuse existing, thoroughly tested Linux drivers to
drastically reduce the driver creation eﬀort [3]. The presence of a real-time bridge is not apparent
in user space, and software programs using the peripherals require no modiﬁcation.
For our experiments, we use an Intel Q6700 CPU with a 82975X system controller; we set the
CPU frequency to 1Ghz obtaining a measured memory bandwidth of 1.8Gbytes/s to conﬁgure the
system in line with typical values for embedded systems. We also disable the speculative CPU
HW prefetcher since it negatively impacts the predictability of any real-time task. The Q6700 has
four CPU cores and each pair of cores shares a common level 2 (last level) cache. Each cache is
16-associative with a total size of B = 4 Mbytes and a line size of L = 64 bytes; reloading the
whole cache requires roughly 2.2 ms. Since we use a PC platform running a COTS Linux operating
system, there are many potential sources of timing noise, such as interrupts, kernel threads, and
other processes, which must be removed for our measurements to be meaningful. For this reason, in
order to best emulate a typical uni-processor embedded real-time platform, we divided the 4 cores
in two partitions. The system partition, running on the ﬁrst pair of cores, receives all interrupts
for non-critical devices (e.g., the keyboard) and runs all the system activities and non real-time
processes (e.g., the shell we use to run the experiments). The real-time partition runs on the second
pair of cores. One core in the real-time partition runs our real-time tasks together with the drivers
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for real-time bridges and the peripheral scheduler; the other core is turned oﬀ. Note that the cores
of the system partition can still produce a small amount of unscheduled bus and main memory
accesses or raise rare inter-processor interrupts (IPI) that cannot be easily prevented. However, in
our experiments, we found these sources of noise to be negligible. Finally, to solve the issues with
memory access due to paging, we used a large 4MB page size just for the real-time tasks using the
HugeTLB feature of the Linux kernel for large page support.
3.2.2.2 Compiler Evaluation
We built a PREM real-time C compiler prototype using the LLVM Compiler Infrastructure [53].
LLVM is a mature compiler infrastructure with a front-end for many standard high-level languages
including C, C++, and FORTRAN. We extended LLVM by writing self-contained analysis and
transformation passes which were then loaded into the compiler. For simplicity, in the current com-
piler prototype, interval partitioning is performed by putting each predictable interval into a separate
function. Within the predictable interval function, the programmer adds macros that 1) indicate
that non-local data should be prefetched (PREFETCH_DATA(start_address, size)) and 2) indicate
that the execution phase is beginning and send scheduling messages (START_EXECUTION(WCET)).
Our new LLVM compiler pass performs all remaining operations needed to transform the inter-
val to be predictable. When a function representing a predictable interval is found, our transform
ﬁrst inlines all functions called within the predictable interval function. This ensures that there is
only a single stack frame and segment of code that needs to be prefetched into the cache. Second,
our transform inserts code to read and record the processor's cycle counter at the beginning of the
interval. Third, it inserts code to prefetch the stack frame and function arguments by prefetching
memory between the stack pointer and slightly beyond the frame pointer (to include function ar-
guments) using the x86 prefetcht2 instruction. Fourth, the transform prefetches the code of the
function by deriving pointers to the beginning and end of the predictable function and then using
the prefetcht2 instruction. Finally, the pass identiﬁes all return instructions inside the predictable
interval function and adds a special function epilogue before them. The epilogue performs interval-
length enforcement by looping until the cycle counter reaches the worst-case cycle count based on
the time value saved at the beginning of the interval and the predictable interval length (WCET)
provided in START_EXECUTION.
To verify the correctness of the PREM compiler and to test its applicability, we used LLVM to
compile several benchmarks mostly taken from MiBench [54], a commercially-representative embed-
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Input bytes 4K 8K 32K 128K 512K 1M
Non-PREM cache misses 151 277 1046 4144 16371 32698
PREM memory phase misses 255 353 1119 4185 16451 32834
PREM execution phase misses 1 1 1 1 1 104
Table 3.1: The DES benchmark was modiﬁed to avoid memory access during the PREM execution
phase by doing prefetching during the memory phase.
ded benchmark suite. First, we elaborate on a DES cypher benchmark because its pattern of cache
misses in the various PREM phases is representative of the other benchmarks we tested. Second, we
discuss a JPEG benchmark because it has a larger, more complicated code base, and we believe the
workﬂow to make it PREM-compliant will match realistic PREM applications. Lastly, we discuss
the entire automotive program group of MiBench (6 benchmarks) to evaluate the broader necessity
and feasibility of PREM compilation. We ran all benchmarks with multiple input data sizes and have
shown here representative measurements using the input_small ﬁles from the benchmarks. No pe-
ripheral traﬃc occurs during execution. To capture worst-case behavior, the cache was invalidated
prior to the start of each measured function by using a hand-written cache_trash function.
TheDES Cypher Benchmark is composed of one scheduling interval which encrypts a variable
amount of data. We compiled it both in the standard, non-PREM way and also with PREM
prefetching, and measured the number of cache misses and prefetches which occurred by using a
CPU performance counter. Adapting the interval required no modiﬁcation to any cypher functions
and a total of 11 PREFETCH_DATA macros.
As shown in Table 3.1, non-PREM execution results in a signiﬁcant number of cache misses
throughout the interval, which, as expected, increases roughly proportionally to the amount of pro-
cessed data. If I/O peripherals were to transmit to main memory concurrently, the task's execution
time could increase. Conversely, the execution phase (after prefetch) of the predictable interval
has almost zero cache misses, only suﬀering a small increase when a large amount of data is being
processed. This demonstrates the key result: with PREM, I/O peripherals can communicate with
main memory freely during the execution phase without aﬀecting the timing of the executing task.
The reason the number of cache misses is not exactly zero in the PREM execution phase is
that the Q6700 CPU core used in our experiments uses a cache replacement policy which can incur
self-eviction, meaning that with more than one contiguous memory region, the probability of self-
eviction is non-zero. CPUs which use diﬀerent cache replacement policies could avoid this eﬀect. In
our experiments, we observed that the number of self-evictions is usually small. However, we still
recommend that timing-critical applications avoid CPUs with cache replacement policy that may
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PREM Non-PREM
prefetch exec-miss time(µs) miss time(µs)
JPEG(1 Mpix) 810 13 778 588 797
JPEG(8 Mpix) 1736 19 3039 1612 3110
qsort 3136 3 2712 3135 2768
susan_smooth 313 2 7159 298 7170
susan_edge 680 4 3089 666 3086
susan_corner 3286 3 341 598 232
Table 3.2: Programs from the MiBench suite were made PREM compliant.
cause self-evictions. Many embedded platforms used in safety-critical markets such as avionics use
processors like the Freescale PowerPC family [55] with more predictable policies like pseudo-LRU
[56].
A typical PREM code augmentation workﬂow was exempliﬁed by the JPEG Image Encoding
Benchmark. In this benchmark, we ﬁrst used gprof to ﬁnd that around 80% of the execution time
is spent in the compress_data() function which performs DCT transformation, quantization and
Huﬀman encoding.
We made compress_data() PREM-compliant by replacing constant function pointers with direct
calls, adding 18 PREFETCH_DATA macros, and removing fwrite system calls from the predictable
interval. The results for two image sizes are shown in Table 3.2, where time(µs) represents the
execution time of the whole interval.
We also went through the complete Automotive Program Group of MiBench and evaluated
each of the six benchmarks to determine the broader necessity and feasibility of PREM compila-
tion. Two of the benchmarks (basicmath and bitcount) were not data intensive, so PREM was
not necessary (the eﬀect of main memory contention on tasks which are not memory intensive is
small). Of the remaining four benchmarks, three (qsort, susan_smooth, susan_edge) were found to
be well-suited for PREM, and we were able to perform most of the computation inside predictable
intervals. The ﬁnal benchmark (susan_corner) had variable-size output, so PREM would typically
need to prefetch much more buﬀer space than what was actually used. Notice that these types of
tasks, however, where the amount of work done is not known ahead of time, would also perform
poorly under worst-case timing analysis which is necessary for real-time schedulability analysis. The
results are again shown in Table 3.2. Note that, except for susan_corner, the number of prefetched
cache lines is only slightly higher than the number of cache misses suﬀered in the non-PREM way,
indicating that the runtime overhead of PREM is generally low.
By evaluating several benchmarks, common strategies emerged to meet the PREM coding con-
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straints (discussed in Section 3.2.1). Similar to the JPEG benchmark, function pointers often pointed
to a single function for a speciﬁc benchmark execution, and could therefore be replaced with a direct
call (as with the qsort benchmark's compare function). In the susan benchmarks, function calls such
as malloc, memcpy, and memset were moved before the predictable interval function. Furthermore,
since our current compiler implementation does not inline library functions, the implementation of
selected libc functions was copied or rewritten to be local functions.
3.2.2.3 WCET Experiments
In this section, we evaluate the eﬀects of PREM on the execution time of a task. To quickly explore
diﬀerent execution parameters, we developed two synthetic applications. In our linear_access
application, each scheduling interval operates on a 256-kilobyte global data structure. Data is ac-
cessed sequentially, and we vary the amount of computation performed between memory references.
The random_access application is similar, except that references inside the data structure are non-
sequential. Both applications access all cache lines of the global data structure at run-time. For
each application, we measured the execution time after compiling the program in two ways: into
predictable intervals which prefetch the accessed memory, and into standard, compatible intervals.
For each type of compilation, we ran the experiment in two ways, with and without I/O traﬃc
transmitted by an 8-lane PCIe peripheral with a measured throughput of 1.2Gbytes/s. In the case
of compatible intervals, we transmitted traﬃc during the entire interval to mirror the worst case
according to the traditional execution model.
Figures 3.12a and 3.12b show the observed execution time for the scheduling interval as a function
of the cache stall time of the application, averaged over 10 runs. The cache stall time represents
the percentage of time required to fetch cache lines out of an entire compatible interval, assuming
a ﬁxed (best-case) fetch time based on the maximum measured main-memory throughput. Only
a single line is shown for predictable intervals because experiments conﬁrmed that, as predicted,
injecting main memory traﬃc over the PCIe bus during the execution phase (where the task does
not access main memory) does not increase execution time. In all cases, the computation time
decreases with an increase in stall time. This eﬀect is an artifact of our implementation: stall time
is controlled by varying the amount of computation between memory references while the overall
number of cache misses is kept constant. Hence, for lower stall time values, the task must execute
for longer amounts of time. Furthermore, execution times should not be compared between the two
ﬁgures because the two applications execute diﬀerent code. Finally, note that reported execution
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Figure 3.12: PREM decreases task execution time if the task originally has a random memory access
pattern. For either pattern, PREM isolates execution time from peripheral traﬃc.
times should be interpreted as average execution times rather than worst case measurements; each
scheduling interval comprises thousands of cache misses, and experimentally capturing the worst
case interference among all CPU cache fetches and PCIe peripheral transactions in main memory is
extremely diﬃcult.
In the random_access case, predictable intervals outperform compatible intervals (without pe-
ripheral traﬃc) by up to 28%, depending on the cache stall time. We believe this eﬀect is primarily
due to the behavior of DRAM main memory. Speciﬁcally, accesses to adjacent addresses can be
served quicker in burst mode than accesses to random addresses. Thus, using PREM can actually
decrease the total execution time by loading all the accessed memory into cache, in order, at the
beginning of each predictable interval. Furthermore, note that transmitting peripheral traﬃc during
a compatible interval can increase execution time by more than 60% in the worst case. In Figure
3.12b, predictable intervals perform worse than compatible intervals (without peripheral traﬃc). We
believe this is mainly due to out-of-order execution in the Q6700 core. In compatible intervals, while
the core performs a cache fetch, instructions in the pipeline that do not depend on the fetched data
can continue to execute. When performing linear accesses, fetches require less time and this eﬀect is
magniﬁed. Furthermore, the gain in execution time for the case with peripheral traﬃc is decreased:
this occurs because bursting data on the memory bus reduces the amount of blocking time suﬀered
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by a task due to peripheral interference (this eﬀect has been previously analyzed in detail [29]). In
practice, we expect the eﬀect of PREM on an application's execution time to be between the two
ﬁgures, depending on the speciﬁc application's memory access pattern.
Additionally, we have also performed extensive experiments to validate the correctness of the
scheduling message and interrupt blocking mechanisms, as well as obtained bus-level traces of PREM
running on our testbed [51].
3.2.3 Multicore PREM
We will now discuss the application of the PRedicatble Execution Model (PREM) for multicore
system scheduling [5]. We will ﬁrst brieﬂy describe an approach which we have analyzed and imple-
mented called Memory-Centric Scheduling. Although Memory-Centric Scheduling has a worst-case
schedulability bound, it is not clear whether it is the best approach for scheduling a multicore sys-
tem under PREM. This motivates the need for a larger evaluation of a diﬀerent possible algorithms,
which we perform using a custom-made PREM system simulator. We ﬁrst describe an abstract task
model for use in our simulator, and then present an evaluation of a number of algorithms. The
best algorithm based on our evaluation, which we call M-LAX, schedules access to memory in a
nonpreemptive fashion according to a global least-laxity-ﬁrst policy.
3.2.3.1 Memory-Centric Scheduling
An initial approach to scheduling PREM-compliant tasks in a multicore system is called Memory-
Centric Scheduling [40]. Memory-Centric Scheduling provides core isolation by using a high-level
Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) schedule for granting access to main memory. The schedul-
ing policy on each core promotes the priority of memory phases over execution phases when memory
access is permitted by the high-level schedule. This is done to ensure that each memory phase com-
pletes as soon as possible, hence allowing the corresponding execution phase to take place between
TDMA slots. For the same reason, memory phases are not allowed to be preempted by other mem-
ory phases. For a set of real-time tasks running under Memory-Centric Scheduling, we have proven
a formal real-time schedulability bound [40].
An example scheduling trace using Memory-Centric Scheduling of one core of a system running
three jobs, with a TDMA slot size of 2 time units, is depicted in Figure 3.13. In Figure 3.13(a),
the three jobs are scheduled according to a ﬁxed priority policy, with J1 having the highest priority
and J3 the lowest. Note that the core stalls in intervals [3, 4] and [10, 12], since memory phases
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Figure 3.13: For this job set, using Memory-Centric Scheduling results in a lower response time
compared with the TDMA-only approach.
can only run during the TDMA slot and there are no active execution phases. The trace in Figure
3.13(b) shows the same task set under Memory-Centric Scheduling. Memory promotion ensures that
the memory phase of J3 ﬁnishes at time 10, hence preventing stall in interval [10, 12]. Similarly,
nonpreemptive execution of memory phases prevents stalling during [3, 4] by allowing J2 to complete
ﬁrst.
Memory-Centric Scheduling, however, is only one approach to scheduling PREM-compliant tasks.
Is it the best approach? In the upcoming sections, we will use a simulation-based analysis to gauge
the performance of Memory-Centric Scheduling compared with other reasonable candidates.
3.2.3.2 Abstract PREM Task Model
Before we perform our simulation-based evaluation of various scheduling algorithms for PREM-
compliant tasks, we must ﬁrst justify the task sets which are generated to perform the evaluation. In
traditional real-time research, one would typically generate task sets by creating tasks with varying
periods and execution times [57]. In our case, however, we are instead interested in evaluating
schedulers for PREM-compliant tasks. For this reason, we must also come up with a reasonable way
to generate PREM-compliant tasks, where each job's execution is divided into various phases, some
of which are memory phases and some of which are execution phases.
In order to make our simulation results meaningful, we want to perform this division in a re-
sponsible way, as opposed to haphazardly dividing each task's execution time into various phases.
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Therefore we need to ﬁrst have an understanding of the way typical real-time applications behave
when they are made PREM-compliant. For this purpose, we reexamine several benchmarks from the
AutoBench group of the EEMBC (Embedded Microprocessor Benchmark Consortium) [58] bench-
mark suite which we had earlier made PREM-compliant [40]. Particularly, we are interested in
extracting parameters from the benchmarks that we could use when generating task sets in our
simulation-based multicore PREM evaluation in Section 3.2.3.4.
The benchmarks we examined were of four streaming applications which would process batches
of input data and produce a stream of corresponding output. Speciﬁcally, the four benchmarks we
used from the AutoBench group were a2time (angle to time conversion), canrdr (response to remote
CAN request), tblook (table lookup) and rspeed (road speed calculation). Ideally more benchmarks
would have been examined, however, making a benchmark PREM-compliant is currently a manual
task which requires examining the behavior of the code in order to know where in the program
cache misses may occur, and then inserting the appropriate prefetch macros in the memory phase
which precedes the corresponding computation phase. We have already described a wider feasibility
analysis of making tasks PREM compliant in Section 3.2.2.
Each benchmark in the EEMBC suite comes with a sample data ﬁle that represents typical input
for the application. Since the original input data is of ﬁnite size, in order to evaluate the behavior
of the benchmark under larger inputs, we replicate the original input data as often as is needed in
order to have the desired input size. This approach, also used in other earlier work [46], is reasonable
because the benchmark conceptually processes a stream of input data, instead of a ﬁxed data set of
a certain size.
Our measurement platform for this experiment was also an Intel Q6700 CPU platform, the same
system used for our PREM implementation described earlier. This setup has a maximum theoretical
memory bandwidth of 1.8 GB/s. However, due to the extra delay caused by cache write-back, the
eﬀective memory bandwidth during memory phases that we measured was roughly half of this, 819
MB/sec. The platform provides 1 MB of last-level cache per core.
For each benchmark, we measured the amount of execution time in CPU cycles in both the
memory phases and execution phases. Since we have the ﬂexibility of controlling the length of the
predictable interval (by varying the input sizes), all the measured numbers are based on a single
interval. As we increased the total input size, we observed that both the memory and execution
phases grow linearly with the input data size. This is somewhat expected, since these benchmarks
are of streaming tasks which process batches of small inputs.
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Figure 3.14: As the size of the input is increased, the cache stall ratio quickly converges to around
a diﬀerent constant value for each benchmark.
From these measurements, we could also compute a critical parameter which describes each
benchmark, the cache stall ratio. The cache stall ratio is deﬁned as the ratio of time spent in the
memory phase to the total time of the interval. Figure 3.14 depicts the cache stall ratio for all four
benchmarks when the input data size is changed. When the total input is small, there is a ﬁxed
amount of both prefetch overhead and execution overhead. This is due to the prefetching of the code
of the benchmark, as well as variables which do not scale in size as the size of the input changes,
as well as a ﬁxed amount of execution which is not dependent on the input's size. When the input
size increases, the phase times gradually stabilize to a linear trend with the input size. Diﬀerent
benchmarks show diﬀerent cache stall ratios, in the range of 4% to 19%, as shown in the ﬁgure.
Our measurements on the EEMBC benchmark applications yielded two observations useful to
help generate PREM-compliant task sets:
• For each streaming real-time task, both the memory phase time and the execution phase time
are a function of the input size. These times can be predicted from the input size using a linear
model with a ﬁxed y-oﬀset (which captures the input-independent prefetch and execution) and
a slope (which captures the input-dependent prefetch and execution). For larger execution
times the slope component dominates the execution time.
• The cache stall ratio, deﬁned as the ratio of the memory phase to the total execution time, is
constant for each benchmark when the input sizes are suﬃciently large. Values for the cache
stall ratio of typical applications can be between 4% to 19%.
The ﬁrst observation is speciﬁc to streaming real-time tasks, since, of course, a general application
can scale in drastically diﬀerent ways as the input size is changed. However, since streaming real-
54
time tasks conceptually process lots of small independent inputs, modeling the phase times with a
linear approximation is reasonable. The second observation is helpful in guiding the parameters we
will use for simulation task set generation. Since the cache stall ratio dominates the execution time
for anything but small input sizes, we can consider generating tasks by choosing a value of cache
stall ratio in this range, and then generating appropriately-sized memory and execution phases.
3.2.3.3 PREM Simulator
A simulator for PREM-compliant tasks must be capable of simulating four key aspects of the PREM
execution model. First, there are multiple cores which must be concurrently scheduled. Second, each
periodic job consists of phases which prefetch data from main memory (memory phases) and phases
which do CPU-only computation on cached memory (execution phases). Third, there is a single
global shared resource, memory access, which all tasks compete for, and generally must only be
accessible by one core at a time (otherwise, it should be possible to simulate the timing interference
caused by concurrent access). Last, memory access is not a traditional nonpreemptable critical
section, but can instead be preempted at any time. We would also like to generate task sets which
match the information we derived from the EEMBC steaming real-time benchmarks in Section
3.2.3.2.
Due to these unique requirements for simulating PREM-compliant systems, we could not directly
use an existing multicore real-time systems simulator, and instead created one which fulﬁlled the
requirements. The two key components in our simulator are task set generators and CPU schedulers.
In this section, we will describe the ﬁrst of these. CPU schedulers are better described in the context
of their corresponding simulation's measurements in the next section. For this reason, we postpone
their detailed explanation until then.
The simulator we created allows the generation and simulation of tasks which are PREM-
compliant. The simulator base is written in Java and provides the framework to perform the
simulation. The simulator uses a modular design where diﬀerent algorithms can created without
modifying the simulator base. The simulator base provides functionality to allow the user to select
which task set generation algorithm and scheduling algorithm to use, and deﬁne the parameters for
these algorithms, as shown in Figure 3.15. Additionally, simulation parameters including the number
of cores in the system, the random seed to use, and the number of simulations or desired simulation
time are provided by the user. When simulation begins, the simulator base spawns multiple threads
based on the number of available processors on the machine it is run, and then, after the desired
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Figure 3.15: In our multicore PREM simulator, parameters can be conﬁgured for both the task
creation algorithm, and the CPU scheduling algorithm.
number of simulations completes, reports schedulability results in a table. The user can then select
an individual simulation from the report table, and examine a visual trace of the speciﬁc simulation
run.
Individual simulations are run by considering all tasks to be released at time 0, and then running
the simulation for one (system-wide) hyperperiod. If no tasks have missed their deadline at the end
of the hyperperiod, the task set is reported as schedulable. Although this method captures neither
the best-case nor the worst-case alignment of tasks in a multicore system, it can generally indicate
which algorithms perform better than others, which is the main purpose of our evaluation.
A Task Partitioner in the simulator is responsible for generating task sets, and partitioning
them onto processors. Each task partitioner can deﬁne a set of parameters and default values.
The simulator base will then allow the user to modify these simulation parameters from the user
interface. Additionally, each task partitioner must override a createTasks method which, given
a list of cores, must create a task set according to the user-deﬁned parameters and assign tasks
to each core. For our evaluation, we created a parameterized task partitioner to create tasks with
properties similar to the EEMBC benchmark tasks we examined previously in Section 3.2.3.2. The
user provides several parameters, which can be deﬁned as either speciﬁc values or ranges. The task
period parameter, for example, is speciﬁed with a range and a quantum value. Only periods which
are in the range and a multiple of the quantum are considered. This keeps the hyperperiod of the
task set manageable, so that simulations can complete in a timely manner. The parameters generally
varied between simulations, however, two were kept constant. For the cache size per core, we used
our testbed (described earlier in Section 3.2.3.2) value of 1 MB. For the eﬀective memory speed, we
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used the measured value of 819 MB/s in all simulations.
Our EEMBC-based task partitioner works by ﬁrst dividing the user-deﬁned total utilization by
the user-deﬁned number of tasks to generate. This is done using UUniSort algorithm [57] with one
slight modiﬁcation. Since we are dealing with a multicore system, this approach can yield individual
tasks with more than 100% utilization, which are never schedulable. In these cases, we run the
UUniSort algorithm again to generate a new task set. Although this loop is not guaranteed to
terminate, in our evaluation, task sets containing only tasks with less than 100% utilization were
always found in a timely manner.
After the utilization was determined, each task is assigned a task period. This is done by
uniformly picking a value from the task period range which is a multiple of the task period quantum.
The execution time can be determined from the task's utilization and the now-computed period. The
total memory phase time is then determined from the cache stall ratio and the execution time. The
remaining time (total execution time minus memory phase time), is the total execution phase time.
One concern with this method is that applications would typically have varying phase execution
times rather than a single ﬁxed time. This can be alleviated in implementation by forcing each
phase to always execute for its worst-case time [39], maintaining a predictable eﬀect on the other
tasks in the system.
Next, tasks are statically partitioned into cores. In our task partitioner, we use a worst-ﬁt
decreasing heuristic in order to do this assignment. This means that the task with the highest
utilization is ﬁrst assigned to the core with the lowest total utilization. Next, the task with the
second highest utilization is put on the core with the new lowest total utilization. This repeated
until no tasks are left. Other task partitioners could also have be considered, but we leave that for
future research and instead focus more on the CPU schedulers.
In the last step of task generation, each task has the potential to be split into multiple pairs
of memory/execution phases. This splitting is done by ﬁrst determining the cache space available
to each task. We evenly divide the core's cache among tasks assigned to that core. The memory
footprint of the task is determined using the total memory phase time and the memory access speed
parameter. Then, we greedily create memory phases which ﬁll the available cache space, followed
by execution phases determined by the cache stall ratio. This is repeated until no execution time
is remaining. Notice that this type of splitting is possible because we are dealing with streaming
real-time tasks, where we have a choice of processing a large batch of data all at once, or several
smaller batches in sequence.
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In our simulator, a CPU Scheduler determines which tasks should execute at each point in
time. Each CPU scheduler can deﬁne a set of parameters and associated default values. As with
the task partitioner, the simulator base allows the user to modify these parameters from within
the user interface. The simulator must also deﬁne two methods: isSchedulable, which returns
a boolean if the particular set of tasks assigned to cores is schedulable, and getSchedule, which
returns a complete trace of the system (which indicates which task executed at every point in time).
The diﬀerence between these two methods is that the ﬁrst can be optimized to simply check for
schedulability without storing a trace (this is the one used when generating a report about a large
number of simulations), whereas the second is used only when the user selects to view a trace of an
individual simulation.
We implemented several classes of parametrizable CPU schedulers. These algorithms are better
described, however, in the context of their simulations measurements in the next section. For this
reason we postpone their detailed explanation until then.
3.2.3.4 Multicore PREM Evaluation
In order to evaluate various scheduling approaches in the PREM-compliant framework, we took
a simulation-based approach. In this approach, we generated synthetic task sets using realistic
parameters, and then used various scheduling algorithms to try to schedule the task sets. While
this approach does not provide a worst-case scheduling bound, it does allow us to evaluate a large
number of diﬀerent algorithms. This is important since the space of reasonable algorithms is quite
large, and a theoretical analysis of each one, along with a corresponding comparison with the others,
would take colossal eﬀort.
Using the simulator we had build, we could evaluate many scheduling strategies for PREM-
compliant tasks. Even though simulations are quick to run, due to the sheer size of the search space,
we still needed to limit the types of algorithms we considered.
We ﬁrst will explain the details about the algorithms we considered and the measurements we
performed. Our simulations were focused on two broad classes of schedulers, each with a wide
selection of parameters. The ﬁrst category are schedulers which are TDMA-based. These are a gen-
eralization of the previously-described Memory-Centric Scheduling approach from Section 3.2.3.1.
We then focus on algorithms similar to the Simple Partitioned FIFO Locking Protocol (SPFP) algo-
rithm [59]. In these algorithms, which we call prioritized memory schedulers, memory is treated as
a global shared resource over which the tasks running on the cores compete. We then compare the
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two classes of schedulers against each other and the case where no implicit scheduling is performed.
Finally, we discuss the results and conclusions of our simulation study.
Simulation Assumptions and Details. Our evaluation will focus on schedulers which work
on statically partitioned task sets. This means that algorithms like global RM or global EDF are
not considered. We also assume that there is a static set of periodic tasks that we are trying to
scheduling with task periods equal to deadlines. We also do not include shared resources among
tasks, except for main memory, which all tasks will access.
We use the same task partitioner, the worst-ﬁt decreasing one described in Section 3.2.3.3, for
all of our experiments. This partitioner always evenly splits the cache among all tasks assigned to
each core, and divides each task into as few memory phases as possible, in a greedy manner.
In the evaluation, we report either the fraction of tasks found to be schedulable at speciﬁc
utilization levels, or something called weighted schedulability [60]. The weighted schedulability is
deﬁned as follows, given a set of evenly-spaced utilization levels Q, where fracSchedulable is a
function which returns the fraction of schedulable tasks at a particular utilization level:
∑
U∈Q U · fracSchedulable(u)∑
U∈Q U
The weighted schedulability is a number between 0 and 1 which indicates a particular scheduler's
ability to schedule tasks over a speciﬁc range of utilization levels. A higher weight is assigned to
the value when the scheduler is capable of successfully scheduling task sets with a high utilization.
It is important to be aware of the utilization range being considered when measuring weighted
schedulability, since the ﬁnal value is sensitive to the utilization range considered. A range which
includes low utilizations with more schedulable task sets will inﬂate the ﬁnal result, and a range
which includes more high utilizations which are unschedulable will deﬂate it. For this reason, it is
most useful when performing a comparison of multiple algorithms, rather than in absolute terms.
At each utilization level, we approximated fracSchedulable by performing 250 simulations on
generated task sets, according to the parameters of the simulation. Thus, for example, if there are
100 samples in the utilization range, each value of weighted schedulability is the combination of
25,000 individual simulations.
In the simulations presented, unless otherwise stated, we will initially consider the following task
set generation parameters. The system contains 4 cores. For each core in the system, 5 tasks are
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created (20 tasks for 4 cores). Task periods chosen between 5ms and 8ms using a period quantum
of 1ms. Tasks have a cache stall ratio between 15% and 20%. This is at the higher end of memory
utilization that we expect, based on the measurements from the EEMBC benchmarks. Modiﬁcations
to these parameters will be considered in the comparison section after our initial description of the
algorithms we compare.
TDMA-based Schedulers. First, we describe experiments with various TDMA-based schedulers.
In these schedulers, there exists a global TDMA memory schedule among cores, and each core is
only allowed to access main memory when the core has its TDMA memory slot assigned. These
schedulers are based on Memory-Centric Scheduling, as described in Section 3.2.3.1.
Memory-Centric Scheduling gives each core a ﬁxed-size TDMA slot. When the core is granted
memory access, all memory phases which are pending are promoted to a priority level above any
execution phases (in order to make use of the memory slot). The intuition behind this eﬀect, which
we call memory promotion, is that memory is the bottleneck of the system, and so it should have
priority over CPU-only computation. Additionally, once a memory phase begins executing, it will
be run to completion before any other memory phases are serviced (if the TDMA slot ends, the
memory phase will resume when the next TDMA slot arrives). The intuition behind this rule,
called nonpreemptive memory phases, is that it allows more memory phases to run to completion,
and therefore allows their corresponding execution phases to become schedulable. We will evaluate
the two main rules of Memory-Centric Scheduling, memory promotion, and nonpreemptive memory
phases, over various slot sizes.
For the comparison of TDMA-based algorithms, the weighted schedulability set Q contains uti-
lizations in the range [0, n], where n is the number of cores, with a utilization step size of n/100.
In the context of Memory-Centric Scheduling, we can consider which CPU scheduler to use. In
the original work [40], Rate Monotonic was used as the CPU scheduler for computing the bound.
However, we observed that using EDF to schedule tasks on the cores generally improved schedu-
lability (which matches the theoretical bound [61] on individual cores). For this reason, all of our
reported results are using EDF as the CPU scheduler.
In the context of TDMA-based scheduling, we evaluate the eﬀect of each of the two rules of
Memory Centric Scheduling. We consider all four cases, with and without memory promotion, and
with and without preemptive memory phases. The results are shown in Figure 3.16. Surprisingly,
nonpreemptive memory phases have only a minor eﬀect on schedulability with these task set gener-
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Figure 3.16: Memory promotion has a much larger eﬀect on schedulability than nonpreemptive
memory phases.
ation parameters. The largest improvement to schedulability is provided by the memory promotion
scheduling rule. The approach suggested by Memory-Centric Scheduling, using memory promotion
with nonpreemptive memory phases, seems to be best even with the EDF CPU scheduler.
We now consider a modiﬁcation to the TDMA-based scheduling where cores that do not have
any pending memory phases can give up their TDMA slot early. In these systems, we expect a better
utilization of memory bandwidth, since cores which have completed all their memory phases do not
block memory if there are other cores which require memory access. Hence, the scheduling policy
turns out to be round robin, with an enforced maximum time that an individual core can access
memory continuously, if other cores need access. A comparison with and without the addition of the
round robin rule is shown in Figure 3.17. As expected, the round robin rule increases schedulability.
One interesting observation about round robin scheduling is that, as the TDMA slot size in-
creases, it does not degrade to the point where almost no task sets are schedulable (as happens
when the round robin rule is not used). This is because at some point, the slot size becomes large
enough that each core will execute until it has no more memory phases pending, and then the next
core will be granted memory access. This makes the scheduler less sensitive to the choice of TDMA
slot size.
For TDMA-based schedulers, the best approach we have found in terms of schedulability is to
use Memory Centric Scheduling with EDF on the CPU, along with the round robin rule and a small
TDMA slot size.
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Figure 3.17: When using memory promotion with nonpreemptive memory phases, the round robin
rule further improves schedulability.
Prioritized Memory Schedulers. Prioritized memory schedulers are the other class of PREM-
based schedulers that we consider. These schedulers work fundamentally diﬀerently than TDMA-
based schedulers. Here, each core executes according to a local scheduling policy (we use EDF).
When a memory phase is encountered, tasks across all cores compete to get memory access. There is
a global, high-level memory arbiter in place which determines which single task among all those with
pending memory phases will be granted main memory access. If a task is granted memory access,
its CPU scheduler always schedules that task immediately. If access is not granted, the memory-
requesting task is blocked and another task, which may not need memory access, may execute on
the same core. The global memory arbiter has the option to revoke memory access in the middle of
a memory phase as well, and grant it to a diﬀerent task.
Prioritized memory schedulers generalize the approach used by the Simple Partitioned FIFO
Locking Protocol (SPFP) [59]. In SPFP, global resource contention is resolved by putting tasks
which compete for global resources into a FIFO. Then, nonpreemptive access to the resource is
granted in FIFO order. Unlike general global shared resources, however, memory access has the
unique characteristic that it can be revoked at any time. This allows us to explore other types of
strategies for resolving the case where multiple tasks compete for memory access. In addition to
FIFO, we also considered other approaches for arbitrating memory access among tasks, including
Rate Monotonic (RM), Earliest Deadline First (EDF), shortest-memory phase ﬁrst, and least-laxity
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Parameter Deviation [ul, uh] EDF Laxity RM FIFO Shortest Figure
- [2.05, 3.90] 0.60 0.77 0.50 0.50 0.54 -
8 Cores [2.45, 5.70] 0.53 0.78 0.36 0.36 0.30 -
12 Cores [2.85, 5.93] 0.64 0.88 0.35 0.34 0.32 -
16 Cores [2.85, 5.93] 0.74 0.90 0.42 0.37 0.37 Figure 3.18
Nonpreempt Mem [2.05, 3.90] 0.62 0.78 0.54 0.50 0.55 -
8 Cores, Nonpreempt Mem [2.85, 5.73] 0.51 0.78 0.34 0.30 0.24 Figure 3.19
12 Cores, Nonpreempt Mem [2.85, 5.95] 0.66 0.87 0.38 0.33 0.33 -
16 Cores, Nonpreempt Mem [2.85, 5.93] 0.77 0.90 0.44 0.36 0.39 -
Table 3.3: Weighted Schedulability of Prioritized-Memory Algorithms
ﬁrst.
In the case of least-laxity-ﬁrst, an ideal scheduler is not implementable. This is because job laxity
changes as a task executes, which can cause an excessive number of preemptions. For this reason,
we ﬁrst consider an approximation of a least-laxity ﬁrst scheduler which uses a scheduling quantum,
q. This scheduling algorithm will perform arbitration to decide which task should access memory at
every scheduling event (task release, deadline, or completion of a scheduling interval), or after q time
elapses, whichever comes ﬁrst. In our ﬁrst measurement, we consider a quantum-based least-laxity
ﬁrst scheduler where q is set to a small value, 25µs. Although this is still likely unimplementable, it
can still be used as a gauge to compare other algorithms against.
For these schedulers, we will also use the memory promotion rule, where memory phases are
given higher priority on cores above CPU-only execution. Similar to the TDMA-based scheduling,
this rule improves schedulability because CPU cores have more ﬂexibility in terms of which tasks to
schedule.
In partitioned multiprocessor systems, it is usually considered meaningless to compare the prior-
ity of two tasks on diﬀerent processors, since one processor may be underutilized. However, since we
are assuming a speciﬁc task partitioning algorithm, we did notice that comparing priorities across
cores, for example as was done in the prioritized memory case for RM and EDF, did improve system
schedulability.
We compared prioritized memory access schemes using a FIFO policy for memory access, as well
as RM, EDF, shortest-memory phase ﬁrst, and least-laxity ﬁrst. The results, in terms of weighted
schedulability ratio, are shown in Table 3.3. The utilization range used for the weighted schedula-
bility computation was from the utilization value ul at which one of the scheduling algorithms could
no longer schedule 100% of the tasks, up to the utilization level uh where none the schedulers could
successfully schedule any of the simulated task sets. The utilization step size was kept constant at
0.025.
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Figure 3.18: In high-contention situations, EDF and least-laxity ﬁrst prioritized memory scheduling
perform best.
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Parameter Deviation [ul, uh] TDMA-RR M-LAX M-EDF Contention Figure
- [2.05, 3.90] 0.64 0.78 0.62 0.61 -
8 Cores [2.85, 5.73] 0.41 0.78 0.51 0.56 -
12 Cores [2.85, 5.95] 0.43 0.87 0.66 0.65 Figure 3.20
16 Cores [2.85, 5.93] 0.47 0.90 0.77 0.73 -
0-5% Cache Stall Ratio [3.25, 3.98] 0.90 0.93 0.91 0.91 -
5-10% Cache Stall Ratio [2.45, 3.95] 0.80 0.90 0.83 0.85 -
10-15% Cache Stall Ratio [2.45, 3.95] 0.66 0.78 0.66 0.68 -
- [2.05, 3.90] 0.64 0.78 0.62 0.61 -
- [2.05, 3.90] 0.64 0.78 0.62 0.61 -
10 Tasks Per Core [2.85, 3.98] 0.89 0.85 0.76 0.51 Figure 3.21
15 Tasks Per Core [3.25, 3.98] 0.98 0.89 0.84 0.34 -
20 Tasks Per Core [2.85, 4.00] 0.98 0.93 0.93 0.54 -
1-10ms Periods [1.65, 3.90] 0.63 0.80 0.71 0.65 -
8 Cores, 1-10ms Periods [2.05, 5.73] 0.46 0.83 0.65 0.60 -
12 Cores, 1-10ms Periods [1.65, 5.93] 0.49 0.88 0.76 0.72 Figure 3.22
16 Cores, 1-10ms Periods [2.45, 6.20] 0.42 0.81 0.74 0.73 -
Table 3.4: Weighted Schedulability Comparison
As the number of cores increases, so does the contention for memory access (and the number of
tasks competing for access, since we keep the number of tasks per core constant). For this reason,
the diﬀerence in schedulability is even more visible when the number of cores is larger. In order to
gauge the absolute diﬀerence between the algorithms, a graph of the fraction of schedulable task
sets for each utilization level in a 16 core system is shown in Figure 3.18. Here, the best algorithms
for prioritized memory access are EDF and least-laxity ﬁrst.
As mentioned before, a least-laxity scheduler, even the quantum-based version we considered,
can cause a huge number of preemptions during a memory phase which makes it not implementable.
We now consider the eﬀect of making the memory phases nonpreemptive.
Table 3.3 contains the weighted schedulability for the version of the schedulers where memory
phases are made nonpreemptive. For memory access which is prioritized by EDF and least-laxity
ﬁrst, we also provide a comparison with the preemptive versions in Figure 3.19. Here, both sched-
ulers beneﬁt from nonpreemptive memory phases. However, this modiﬁcation allows for the better
of the two algorithms, least-laxity ﬁrst, to be realizable in an implementation.
Comparison. We now compare the best schedulers we have found so far from both categories.
Additionally, we considered the unscheduled case were concurrent memory access causes timing
interference among cores. We also consider a wider range of task generation parameters to make
sure our analysis is not subject to the speciﬁc parameters we have been using in the simulations so
far.
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Figure 3.20: A comparison with the regular task generation parameters shows M-LAX performing
best.
From TDMA-based schedulers we consider the TDMA-Round Robin (TDMA-RR) scheduler with
a small slot size (25µs). Although a 25µs slot size is likely unimplementable due to the context-switch
overhead, it serves as an upper bound on the performance that can be expected from a TDMA-based
approach. From prioritized memory schedulers, we will evaluate least-laxity ﬁrst with nonpreemptive
memory phases (labeled as M-LAX) as well as an EDF-based scheduler with nonpreemptive memory
phases (labeled as M-EDF). We also include a contention-based scheduler, which represents the
unscheduled case where memory phases among diﬀerent cores can overlap. In contention-based
scheduling, task execution is slowed down whenever there are concurrent memory phases on diﬀerent
cores. When n cores have overlapping memory phases, contention-based scheduling fairly divides the
memory bandwidth among tasks so each core gets 1n of the original memory bandwidth (resulting
in a longer memory phase). This would happen if the low-level hardware arbiter used some form of
round-robin and the memory requests were of equal size. This is, however, slightly pessimistic in
that it assumes memory phases are always constantly accessing memory.
A comparison with the original scheduling parameters is given in Table 3.4. Among the scheduling
algorithms we have investigated, M-LAX outperform the others, including the contention-based case.
A view of the absolute diﬀerence with 12 cores is shown in Figure 3.20.
We modiﬁed the cache stall ratio to show the eﬀect of the amount of memory contention on
the diﬀerent scheduling approaches. As seen in Table 3.4, when contention is low, all schedulers
do comparatively better (the utilization ranges used for weighted schedulability, and the value of
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Figure 3.21: As we increase the number of tasks in the system, contention-based scheduling lags
behind the other approaches.
weighted schedulability are both higher). As the cache stall ratio increases, as the tasks demand
more memory access, M-LAX begins to outperform the other schedulers by an increasing margin.
Next, we increase the number of tasks in the system. A representative plot is shown in Figure
3.21. The number of tasks per core is used to determine the number of tasks in the entire system.
However, due to the worst-ﬁt-ﬁrst decreasing task partitioner, this does not mean that each core
has the same number of tasks assigned to it. With more tasks in the system, at the same utilization
level, each task generally will have a smaller utilization. By increasing the number of tasks at a
ﬁxed utilization level, all schedulers experience improvement in schedulability. Contention-based
scheduling lags behind the others in the amount of improvement, however. This matches the result
from the Memory-Centric Scheduling bound [40]. As we add more tasks to the system at a ﬁxed
utilization level, the length of the memory phases becomes shorter. The TDMA-RR approach does
well in this situation, outperforming even M-LAX. Although M-LAX still does well in this case,
TDMA-RR more evenly divides bandwidth among the cores, which is important in this situation.
When we modiﬁed the task periods to be between 1ms and 10ms with a period quantum of 1ms,
as shown in Figure 3.22, M-LAX performs best. This shows it is a good choice for other task periods
as well. TDMA-RR performs poorly here because a fair bandwidth allocation does not take into
account the larger diﬀerence in task criticality.
Discussion. Among the schedulers we have investigated, M-LAX scheduling, which is scheduling
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Figure 3.22: After modifying the period used for the generation, M-LAX still performs best.
where memory phases are arbitrated globally using a nonpreemptive least-laxity ﬁrst approach,
generally performs best. Even in the case where there are more tasks per core, and TDMA-RR does
best, M-LAX is not far behind. In these cases, the TDMA-RR we simulated, with a 25µ s TDMA
slot size, is an upper bound on the expected performance of an implementable TDMA-RR with a
larger, more realistic slot size. Having a larger slot would likely degrade performance, as shown in
Figure 3.17.
We believe a laxity-based approach works better than EDF when choosing which tasks to run in
a multicore system. This is because individual tasks can vary greatly in their utilization, so a task
with a long deadline on one core might actually have a long execution time as well, so it cannot be
excessively delayed. If another core has a task with a shorter deadline, however, it would get priority
in an EDF-based approach. Using a least-laxity ﬁrst scheduling rule is better because it takes into
account not just the deadlines, but also the remaining execution time.
The nonpreemptable aspect of memory phases in M-LAX scheduling is not only necessary be-
cause a fully preemptable version is unimplementable, but this rule actually improves schedulability
(Figure 3.19). This is due to the case when tasks on diﬀerent cores running memory phases have
identical laxity. A preemptable least-laxity scheduler would switch back and forth between them, so
only one is executing at a time. The nonpreemptive version will execute an entire memory phase,
and then, when the second task's memory phase is running, the ﬁrst task can run its execution
phase. This improves parallelism, which generally beneﬁts schedulability.
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One potential downside of nonpreemptive memory phases is that they can cause priority inver-
sion. This can especially cause problems when the memory phase times approach the lengths of the
periods of tasks, since the maximum memory phase time represents the maximum blocking time
from this priority inversion. For this reason, we do not expect M-LAX to do well when the minimum
period in the system is small, where small means comparable to the size of the memory phases in
the task set. This can be somewhat resolved by, if the task permits it, making memory phases even
smaller, or splitting memory phases into multiple nonpreemptive chunks. This splitting, however,
will likely increase task preemptions.
In conclusion, our evaluation indicates that partitioned PREM-compliant task sets are generally
best scheduled by an M-LAX scheduler. This scheduler uses EDF to schedule computation on each
CPU, but promotes memory phases above CPU-only computation. Memory arbitration among tasks
is done through a global high-level arbiter which chooses the memory phase corresponding to task
with the least laxity. Surprisingly, the nonpreemptive memory phases in M-LAX serve not only to
make the scheduler implementable, but also were shown to generally outperform a quantum-based
strategy for least-laxity approach that approximates the ﬂuid model.
3.3 Related Work
Real-Time I/O Management System. Several related works address the problem of interference
while accessing main memory. Some approaches look at analysis of interference among mutually-
transmitting peripherals [62, 63]. Empirical approaches can estimate the impact of PCI-bus load
on task computation time based on experimental measurements of reference tasks [64]. Alternately,
analytical approaches exist to bound I/O interference [65]. However, the analysis is restricted to
a single DMA controller using predictable cycle-stealing arbitration, and can not be applied to a
COTS system. There is also analysis to estimate the impact of mutual interference among processing
cores. For example, static analysis can compute cache access delay in a multiprocessor system [66].
However, these results focus on deriving the increase in task execution time while neglecting the
eﬀect of delay on communication ﬂows.
Modeling complex COTS interconnections and estimating delay and buﬀer requirements for
peripheral ﬂows can be done in an AADL-based environment [67]. An event-based model may be
used to estimate delay for both computation and communication activities in a multicore system-
on-chip [28]. However, lack of precise knowledge of COTS behavior implies that this analysis must
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make pessimistic assumptions, which can lead to high delay and buﬀer sizes. The Real-Time I/O
Management System removes such unpredictability by forcing an implicit bus schedule.
Several other analysis frameworks exist to estimate delay characteristics for communication ﬂows
in embedded systems. For example, Real-Time Calculus can compute end-to-end delay for various
real-time systems [68, 69]. Analysis methodologies are available for existing real-time interconnec-
tions such as CAN [70]. However, these methodologies typically assume a detailed knowledge of
each component's behavior, which is often unavailable in a COTS-based system.
Predictable Execution Model. Prior real-time research has proposed several solutions to
address diﬀerent sources of unpredictability in COTS components, including real-time handling of
peripheral drivers, real-time compilation, and analysis of contention for memory and buses. For
peripheral drivers, Facchinetti et al. [71] proposed using a non-preemptive interrupt server to better
support the reusing of legacy drivers. Additionally, analysis can be done to model worst-case tem-
poral interference caused by device drivers [72]. For real-time compilation, a tight coupling between
compiler and worst-case execution time (WCET) analyzer can optimize a program's WCET [73].
Alternatively, a compiler-based approach can provide predictable paging [74]. For analysis of con-
tention for memory and buses, existing timing analysis techniques can analyze the maximum delay
caused by contention for a shared memory or bus under various access models [28, 29]. All these
works attempt to analyze or control a single resource and obtain safe bounds that are often highly
pessimistic. Instead, PREM is based on a global coschedule of all relevant system resources.
Instead of using COTS components, other researchers have discussed new architectural solutions
that can greatly increase system predictability by removing signiﬁcant sources of interference. In-
stead of a standard cache-based architecture, a real-time scratchpad architecture can be used to
provide predictable access time to main memory [75]. The Precision Time (PRET) machine [76, 77]
promises to simultaneously deliver high computational performance together with cycle-accurate
estimation of program execution time. Unfortunately, these solutions require extensive redesign
of existing components (in particular, the CPU). While our PREM execution model borrows some
ideas from this work, it is compatible with available COTS platforms: all existing components can be
reused, albeit some new devices must be connected to the motherboard and the COTS peripherals.
This approach allows PREM to leverage the advantage of the economy of scale of COTS systems,
and support the progressive migration of legacy systems.
Multicore PREM Scheduling. In terms of real-time multiprocessor scheduling, many solu-
tions have been proposed [78], but most results do not consider the interference caused by shared
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physical resources like caches, buses, memory. Many timing analysis frameworks have been proposed
to capture such interference, but unfortunately, WCET estimations tends to be quite pessimistic.
Hence, instead of performing timing analysis, we focus on memory and cache-aware scheduling tech-
niques. Holman et al. [79] reduced bus contention at the start of the scheduling quantum caused by
simultaneous data reloading into the cache. Anderson et al. [80] provided methods to reduce cache
contention in a multicore system with a shared cache. However, these approaches are not optimized
for the worst case, even though they perform well in the average case. Other solutions have been
developed for soft real-time systems [81, 82, 83, 84], but they cannot be directly used to provide
guarantees necessary for hard real-time. Multicore systems with a shared L2 cache were also studied
by Guan et al. [85], who proposed a scheduling algorithm and a schedulability test based on linear
programming. Rosen et al. [66] proposed a method to obtain eﬃcient TDMA arbitration policies
by using static analysis.
Other research has investigated hardware-based architectural modiﬁcations to increase system
predictability by removing the sources of inter-core interference. Such eﬀorts include predictable
DRAM controllers [86, 87, 88], real-time scratchpad architectures [75], and predictable pipelines
[76]. Our work, in contrast, considers using COTS hardware, but with modiﬁed software which
enables high-level scheduling of memory access to prevent contention at the low-level, non-real-
time, hardware arbiters. In the PREM scheduling problem, main memory is essentially treated as
a resource shared among all cores. In other words, to execute a memory-intensive portion of the
code (memory phase), the task must acquire both its local processor as well as the shared memory
resource. In this sense, the PREM scheduling problem is a special instance of the more general
problem of real-time resource sharing in a multiprocessor. Several solutions have been proposed for
this problem [89, 59], based on locking protocols for real-time multiprocessor systems [90, 91].
Brandenburg et al. [59] precisely deﬁned the concept of blocking time in multiprocessor schedul-
ing and presented optimality results for resource sharing protocols. In particular, a distinction is
made between the case where a high-priority task waiting for resource access still allows lower-priority
tasks to execute in its place (s-aware blocking), and the case where this is not possible (s-oblivious
blocking). Since, in the PREM scheduling problem, tasks which are waiting for main memory access
are suspended, we naturally consider s-aware blocking. The Simple Partitioned FIFO Locking Pro-
tocol (SPFP), which uses a single global FIFO for all shared resources, is asymptotically optimal in
the s-aware case for partitioned scheduling [59]. Therefore, when evaluating multiprocessor PREM
schedulers, we compared our approach with SPFP in Section 3.2.3.4.
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3.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, we addressed the challenge of aﬀordability in real-time systems. This was done
by leveraging on the low cost and high performance nature of commercial-oﬀ-the-shelf (COTS)
components. COTS components, however, often can not guarantee real-time requirements. We
therefore proposed minimal additions to COTS systems and modiﬁcations to current practice, in
order to make systems capable of satisfying real-time computation requirements.
We described two speciﬁc techniques to do this. One was a Real-Time I/O Management system,
which could buﬀer incoming I/O traﬃc and deliver it predictably to main memory. The second was
the PRedicatable Execution Model (PREM), which modiﬁed software tasks running on the CPU to
only access main memory at known intervals of time.
The high-level link between these approaches is the idea of implicit scheduling. Since the low-
level bus and memory arbiters are not real time and not changeable, we instead control when the
requests to shared resources occur. If only a single request to shared resource occurs at a time, it
will be immediately granted, contention-free, by the non-real-time arbiter. We have demonstrated
that implicit scheduling is eﬀective for both I/O peripherals and for real-time software tasks.
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Chapter 4
Node Safety
In cyber-physical systems, it is essential that the low-level controllers on the individual nodes, which
actuate objects in the physical world, meet formal safety requirements regarding this actuation.
Furthermore, the high-level safety approach outlined earlier in Chapter 2 relies upon a behavior
model of the individual nodes of the distributed control system. If this model does not reﬂect the
behavior of the individual nodes, errors in the low-level controllers may compromise not only local
safety, but can also lead to violations of global safety properties of the CPS. Directly guaranteeing
the node's behavior through formal veriﬁcation, however, is often impossible due to a lack of accurate
models, or, even if such models are available, leads to an intractable veriﬁcation problem. In this
chapter, we will ﬁll in this remaining gap of guaranteeing the behavior of the individual nodes,
without mandating direct veriﬁcation or exhaustive testing.
The approach we advocate is based upon the Simplex Architecture [18]. Simplex incorporates
supervisory control and switching logic on top of an unveriﬁed controller, for the purpose of improv-
ing system robustness. A Simplex system consists of three main components, shown in Figure 4.1.
Under normal operating conditions, the unveriﬁed complex controller actuates the system. If the
system state becomes in danger of property violation, the safety controller takes over. After some
time, the safety controller should drive the system to a state that can tolerate aggressive action
without danger of property violation, and the complex controller is allowed to resume control. The
switching between the controllers is performed by a decision module.
The advantage of the Simplex design is in the potential for simpler veriﬁcation. By verifying
the safety controller and decision module, properties about the composite system can be proven.
Thus, we avoid having to perform veriﬁcation on the complex controller directly, which, in some
instances, can signiﬁcantly reduce veriﬁcation eﬀort. For example, if the complex controller is hand-
coded, models developed independently will not capture its true behavior (hand written code almost
certainly will contain bugs), and accurate models generated from the code are often intractably
large. Creating the safety controller in a veriﬁed manner can often be less intensive than creating
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Figure 4.1: The Simplex Architecture provides system veriﬁcation by using an unveriﬁed complex
controller combined with a veriﬁed backup safety controller and veriﬁed decision module which
chooses which controller to run at each point in time.
the complex controller, as only safety-critical considerations need to be taken into account, whereas
the complex controller must also meet mission-critical requirements.
From the design of Simplex, it is clear that a correct decision module is essential. Some systems
can not modeled easily with diﬀerential equations or have safety controllers that are too complex to
permit proofs for useful properties [92]. In these instances, best practices from software engineering
may be used to develop the decision module.
In other systems, a formal approach is possible. For verifying a decision module in a system
with purely continuous dynamics, a Lyapunov function's stability region can be used drive the
decision module [93, 94]. A Lyapunov function for a controller for a particular plant deﬁnes a
region of space where, if the current system state is within the region and the controller is used,
the system will remain within the region indeﬁnitely. If a Lyapunov function exists for the safety
controller where the stability region is deﬁned within the operational constraints without containing
property violation states, and we know the maximum gradient over time for any controller within
the Lyapunov stability region, we can formally derive the decision module switching rule. If our
current system state is at least the maximum gradient times the control iteration time away from
the Lyapunov stability region boundary, the complex controller can be used. In the worst case, the
state space will proceed at the maximum gradient towards the Lyapunov stability region boundary,
but will not cross it before the next control iteration. We can then switch to the safety controller
which is guaranteed to stay within the Lyapunov stability region. In this way, the property violation
region is never entered. The situation is shown in a two-dimensional state space in Figure 4.2. In
practice, a margin larger than the maximum gradient times the control iteration time is often used
to account for modeling errors and provide additional safety. After the safety controller returns
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Figure 4.2: In a continuous two-dimensional state space, a Lyapunov function of the safety controller
can be used to guarantee safety. The distance d is at least the maximum gradient of the state space
within the stability region times the control iteration time. If the state is within the grey region,
the complex controller can be used. Otherwise, the safety controller is used.
the state to within the complex controller region, the complex controller can resume driving the
plant. Typically, however, a smaller region is used when switching back to the complex controller,
creating a hysteresis which prevents frequent controller switching. The drawback of this approach is
that, even within strictly continuous systems, there is no general technique to determine a Lyapunov
function for a particular controller and plant.
This chapter advances research in the Simplex Architecture in two key areas:
• Existing application-level fault-tolerance methods, even if formally veriﬁed, leave the system
vulnerable to errors in the real-time operating system (RTOS), middleware, and micropro-
cessor. We ﬁrst introduce the System-Level Simplex Architecture in Section 4.1, which uses
hardware/software co-design to provide a fail-operational guarantee despite such errors.
• Formal design of Simplex has previously mainly been concerned with purely continuous sys-
tems. Chapter 4.2 develops formal approaches to apply Simplex to hybrid system models,
which consist of continuous dynamics deﬁned by diﬀerential equations, and discrete logic rep-
resented by a ﬁnite state machine.
4.1 The System-Level Simplex Architecture
The original Simplex Architecture (which we refer to in this section as the Application-Level Simplex
Architecture), is an approach to protect systems from faults in an unveriﬁed complex controller's
logic by providing a veriﬁed safety controller and veriﬁed decision module. However, most systems
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in use will contain a set of dependent layers on which all our software relies for correctness. These
include things like the microprocessor, the Real-time Operating System (RTOS) or the middleware.
If errors are present in these components, or errors arise from their upgrades, the Application-Level
Simplex approach can not guarantee safety.
For this reason we propose the System-Level Simplex Architecture, which provides robustness
in the presence of both bugs in the application and bugs in previously dependent layers such as
the RTOS. In this new architecture, we perform hardware/software partitioning on the Simplex
framework. The two Simplex safety-critical components, the safety controller and decision module,
are moved to a dedicated processing unit, not for the typical HW/SW co-design reasons of power
and performance, but instead to provide isolation from software-related complexity. Additionally,
this architecture meets the temporal constraints of the monitored safety properties by design.
In this section, we will ﬁrst explain the key design elements of System-Level Simplex. We will then
elaborate on the fault model under consideration. Next, we apply System-Level Simplex to two case
studies. In the ﬁrst, we examine pacemaker design and contrast the failures handled by the System-
Level Simplex Architecture pacemaker with a previous-generation pacemaker. Then we apply the
System-Level Simplex Architecture to an inverted pendulum system and verify its robustness with
fault-injection testing. In our earlier research on System-Level Simplex [2], we had also created a
design process to help produce both a valid architecture design and a valid implementation of a
system which uses System-Level Simplex.
4.1.1 System-Level Simplex Design
The System-Level Simplex Architecture is based on the original Simplex concept[18]. As described
in the chapter's introduction, Simplex is logically divided into three subsystems: safety, complex,
and decision. The safety subsystem has a simple, reliable controller which provides veriﬁably safe
performance. This is used in case the complex controller malfunctions. The complex controller
drives the system as long as it does not jeopardize system liveliness. This controller can be changed
and upgraded while the system is running and may even contain bugs. The decision subsystem
chooses which of the two previously-mentioned controllers to use. The decision module and safety
controller make up the trusted computing base, and must function correctly for the system to remain
safe, while most of the system's complexity is contained within the complex controller.
The Application-Level Simplex design had all three subsystems located in software. This worked
well for protecting the system from value faults from the complex controller, however it required
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that, to guarantee system safety, the middleware, the operating system, and the microprocessor were
all fully reliable. We relax this requirement in the System-Level Simplex architecture by performing
hardware/software partitioning on the system. The two Simplex safety-critical components, the
safety controller and the decision module, are moved into a dedicated processing unit outside the
microprocessor.
This is akin to hardware/software co-design, except that we perform this move not primarily
for reasons of performance and power consumption, but instead to protect from software-related
faults. The designer therefore has a choice of what the dedicated processing unit should be. One
option is to use a microcontroller to run the two safety core subsystems. However, in safety-
critical systems, even processors are not completely trusted [95], and we can choose to eliminate this
underlying complexity. For example, we can run the Simplex safety core on dedicated hardware.
Ideally we would produce an Application-Speciﬁc Integrated Circuit (ASIC), but instead, for cost
and reprogrammability reasons, we opted to perform our evaluation using a Field Programmable
Gate Array (FPGA). The same VHDL code used to program an FPGA can be used to produce an
ASIC.
By moving the Simplex safety core to isolated hardware, we can also provide temporal correctness
for the monitored safety properties. If the high-performance complex subsystem does not produce
a control command in the appropriate time, whether caused by an RTOS bug, poor cache perfor-
mance or excessive bus contention, the conservative safety controller's output is used. Since the
safety controller runs in parallel on isolated hardware (which prevents run-time variations caused
by resource sharing), the temporal constraints are met by design.
4.1.2 Fault Model
The System-Level Simplex Architecture tolerates two broad categories of faults: logical faults and
resource sharing faults.
Logical faults occur when the complex controller passes an unsafe value to the decision module,
or a value of an incorrect type. One cause for this sort of fault is a malfunctioning complex controller.
An incorrectly-typed value, on the other hand, may cause logical operations that use it to fail. For
example, if the control commands are IEEE ﬂoating-point values that correspond to voltages, the
values NAN or inﬁnity are incorrectly-typed. Another logical fault occurs when a non-functional
complex controller does not output any value.
Resource sharing faults are caused by failures in common resources among components. The
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original Application-Level Simplex Architecture shares several resources, each of which can cause
the system to fail. These include all the physical and logical resources managed by the OS like
memory, CPU, and shared libraries. These faults can manifest directly (a misimplemented library
causing the decision module process to crash), or indirectly (a mismanaged processor causing timing
faults). Additional shared resources may include the communication bus and the power source.
There also exist out-of-scope faults which System-Level Simplex does not address. Speciﬁcally,
the sensors and actuators used by our system must be reliable and accurate. The FPGA hardware,
which runs our Simplex safety core, is assumed to be correctly manufactured. Additionally, the
synthesis process, which takes our VHDL code and generates FPGA bitstreams, is unaddressed.
However, these faults are rare since companies strive to provide reliable hardware and synthesis
tools, and some of them may be even further reduced by techniques like triple modular redundancy
(TMR) [96]. We also do not handle environmental modeling faults which can be present in any
system that uses formal methods. Since model checking is performed on the models and not the
physical environment, a signiﬁcant mismatch between the two results in an unsafe system, even if
it is fully model checked. To account for these errors, the formal model should be reviewed, and
fault-injection testing should still be performed on the ﬁnal system.
4.1.3 System-Level Simplex Design for a Cardiac Pacemaker
A cardiac pacemaker is a piece of hardware inserted into a patient's body in order to regulate his
or her heart rate. Detailed designs of cardiac pacemakers have been disclosed [97, 98]. In this
safety-critical application, we examine the practicality and usefulness of the System-Level Simplex
Architecture, as well as the end-to-end design process.
We investigate two considerations for using the System-Level Simplex Architecture:
• Can the system be divided up into a safe controller and a complex controller, such that the
most likely causes of failure are contained in the complex controller?
• How do the resultant safety guarantees compare to those of existing pacemakers?
4.1.3.1 Dividing the Cardiac Pacemaker System
The ﬁrst concern, the division of the system into complex and simple controllers, asks if the logical
Simplex framework can be applied to a cardiac pacemaker. Since this is domain-speciﬁc, we examine
some properties of artiﬁcial pacemakers.
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The ﬁrst generation of artiﬁcial pacemakers actuated the heart at a set interval. This func-
tionality was suﬃcient to keep the patient alive, however, problems did arise. For example, when
a healthy person walks up stairs or performs strenuous action, his heart rate increases. The ﬁrst
generation of pacemakers did not take this into account and patients would become dizzy and un-
comfortable. Additional functionality was added to pacemakers to detect if the heart rate should
be increased by monitoring the temperature of the blood, or the acceleration on the patient's body
[97]. Requirements were then added on top of this to preserve smooth heart-rate transitions, rather
than suddenly jumping from 65 to 120 beats per minute because of a sudden large acceleration.
Additionally, modern pacemakers attempt to detect and log anomalous events related to the heart
to aid a doctor's diagnosis. The logged data must be retrieved, and this is done through wireless
communication with an external device.
Modern pacemakers have many other requirements, however we already covered enough to apply
the System-Level Simplex Architecture. The rate-adaptive pacing modes, where the heart rate
changes over time, require complex functionality. The pacing rate to which we should change is
a function of the current rate, as well as the past and present accelerometer readings. The safety
properties we want to enforce are that the heart rate should be between a lower rate limit and an
upper rate limit, and should not change by more than a doctor-speciﬁed rate-smoothing parameter.
These are the properties monitored by the decision module. The safe controller is a ﬁnite-state
machine that meets the safety requirements. We choose a safe controller that slows down the heart
to the resting rate (lower rate limit) in a way that satisﬁes the rate smoothing requirement. This
safety controller does not have the complex rate-adaptive functionality, but instead provides a fail-
operational mode that will maintain safety for the patient.
4.1.3.2 Comparing against Existing Pacemaker Reliability Mechanisms
The second consideration compares the existing reliability mechanisms found in one previous-
generation pacemaker description [97] to the design created using the System-Level Simplex end-to-
end design process. We focus on two mechanisms for enhanced reliability which were present in the
pacemaker description we examined.
The ﬁrst is a watchdog timer which is periodically reset during normal system execution. If the
execution hangs at some point, the timer will not be reset and will timeout. The timeout triggers
a high-priority interrupt which signals that an anomalous event has occurred and the system is
reinitialized. Alternately, the system can be shut down as a fail-safe mechanism.
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The watchdog timer mechanism is compatible with the System-Level Simplex Architecture. It
provides a means to restart the system when it enters a rare error state. However, the watchdog
timer does not protect the system from unsafe pacing, only system hangs. Additionally, deterministic
bugs in the program will continue to restart the system, whereas a System-Level Simplex system is
able to function safely in spite of deterministic bugs in the complex controller.
The other safety mechanism we examine is a redundant pacemaker system which, at ﬁrst, ap-
pears to be similar to the Simplex approach. This system provides a simpler pacing mode without
rate-adaption. This system takes control from the microprocessor when a fault is detected in the
operation of the microprocessor circuit. This component, like the System-Level Simplex Archi-
tecture, provides protection from microprocessor errors. This is a real cause of concern with this
speciﬁc pacemaker design because it uses a custom pacemaker-speciﬁc microprocessor. However, it
does not provide protection from logical faults in the software. Additionally, control is switched to
this system when any fault in the microprocessor is detected. In the System-Level Simplex Archi-
tecture, a hardware fault that only aﬀects the logging mechanism (perhaps because of a rarely used
instruction), one that does not compromise safety, would not trigger a change in control.
4.1.4 System-Level Simplex Design for Inverted Pendulum
An inverted pendulum is a classical control testbed where a rod must be maintained upright by
moving a cart along a track. An inverted pendulum presents an obvious failure state when the
rod falls over. We applied the System-Level Simplex Architecture to an inverted pendulum and
evaluated its robustness by inserting faults and observing system robustness.
We guaranteed safety in this system through the same technique as previous Simplex applications
[18]. By measuring the inverted pendulum system, we could deﬁne a Lyapunov stability function
[99]. From this, we can generate the safety controller C code using Matlab Simulink [100] and
determine when the decision module should switch controllers (before the state leaves the Lyapunov
stability neighborhood). The C code was then manually translated to VHDL for hardware synthesis.
Our hardware safety core resides on an externally-powered Xilinx ML505 FPGA. This FPGA
contains a PCIe port which is used to communicate to a PC which runs the software portion of
the architecture. The software portion uses a custom driver written for Linux. We run Linux/RK
[101] as the operating system for the complex controller. Since the System-Level Simplex Architec-
ture handles timing faults, we purposefully do not use the provided real-time scheduler. Through
memory-mapped I/O, the complex controller reads the most recent angle and track position and
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Inverted Pendulum Fault-Injection
Failure Type Safe
No Output
√
Maximum Voltage
√
Wrong Way  Maximum Voltage
√
Time Degraded Control
√
OS Crash
√
Timing Faults
√
Computer Reboot
√
Table 4.1: The System-Level Simplex inverted pendulum implementation tolerates a variety of faults.
suggests a motor voltage to the hardware-based decision module.
After constructing the system, we veriﬁed that the software-based complex controller was able to
actuate the inverted pendulum as long as it did not jeopardize safety. When the pendulum's state
approached the edge of the Lyapunov stability neighborhood, the safety controller took over and
prevented the pendulum from collapsing. In this way, the system was able to tolerate a multitude
of faults as outlined in Table 4.1. We outline two of these faults in detail.
4.1.4.1 Wrong Way  Maximum Voltage
The pendulum should remain balanced even if the complex controller outputs a motor voltage that
would normally destabilize the system. This test took an extreme case of this where we used a
working inverted pendulum controller for a few seconds, and then output the maximum voltage in
the direction opposite of that needed to stabilize the pendulum. The decision module detected this
and switched control to the safety subsystem. The safety controller returned the pendulum to a
stable state and control was again given to the complex subsystem after a few seconds. Measurements
from one iteration of this process are given in Figure 4.3.
4.1.4.2 Computer Reboot
The System-Level Simplex Architecture provides protection from arbitrary operating system behav-
ior, including rebooting the system. From the decision module's perspective, the computer rebooting
is equivalent to a complex controller that sends no output. We ran this test on our inverted pen-
dulum setup, and the pendulum remained stable throughout the reboot process. Additionally, after
the computer restarted, the software-based complex controller was able to regain control of the in-
verted pendulum using memory-mapped I/O with the FPGA. This is signiﬁcant because a common
remedy for software problems is rebooting the computer. A malfunctioning complex controller can
be repaired in this fashion while the physical system remains safe and stable.
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Figure 4.3: When the inverted pendulum state passes the edge of the recoverable region (dashed
line), the safety controller takes over and prevents system collapse.
4.2 Simplex Decision Module Generation
A system which uses the Simplex approach, whether it is the original Application-Level Simplex
design or the System-Level Simplex architecture described in the previous section, needs a correct
decision module to provide system safety. Existing formal approaches for this crucial task, as dis-
cussed in this chapter's introduction, focus on purely continuous systems. We will now describe an
approach for formal design of the Simplex decision module which is generalized for hybrid systems,
which contain both continuous and discrete dynamics. This approach is based on computing reach-
ability and time-bounded reachability, which will describe next. Finally, we will describe two tools
we have created which use our research results in order to support Simplex-based design.
In the following sections we will consider hybrid systems, which are systems that contain both
discrete and continuous dynamics. The basic approach we will describe uses reachability and time-
bounded reachability in order to generate the decision module logic. This is described in Section
4.2.1. In the context of computing reachability, we consider general nonlinear hybrid systems, and
develop an initial approach based on quantization in Section 4.2.2. Afterward, we show how we can
increase accuracy of the approach arbitrarily in exchange for computation time, and apply it to a
more general class of systems in Section 4.2.3.
4.2.1 Decision Module Generation Approach
In this section, we give brieﬂy outline hybrid systems (a more thorough treatment will be provided
later) and model Simplex as a hybrid automaton. With this modeling in place, the decision module
logic can be expressed using the reachability and time-bounded reachability of hybrid automata. In
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the next sections, we will expand upon algorithms to compute this reachability and time-bounded
reachability.
The key components for Simplex (shown in Figure 4.1) are (a) the complex controller (cc), (b)
a safety controller (sc) and (c) a decision module (dm). Once every ∆ time, the dm observes the
plant and makes a decision about which controller (sc or cc) to activate. Roughly, if there is a
possibility of entering an unrecoverable state within the next ∆ interval, then dm activates sc. Once
sc restores the plant to a state from which there is no possibility of violating safety in the next ∆
interval, it reactivates cc. We model each controller/plant combination in the Simplex system as a
hybrid automaton [102, 8, 9].
Informally, a hybrid automaton is a combination of diﬀerential equations with a ﬁnite state
machine, where the state of the system can evolve both continuously and discretely. The continuous
evolution of a hybrid system typically models the evolution of the physical variables in the plant,
while the discrete transitions typically model software behavior. A state of a hybrid automaton
consists of an assignment to each continuous variable, as well as the discrete mode of the automaton.
The reachable set of states from an initial state are the states which the hybrid automaton may enter
as time elapses, according to the switching rules and invariants of the automaton. A more formal
presentation of hybrid automata and their semantics will be provided in later, in Section 4.2.2.1.
Let U be the set of unsafe states of the plant model. BackReach(U , sc) is deﬁned as the set of
states from which U can be reached within the sc hybrid automaton. In order to drive the Simplex
switching logic, we will use the set of states from which BackReach(U , sc) can be reached in up to ∆
time within the cc hybrid automaton. In the course of our research [6], we have shown that if sc is
activated when the plant state is ﬁrst detected to be in this set of states, then the overall Simplex
system remains safe. Intuitively, this is for the following reason. The set of states BackReach(U , sc)
represent the unrecoverable states that may not be entered, since even the safety controller may
reach an unsafe state from these. At each decision point, which happens every ∆ time, we then
will check if the complex controller can be used for the next ∆ time. This amounts to checking if
the ∆-reachable states (the states reachable in up to ∆ time) from the current state contain any
of the unrecoverable states. To compute these states directly from the unsafe states U , we use the
expression:
G = BackReach≤∆(BackReach(U , sc),cc) (4.1)
Given this expression we can, in principle, generate a dm that is correct by construction. Un-
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fortunately, the problem of computing backwards reachable sets for hybrid systems has been well
studied and is, for general hybrid systems, undecidable [103]. Furthermore, an accurate model for
cc may not be available for the reasons presented in the chapter's introduction. We can circumvent
these issues by computing an overapproximation G′ ⊇ BackReach≤∆(BackReach(U , sc),cc') based
on an abstract model cc' of the complex controller. For example, the actual outputs generated
by cc can be abstracted by the range of values that are valid outputs for the actuators. Since G′
overapproximates G, using G′ as the switching set also guarantees overall system safety (but may in-
troduce pessimism based on the accuracy of the overapproximation). The next sections will describe
methods of computing overapproximations of reachability and time-bounded reachability.
4.2.2 Quantization-based Approach for Computing Reachability
We will now a quantization-based approach for computing overapproximations of reachabilty and
time-bounded reachability. Although this approach uses discrete abstractions, it is diﬀerent from
discrete abstraction algorithms discussed in earlier work [104, 105]. Existing approaches consider
which neighboring regions can be reached from each region, and then perform a ﬁxed-point com-
putation to determine reachability. The approach presented here, on the other hand, will construct
a discrete abstraction where every evolution of the system of up to some δ time will have a cor-
responding discrete transition. Therefore, by looking at all outgoing edges from a discrete state,
δ-reachability can be overapproximated (which is necessary for computing the Simplex decision logic
in Equation 4.1 in Section 4.2.1).
In this section, we will ﬁrst present a formalization of hybrid systems and their discrete ab-
stractions in Section 4.2.2.1. Next, Section 4.2.2.2 uses the developed formalism to describe a
quantization-based approach which can be used to overapproximate reachability and time-bounded
reachability. Finally, we describe using the quantization approach on an oﬀ-road vehicle rollover
case study in Section 4.2.2.3.
4.2.2.1 Hybrid Systems Formalism
Let V be a set of variables. Each variable v ∈ V is associated with a type which deﬁnes the set of
values v can take. The set of valuations of V is denoted by val(V ). A variable may be discrete or
continuous. Typically, discrete variables model protocol or software state, and continuous variables
model physical quantities such as time, position, and velocity. For a subset S ⊆ Rn, we denote by
Si the projection of S on the i
th coordinate, 0 ≤ i ≤ n.
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Hybrid Automata and Discrete Abstractions
Discrete abstractions for cyber-physical systems are mathematically modeled as automata or
labeled transition systems.
Deﬁnition 1. A Labeled Transition System (LTS) A is a tuple 〈Y,Θ, A,D〉 where
1. Y is a set of variables; elements of val(Y ) are called states,
2. Θ ⊆ val(Y ) is a set of initial states,
3. A is a set of actions, and
4. D ⊆ val(Y ) × A × val(Y ), is a set of transitions. For an element (y, a,y′) ∈ D, we write
y
a→ y′.
An execution of LTS A is an (possibly inﬁnite) alternating sequence y0a1y1a2 . . ., where y0 ∈ Θ,
and for each i, yi
ai+1→ yi+1. The set of executions and reachable states of A are denoted by ExecA
and ReachA. Given a set of states S ⊆ val(Y ), the set PrevA(S) is deﬁned as the set of states from
which some state in S can be reached in a single transition of A, that is, {y ∈ val(Y ) | ∃y′ ∈ S, a ∈
A,y
a→ y′}. BackReachA(S) is the least ﬁxpoint of the PrevA() starting from S.
Here, we work with input/output-free hybrid automaton models for cyber-physical systems. A
Hybrid Automaton (HA) is a non-deterministic state machine whose variables may change, (a) in-
stantaneously through transitions, or (b) continuously over an interval of time following a trajectory.
A trajectory for a set of variables V models continuous evolution of the values of the variables over
an interval of time. Formally, a trajectory τ is a map from a left-closed interval of R≥0 with left
endpoint 0 to val(V ). The ﬁrst state of τ , τ.fstate, is τ(0). A trajectory τ is closed if the domain of
τ is [0, t] for some t ∈ R≥0, and we deﬁne the last state in τ , τ(t), as τ.lstate.
Deﬁnition 2. A Hybrid Automaton (HA) A is a tuple (V,Θ, A,D, T ) where
1. V is a set of variables; the elements of val(V ) are called states,
2. Θ ⊆ val(V ) is the set of start states.
3. A is a set of actions.
4. D ⊆ val(V )×A× val(V ) is a set of transitions. A transition (v, a,v′) ∈ D is written in short
as v
a→A v′ or as v a→ v′ when A is clear from the context.
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5. T is set of trajectories for V that is closed under preﬁx, suﬃx, and concatenation [9]. In
addition, A is non-blocking, that is, at any state v ∈ val(V ), either an action can occur or
time can elapse.
An execution fragment of A is a ﬁnite or inﬁnite sequence τ0a1τ1a2 . . ., such that for all i in the
sequence, τi.lstate
ai+1→ τi+1.fstate. An execution fragment is an execution if τ0.fstate ∈ Θ. The ﬁrst
state of an execution fragment α, α.fstate, is τ0.fstate, and for a closed α, its last state, α.lstate, is
the last state of its last trajectory. The set of executions and reachable states of A are denoted by
ExecA and ReachA.
Deﬁnition 3. Given a hybrid automaton A = 〈V,Θ, A,D, T 〉, a set of variables Y , and a mapping
f : val(V ) → val(Y ), a Discrete Abstraction of A is a labeled transition system B = 〈Y,Θ′, A ∪
{Time},D′〉, where
1. y ∈ Θ′ iﬀ ∃v ∈ Θ, f(v) = y,
2. (y, a,y′) ∈ D′ iﬀ
(a) transition a ∈ A and ∃(v, a,v′) ∈ D such that f(v) = y and f(v′) = y′, or
(b) trajectory a = Time and ∃τ ∈ T , such that τ is closed and f(τ.fstate) = y and
f(τ.lstate) = y′.
In other words, B is a time abstract transition system that simulates A; every discrete transition
v
a→A v′ of A is simulated by a discrete transition f(v) a→B f(v′) of B, and every closed trajectory
τ of A is simulated by f(τ.fstate) Time→B f(τ.lstate) of B.
Formal Hybrid Automaton Model of Simplex
In constructing hybrid automata models for Simplex-based embedded control systems, we con-
sider automata in which an opportunity for high-level control mode switches arise once every ∆
unit of time. Such hybrid automata often arise in modeling periodically scheduled real-time and
embedded systems [106]. In this section, we deﬁne a class of hybrid automaton with a mode vari-
able, which is suitable for capturing Simplex-based control systems. The possible values of mode
correspond to the active controller, either the safety controller or the complex controller.
Automaton Simplex, shown in Figure 4.4, captures an abstract n-dimensional Simplex-based
control system. The Simplex speciﬁcation is parameterized by a positive constant ∆. The three
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Figure 4.4: The aggregate Simplex automaton switches between the safety controller mode and
complex controller mode based on the current state of the system.
variables are (a) continuous state variables X = {x1, . . . , xn} each of type R, (b) discrete state
variablemode which can take two values, namely {safety, complex}, initialized to safety, and (c) clock
variable c, initialized to 0. We denote the vector of n continuous variables as a single x. We say
that the system is in the safety (complex) mode when mode = safety (and complex, respectively).
When the system is in the safety (complex) mode, the continuous variables evolve according to
the diﬀerential equations x˙ = FS(x); c˙ = 1 (x˙ = FC(x); c˙ = 1), where the right hand side of
the diﬀerential equations FS (FC) are real-valued continuous functions, and subject to restrictions
that we outline later in Section 4.2.2.2. Furthermore, the length of all trajectories of Simplex are
upperbounded by ∆. Every ∆ time, exactly one action occurs, sw_s or sw_c. As a result, the
corresponding discrete transition Simplex may or may not change the value of mode; the value of
x does not change. The value of mode changes from safety to complex if, at the pre-state of the
transition, the valuation of x is in Gc. Similarly, mode changes from complex to safety if x is in Gs
in the pre-state.
Thus, given the dynamics of the system (Fs and Fc) under the safe and the complex controllers,
and a safety property speciﬁed by an unsafe set U , the task of designing the decision module for a
Simplex-based control system boils down to ﬁnding Gs and Gc such that (a) (safety) ReachSimplex ∩
U = ∅, and (utility) as time goes to inﬁnity, the duration of time for which mode = complex also
goes to inﬁnity. Here, we will only focus on formally proving the safety property.
For the simplicity of exposition, we have described Simplex with two modes, each of which
has continuous dynamics described by the diﬀerential equations FS or FC . The design methodology
described in the next section, however, generalizes to systems where the safety and the complex mode
dynamics are described their own hybrid automaton (under some restrictions, described below), with
several (sub-)modes with their own discrete switches.
87
4.2.2.2 Quantization-based Discrete Abstractions
In this section, we will ﬁrst discuss the restrictions we place on the hybrid automata associated with
each mode. Next, we use a quantization-based abstraction function to algorithmically construct
discrete abstractions of the hybrid automaton for each of the individual controller modes of the
aggregate Simplex hybrid automata. These automata are, in turn, used to veriﬁably determine the
mode guards, Gc and Gs for the combined Simplex system.
Recall, the set of variables for Simplex are V = {x,mode, c}, where x is a continuous variable
of type Rn, mode is a {safety, complex}-valued discrete variable, and c is a real-valued clock. We
deﬁne Simplexsafety and Simplexcomplex to be the hybrid automata corresponding to the safety and
complex modes of Simplex. That is, Simplexsafety and Simplexcomplex are each a hybrid automaton
with variables {x1, . . . , xn, c}. For a state x ∈ val({x1, . . . , xn, c}), we refer to the values of the n
continuous components by x.x1, . . . ,x.xn, or aggregately as x.x, and the value of the clock as x.c.
The unsafe states for the system are speciﬁed by a predicate Ux on the continuous state space,
Rn, and thus, the overall unsafe set for either Simplexsafety or Simplexcomplex is U = Ux × R≥0.
We construct the discrete abstractions AbsSimplexsafety and AbsSimplexcomplex of the given con-
crete Simplexsafety and Simplexcomplex automata by quantizing the continuous state space. The con-
struction technique for the AbsSimplexsafety and AbsSimplexcomplex abstract discrete transition systems
is analogous. Therefore, we now only refer to the construction of an AbsSimplexmode labeled tran-
sition system which abstracts a Simplexmode automaton, and assume the corresponding diﬀerential
equations, referred to simply as F , are being used for the mode under consideration.
There are two types of discrete transitions in a discrete abstraction, those arising from transitions
in the hybrid automaton (from Deﬁnition 3.a in Section 4.2.2.1), and those arising from trajectories
(from Deﬁnition 3.B in Section 4.2.2.1). In our abstraction procedure, we will consider a restricted
class of hybrid automata which have disjoint mode invariants, and do not contain resets for the
continuous variables. In this type of automaton, the evolution of the continuous variables does not
contain discontinuities, even between discrete mode transitions. Furthermore, given a valuation of
the continuous variables, the discrete mode of the hybrid automaton can be uniquely determined. In
the constructed discrete abstraction, we will have the unique property that each discrete transition
corresponds to an evaluation of up to ∆ time (for some constant ∆ used in the construction) in the
corresponding hybrid automata. We will use this property later to construct the Simplex decision
module behavior using the discrete abstraction. Each discrete transition in the abstraction, there-
fore, can correspond to a series of discrete transitions and trajectories in the hybrid automata. The
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notions of reachability and backreachabilty can still be deﬁned using ﬁxpoints as in Section 4.2.2.1.
Dynamics Restrictions
In the algorithm presented here, we place three restrictions on the mode's diﬀerential equations,
F , which, in turn, restrict the underlying dynamics. Systems with dynamics that do not meet these
restrictions are not applicable with with this approach (we will later present algorithms which relax
some of these restrictions). Later, in our case study in Section 4.2.2.3, we show that these restrictions
are not overbearing by applying the developed technique towards rollover prevention of autonomous
oﬀ-road vehicles.
We ﬁrst list the three restrictions on the diﬀerential equations, F , and then describe each one in
more detail.
R1. For each continuous variable xi, there exist upper and lower bounds xiu and xil, such that for
all reachable states v of Simplexmode, v.xi ∈ [xil, xiu].
R2. For any continuous variable xi, the right hand side of the (possibly nondeterministic) diﬀer-
ential equation for x˙i is expressible as a (possibly nondeterministic) function fi(v.x). We assume
that, for any product of half-open intervals S ⊆ Rn, there exist computable bounds, lS , uS ∈ R, on
the derivatives such that, for all v.x ∈ S, fi(v.x) ∈ [lS , uS ].
R3. The dependency graph of the continuous variables induced by the diﬀerential equations
x˙ = F (x) is acyclic, save for self-dependencies.
Many physical variables such as velocity, acceleration and temperature, can be associated with
upper and lower bound values in the context of a given system. Such bounds can be used in place
of xil and xiu in Restriction R1. This implies that our restricted class of Simplexmode models can
not capture, for example, an unbounded position of a particle on the real line. This requirement is
necessary for the constructed abstract discrete transition system to be of ﬁnite size, and therefore
directly usable by a model checker to determine the Simplex guards. The second restriction, R2,
requires that, for every trajectory τ in Simplexmode that is within an arbitrary product of half-open
intervals S ⊆ Rn, it is feasible to determine bounds on the minimum and maximum rate of change
(diﬀerential inclusions) of any continuous variable along τ . The simplest example of this is if the
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minimum and maximum possible rates of change of a variable remain constant with respect to time
over all τ . For example, the rate of change of the angular velocity of a wheel is always bounded
by the minimum and maximum angular acceleration that can be produced by the associated motor
over all operating conditions (assuming there are no brakes). Such derivative bounds can also be
derived for variables which change based on their own values, or the values of other variables. This
would be the case if, for example, the rate of change of the angular velocity of a wheel was modeled
as depending on the current angular velocity of the wheel. As we approach motor saturation (a high
angular velocity), we can no longer increase the angular velocity as rapidly as we could when at
rest. An example of a dependency on another variable would be if the rate of change of the angular
velocity was modeled based on the pitch angle of the road on which we were driving. Symbolically,
suppose x1 evolves according to x˙1 = f1(x1, x2). Given a closed interval I1 of values of x1 and a
closed interval I2 for values of x2, R2 requires that we can compute u, l such that for all states v
where v.x1 ∈ I1 and v.x2 ∈ I2, f1(v.x1,v.x2) ∈ [l, u]. This restriction is necessary to be able to
apply our algorithm for constructing the transitions of the abstract discrete transition system.
Restriction R2 also limits the sorts of systems for which we can form discrete abstractions
without introducing signiﬁcant pessimism. Particularly, if we can determine the exact discrete state
of the hybrid automaton Simplexmode which the system is in from only the values of v.x, ﬁnding
such bounds does not add signiﬁcant pessimism into the abstract system we are constructing (the
bounds from the states corresponding to the product of half-open intervals under consideration can
be determined directly). However, if the hybrid automaton Simplexmode can be in multiple discrete
states for a particular value of v.x, the bounds must encompass bounds from all possible discrete
states, which may introduce pessimism depending on the variation in the diﬀerential equations at
the diﬀerent states. Since we limited the types of hybrid automata we considered to ones where a
valuation of the variables can identify the unique mode the hybrid automata is in, for small half-open
intervals (sets of valuations close to each other), the pessimism from this approach is small. The
eﬀect of this pessimism will be an abstract discrete transition system which may contain spurious
transitions which do not reﬂect actual system dynamics. Since our guards will be determined based
on the constructed discrete transition system, we may switch to the safety controller earlier than is
necessary because of these spurious transitions.
Restriction R3 forbids certain types of feedback interconnections in the underlying system dy-
namics. Particularly, when the change for each variable xi over the change in time is deﬁned as
x˙i = fi(x
a
i , x
b
i , . . .), we obtain a derivative dependency graph. Restriction R3 forbids this de-
90
pendency graph from having circular dependencies, except for self-dependencies. This means, for
example, for two variables x1 and x2, dynamics like
x˙1 = f1(x2) = x2
x˙2 = f2(x1) = −x1
are not allowed, but dynamics like
x˙1 = f1(x1, x2) = x1 + x2
x˙2 = f2(x2) = −x2
are permitted. This is necessary to be able to apply our algorithm for constructing the transitions
of the abstract discrete transition system. This restriction will be relaxed in later algorithms in this
chapter.
Abstraction Function
When deﬁning our abstraction function, which takes a concrete state in Simplexmode and maps it
to an abstract state in AbsSimplexmode, we ﬁrst ﬁx a collection of quantization parameters q1, . . . , qn ∈
R>0, one for each continuous variable. The choice of quantization parameters is a tunable trade
oﬀ, where larger constants will lead to more pessimism in the associated discrete transition system
(which means the decision module derived based on the discrete transition systems will be more
pessimistic, possibly switching to the safety controller before it is absolutely necessary), and smaller
constants lead to discrete transition systems with more discrete states (which increases the amount
of time necessary for a model checker to iterate the system to determine the decision module's
switching guards).
A Simplexmode discrete transition system has set of variables Y = {y1, . . . , yn}, where each yi is
integer-valued. For y ∈ val(Y ), we refer to values of the n components by y.y1, . . . ,y.yn.
The quantization-based abstraction function, quantize : Rn → val(Y ), is deﬁned as: for any
x ∈ Rn, quantize(x) = y, where for each yi ∈ Y , y.yi = bv.xiqi c. Notice that the explicit notion of
clock is dropped when performing the abstract mapping. Instead, each transition in AbsSimplexmode
corresponds to a series of trajectories and/or discrete transitions in the Simplexmode automaton,
with total duration at most ∆ (where ∆ is, again, the Simplex controller iteration time param-
eter). The abstraction function deﬁnes the states and transitions of AbsSimplexmode according
91
to Deﬁnition 3. An algorithmic way to construct these transitions will be discussed below. For
convenience, we also deﬁne two related functions, quantize-set and quantize−1. The function
quantize-set : Rn → 2val(Y ) is the extension of quantize to larger sets of Rn, while quantize−1
is the concretization map, quantize−1 : val(Y ) → 2Rn , which is the inverse of quantize. The
concretization of an abstract state gives us the corresponding product of half-open intervals in the
continuous space, speciﬁcally,
quantize−1(y) =
n∏
i=1
[
qi ∗ y.yi, qi ∗ (1 + y.yi)
)
.
Algorithm for Constructing Discrete Transitions
Assumption R1 implies that for each continuous variable xi, we can restrict the type of xi to
the closed interval [xil, xiu] of R without altering the behavior of the Simplexmode automaton model.
Since each quantization parameter qi for the corresponding variable xi is strictly positive, it follows
that the type (set of all possible values) of the abstract variable yi is the ﬁnite set {bxilqi c, . . . , bxiuqi c}.
Since there are a ﬁnite number of abstract discrete states for each variable, and there are a ﬁnite
number of variables, there are a ﬁnite number of abstract discrete states in the aggregate system
consisting of all the variables. Therefore, we construct the possible transitions of the abstract system
by considering one abstract state y, and repeat the procedure over the ﬁnite number of abstract
system states.
RequirementR3 rules out circular dependencies (except self-dependencies) in deﬁning the deriva-
tives of continuous variables within a trajectory. Therefore, ignoring self-dependencies, we can form
a directed acyclic graph (DAG) of these dependencies and perform a topological sort. For the rest
of the algorithm, we assume the variables, x1, x2, . . . , xn, are ordered according to this topological
sort.
We now determine abstract transitions which correspond to trajectories of Simplexmode from a
particular abstract state y. We ﬁrst determine the reachable abstract values for the y1 variable,
then the reachable abstract values for the y2 variable, and so on. After this, we combine the cross
product of the reachable values of all the variables to construct the possible transitions from state
y. The new goal, then, is determining the reachable abstract values for each variable from state y.
Initially, we consider, x1, which is has no non-self incoming edges in the derivative dependency
DAG (since the variables are ordered according to the DAG's topological sort). Since x1 has no
non-self incoming edges, the bound function for its derivative, x˙1, is deﬁned as either a constant, or a
function of x1. In both cases, by requirement R2, it is feasible to determine bounds on the minimum
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Figure 4.5: A state (grey) interval within a self-dependent variable is evaluated for abstract discrete
reachability within one time step. The updated product of half-open intervals in the associated
dimension would reﬂect the concrete values corresponding to the reachable intervals, in this case
[0,4).
and maximum rate of change of x1, the continuous variable, by considering a half-open interval
corresponding to the current possible concrete states. This interval can be obtained by considering
the dimension corresponding to y1 of the current possible concrete states, quantize
−1(y)1.
However, since the bounds on x˙1 are only valid within the interval, the bounds may change if the
variable enters another interval before ∆ time passes (recall that we are trying the determine the
reachable values of the variable in up to ∆ time in the construction). Consider the situation shown
in Figure 4.5. Here, an initial state corresponding to the grey interval is evaluated for reachability.
If we were to only consider the derivative bounds at the current interval, x˙ = [−0.5, 0.5], we would
not consider the state corresponding to the interval [3, 4) as reachable in one time step, whereas
in actuality if the value of the variable enters the state corresponding to the interval [2, 3), our
maximum derivative increases and we may, in fact, reach the interval [2, 3).
In general, to determine the minimum-valued abstract state we can reach in up to ∆ time, we
start at the lower bound of the current state's interval and iterate the discrete states using the
minimum derivative until we exhaust ∆ time (or the minimum derivative becomes nonnegative),
using new minimum derivatives as we enter new intervals. To determine the maximum state we
can reach after up to ∆ time, we start at the upper bound of the current state's interval and
iterate the discrete states using the maximum derivative until we exhaust ∆ time (or the maximum
derivative becomes nonpositive), again, using new maximum derivatives as we enter new intervals.
The reachable values of the variable under consideration in up to ∆ time, then, are bounded between
the two resultant states. We therefore have determined the reachable values for this variable in up
to ∆ time, and can add the corresponding discrete transitions into the discrete abstraction we are
constructing.
After determining the reachable values for the ﬁrst variable in the topological sorted order, we
update the product of half-open intervals for computing derivative bounds to reﬂect the values of
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Const ruc tTrans i t i ons ( )
{
for each y ∈ val(Y )
S ← quantize−1(y)
for each yi ∈ y in the t o p o l o g i c a l l y so r t ed order
reachmin ←MinReach(∆, S, qi ∗ y.yi, i)
reachmax ←MaxReach(∆, S, qi ∗ (1 + y.yi), i)
S ← S1 × . . .× Si−1 × [reachmin, reachmax]× Si+1 × . . .× Sn
for each y′ ∈ quantize-set(S)
D ← D ∪ {(y,Time,y′)}
}
Value MinReach (Time t , Subset S , Value x , DimensionNumber i)
{
S ← S1 × . . .× Si−1 × [qi ∗ bx/qic, qi ∗ (1 + bx/qic)]× . . .× Sn
[l, u]← DerivativeBounds(i, S)
i f l ≥ 0 // d e r i v a t i v e i s p o s i t i v e , done
return qi ∗ bx/qic
else i f t+ l ∗ qi < 0 // time exp i res , done
return qi ∗ bx/qic
else // o therwi se cons ider next i n t e r v a l
return MinReach(t+ l ∗ qi, S, qi ∗ (bx/qic − 1), i)
}
x1 reachable in up to ∆ time. Thus, when computing the derivative bounds of any variables whose
derivatives depend on the value of x1, all values of x1 reachable in up to ∆ time will be considered.
The algorithm then continues iterating each variable in the topologically sorted order. Thus, for
evaluating the reachable values for an arbitrary variable yj , we will always have the intervals of
reachable values in up to ∆ time for every dependent variable, except possibly yj . We can then
determine the reachable values of variable yj by using the iterative procedure outlined above, starting
with the variable interval corresponding to yj , quantize
−1(y)j .
After we determine the abstract states reachable for each variable starting from y, the cross prod-
uct of the reachable values for each variable encodes the possible discrete transitions corresponding
to all possible continuous evolution of the variables in up to ∆ time. If we repeat this procedure for
every discrete state in the system, we will get a complete labeled transition system, AbsSimplexmode,
which is an abstraction of the continuous automaton, Simplexmode.
The complete algorithm is outlined below. The algorithm uses the MinReach function (and
MaxReach, which is similar) which is also deﬁned. Here, D refers to the set of discrete transitions.
Prior to the start of the algorithm, the variables are ordered according to the topological sort of the
graph formed by their diﬀerential equation dependencies, ignoring self-dependencies.
Here, DerivativeBounds is the function which returns the diﬀerential inclusions, mandated by
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Requirement R2. Notice that, depending on the Simplex time parameter, ∆, and the quantum pa-
rameters for each variable, q1, q2, . . . , qn, the result of this process may have some spurious abstract
transitions which are not in the concrete, continuous system. However, it is still a simulation of
the concrete system, in that any concrete combination of trajectories and discrete changes in the
concrete system, Simplexmode, will have a corresponding set of transitions in the abstract system,
AbsSimplexmode. By applying this technique for the two Simplex modes, you obtain two discrete
transition systems which are discrete abstracts of their corresponding mode.
Finding Guards from Discrete Abstractions
Having constructed the discrete abstractions for the individual modes of Simplex, AbsSimplexsafety
∆
= S and AbsSimplexcomplex ∆= C, we now describe the veriﬁable construction of the guards Gc and
Gs that constitute the switching logic in the Simplex decision module in Figure 4.1. Suppose that
the unsafe set of states is U . A safe switching predicate Gc can be computed as:
Gc = quantize
−1(PrevC(BackReachS(U))).
In other words, we consider all the set B of states that are backwards reachable from U using the
discretized safety controller. Then we consider the set C of states that can reach B using a single
step in the complex controller discrete abstraction (which corresponds to up to ∆ time elapsing
in the concrete system) and set Gc as the set of concrete states corresponding to C. At a high
level, states in Gc are ones where, if we use the complex controller for one control iteration (for ∆
time) and then switch to the safety controller, the system state may still eventually enter the unsafe
region. Therefore, during execution, if the current state is in Gc, we must use the safety controller
immediately. By starting in an initial state that is not in Gc and following this strategy, the system
model will never enter an unsafe state.
In the next section, we illustrate using a model checker to perform this procedure within an case
study.
4.2.2.3 Oﬀ-Road Vehicle Rollover Case Study
We now describe a case study which aims to formally provide property guarantees for autonomous
oﬀ-road vehicles. Although we simultaneously investigated several integrity and performance prop-
erties [107], here we discuss only oﬀ-road vehicle rollover prevention. After a brief problem de-
scription, we describe the discrete model generation, which is based on the theory developed earlier
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in Section 4.2.2.2. Then, we use a model checker to determine the Simplex automaton guards, as
well as verify the correctness of the aggregate system. Finally, we discuss creating a veriﬁed and
precisely-timed implementation of the decision module based on these guards.
Throughout the case study, we work with the Maude [108] model checker. Maude is a high-
performance rewriting framework which uses rewrite equations and rewrite rules to codify models,
both of which can be speciﬁed conditionally. While rewrite equations perform serial and deter-
ministic computations, rewrite rules can be used to encode parallelism and nondeterminism. Since
our system derivatives are bounded by closed intervals, nondeterministic rewrite rules are used to
discretely encode the nondeterministic system dynamics. The Maude engine can then exhaustively
model check and verify properties about all possible executions of the system.
Oﬀ-road Vehicle Rollover Description
Although there is no operator inside to injure, autonomous vehicle rollovers may cause damage to
vehicles and damage to property. The high-level system may be designed to avoid high-risk situations
such as high-sloping terrain, sharp turning, and high speeds, but since automatic controllers on
oﬀ-road vehicles run sophisticated algorithms, integrating proprietary with commercially-available
software, often using COTS hardware, formally verifying rollover avoidance is diﬃcult. A Simplex
implementation for rollover prevention is therefore a simpler system to validate.
We must describe the rollover property formally in order to verify that a model of an autonomous
oﬀ-road vehicle never experiences rollover. We pessimistically state that the rollover property is
violated whenever one of the wheels of the vehicle lifts oﬀ the ground, which is never part of normal
oﬀ-road vehicle operation. The relevant physical constants and variables are shown in Figure 4.6.
The equation to determine if the rollover property is violated is:
g <
v2 ∗ sin(β)
WB
∗ sin
(
tan−1
(
2H
TR
))
cos
(
tan−1
(
2H
TR
)
+ α
)
g: gravitational acceleration
WB: vehicle wheel base
2H: twice the vehicle's height of center of gravity
TR: vehicle track width
v: vehicle velocity
β: vehicle steering angle
α: slope terrain angle
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Figure 4.6: The rollover condition is violated whenever Flift exceeds Fstability. Here, ω is the angular
velocity, calculated as v ∗ sin(β)/WB. The angle θ is computed as tan−1(2H/TR).
There is also a symmetric rollover case where α < 0 and β < 0. Additionally, from this equation
we can infer the behavior of the safety controller. To avoid rollover, it is clear from the equation
that one should reduce the steering angle β, and reduce the velocity v, which matches our intuition
about rollover.
Discrete Model Generation
Once we know relevant variables for the property we are interested in verifying, we need to
construct the hybrid automaton for the tractor system. The variables relevant to rollover are the
angle of the terrain α, the steering angle β, and the velocity of the tractor v. Within our case study,
we constructed a parameterized model generator, which takes as input about 30 parameters about
the oﬀ-road vehicle system (such as the absolute maximum and minimum velocity, the discretization
quantum for each variable, the rates of change of the steering angle, the track length and the wheel
base), and outputs a Maude model which encodes the associated discrete abstraction. Our model
consists of three variables, the slope angle α, the steering angle β, and the velocity v. The rates
of change, α˙, β˙, and v˙, depend only on their own values, and v˙ has diﬀerent diﬀerential equation
ranges depending on the direction of travel, as shown in Figure 4.7. As previously discussed in
Section 4.2.2.2 dealing with restriction R2, such an automaton for our velocity dynamics can be
naturally modeled with our approach by a discrete abstraction, and does not introduce excessive
pessimism because of the bounds computation. For each speciﬁc value of v, there is exactly one
corresponding discrete state in the hybrid automaton dynamics description.
Our model generator runs the algorithm described in Section 4.2.2.2 and outputs Maude modules
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Figure 4.7: This hybrid automaton captures the behavior of the velocity variable, v, in our rollover
model. A complete system model would also include the terrain angle α and the steering angle β.
Here, vmin is the minimum velocity, vmax is the maximum velocity, afwd is the maximum acceleration
when moving forward, aback is the minimum acceleration when moving backwards, and abreak is the
minimum acceleration due to breaking when moving forwards, which is the opposite of the maximum
acceleration due to breaking when moving backwards.
encoding a discrete transition system for AbsSimplexcomplex, which simulates the possible dynamics
for the oﬀ-road vehicle system when the complex controller is used.
Within a single execution of the Maude model of the complex controller, a nondeterministic ex-
ecution takes place since, at every point in time, there are many rewrite rules which can be applied
to the system. This is expected, since we do not know which possible action the complex controller
will take and there are always several options. More importantly, when the Maude engine performs
model checking on the system, it iterates all possible rewrite rules exhaustively, allowing us to verify
properties for all possible behaviors of the complex controller. For the safety controller, where the
vehicle slows down and reduces the steering angle, the model generator creates rewrite equations
describing the maximum rate at which we can slow down and the maximum rate at which we can
straighten the wheels, based on the input parameters. The safety controller's dynamics, and the
corresponding discrete transition system AbsSimplexsafety, then, are described by transitions where
the slope angle, α, is allowed to change nondeterministically, but the velocity, v, reduces at the
maximum allowed rate and the steering angle, β decreases at the maximum allowed rate.
Constructing Simplex Decision Module Guards
After we have Maude models corresponding to AbsSimplexcomplex and AbsSimplexsafety, we can
use the model checker to determine the guards for our system. We primarily focus on determining
the guard Gc from Figure 4.4, which is the set of states where we should switch from the complex
controller to the safety controller. The guard for the reverse transition, from the safety controller
to the complex controller, can use Gs = Gc, or, more likely, Gs ⊂ Gc, if a hysteresis is desired to
prevent frequent controller switching.
To determine this guard set, we use the discrete transition systems for each mode and the model
checker to perform state-space searches. We can use the technique from Section 4.2.2.2 and have
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the model checker output the states in Gc. These are the states where the complex controller can
not be used because, even if the safety controller is used immediately at the next control decision,
rollover can still occur. Notice that this set of states is not the same as the set of states which
statically violate the rollover condition, as the model checker and constructed discrete transition
systems capture any inertia within the model, as well as all possible changes in the unactuated
variables (the slope of the terrain, in this instance).
The behavior of the decision module, then, is to take the quantized current state of the system,
and check if it belongs to the state set output by the model checker. If it does, the safety controller
must be used. If it does not, the complex controller can actuate the system. The last step is to
encode the state set Gc output by the model checker into a form that can be checked online, while
the system is running.
Veriﬁable Implementation
To provide a veriﬁable implementation, we manually constructed linear bounds which captured
all the states in Gc. After we have determined the bounds on the states where the safety controller
should be used, we create the implementation of the decision module. To aid in this step, we have
created formal semantics for a subset of VHDL (a hardware description language) within Maude
[109], particularly enough of the language to be able to perform bounds checking.
The ﬁrst step is to create the decision logic implementation in the VHDL semantics syntax within
Maude. This code is executable within the Maude model checker (because the formal semantics
are deﬁned within Maude), but has a direct correspondence with a VHDL module. Using the
Maude-based implementation along with the semantics, we can perform a state-space search on the
composite system which will now include the discrete mode transitions determined by the guards,
verifying that if we use the bounds as the switching strategy, the system will never enter a rollover
state.
The second step, is to take the Maude-based implementation and translate it a VHDL module.
This is a straightforward step since there is a direct correspondence between the Maude-based
VHDL code and regular VHDL code. We have created a program which does this translation
automatically. The output of the program, then, is a VHDL module which captures the behavior of
the decision module which was formally checked by Maude to result in a system where rollover does
not occur. The VHDL code can then be put through a hardware synthesis tool and executed on a
Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA), or turned into an Application-Speciﬁc Integrated Circuit
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(ASIC).
The advantage of using VHDL as a target language is twofold. First, from a real-time perspective,
hardware logic is extremely predictable. Our VHDL Maude semantics include a cycle counter which
can be used in conjunction with the model checker to determine an upper bound on the number of
clock cycles used to perform the decision module logic (by performing a search for a state where the
cycle counter is greater than some value and seeing no matching reachable states). The number of
cycles, when combined with a clock frequency, gives us a worst-case execution time. The hardware
synthesis tools then check that timing constraints of the VHDL module are met (that the hardware
logic can actually execute at the desired clock frequency). The second advantage of targeting VHDL
is that performing Simplex at a lower level (in dedicated hardware) has previously been shown
to be able to capture more potential errors [2]. By using the lower-level, System-Level Simplex
Architecture, our design is more robust.
4.2.3 Increased Reachability Accuracy for More General Systems
We will now discuss another approach for computing reachability diﬀerent from the quantization-
based method presented earlier. Here, reachability is computed using a two-step procedure. Roughly,
in the ﬁrst step, we compute the reachable states in up to δ time from the initial state, which is
added to the current reachable set. In the second step, we compute which states are reachable
in exactly δ time. These are the states that are used as the next initial states in the recursive
procedure. Since the states reachable in exactly δ time are a subset of those reached in up toδ
time, our computed set is smalled compared with standard discrete abstraction approaches. The
bigger the δ used, the larger the potential savings. However, since the δ-reachabilty algorithm is
also an overapproximation, using a large δ can also lead to larger errors, so a balance must be struck
between the two potential sources of error.
Throughout this section, we will augment the discussion with a demonstrative Simple-Vehicle
System, which is introduced in Section 4.2.3.1. Section 4.2.3.2 presents the assumptions of our
backreachability algorithm. Next, Subsection 4.2.3.3 presents the algorithm for computing bounded
and unbounded backreach sets. Next, in Section 4.2.3.4, three strategies are proposed which together
can bound the error of a BackReach≤∆ computation to an arbitrary constant. A case study based
on a waypoint tracking system, which uses the described algorithm, is then given in Section .
Additionally, although we are concerned with backreachability for Simplex, the explanations are
easier to understand, and therefore presented, in terms of forward reachability. The two notions can
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Figure 4.8: The gray area indicates BackReach(U , sc), which are states where using the safety
controller leads to safety violations for the example from Section 4.2.3.1.
be shown to be computationally equivalent.
4.2.3.1 Simple-Vehicle System Example
Consider a vehicle which moves along a one-dimensional line, modeled as a point x on the x-axis
which moves according to the input acceleration a generated by the controller. Physical constraints
require that a ∈ [amin, amax], and the velocity of the vehicle remains in the range [vmin, vmax]. The
safety property requires that the point x remains in the range [xmin, xmax], where xmin < 0 < xmax.
For simplicity, we assume xmin = −xmax, vmin = −vmax and amin = −amax.
For this system, the safety controller that we consider is a bang-bang controller which outputs
the maximal negative acceleration a = amin for x > 0 and outputs a = amax if x ≤ 0. Two possible
sets of unrecoverable states (depending on the exact parameters of the plant) are shown in Figure
4.8.
Next, we specify the hybrid automata for the complex controller and plant system, as well as
the safety controller and plant system, shown in Figure 4.9. The hybrid automaton for the complex
controller and plant system, in Figure 4.9a, has three locations (discrete modes). Under unsaturated
operation, the location invariant is vmin < v < vmax and the derivative equations are x˙ = v and
v˙ = [amin, amax] (v˙ is nondeterministic). There are two other locations corresponding to when
the point has reached its minimum and maximum velocity (labeled min_speed and max_speed)
where v˙ is restricted to be either nonnegative or nonpositive. The hybrid automaton for the safety
controller and plant system, in Figure 4.9b, contains two locations corresponding to the two states
of the controller (labeled forward and backward), and two more locations for when the velocity has
reached saturation (labeled min_speed and max_speed). When we compute an overapproximation
of BackReach or BackReach≤∆, it will be with respect to one of these automata.
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 Invariant:
v˙ =[5,−5 ]
x˙ = v
vmin v vmax
 
Invariant:
v˙ = 5
x˙ = v
v = vmin
 
Invariant:
v˙ =−5
x˙ = v
v = vmax
min_speed unsaturated max_speed
(a) The complex controller abstraction and plant automaton.
 
Invariant:
v˙ = 0
x˙ = v
x0 ∧ v=vmin
 
Invariant:
v˙ = 0
x˙ = v
x≤0 ∧ v=vmax
 
Invariant:
v˙ =−5
x˙ = v
x0 ∧ vvmin
 
Invariant:
v˙ = 5
x˙ = v
x≤0 ∧ vvmax
forward
max_speed min_speed
backward
(b) The safety controller and plant automaton.
Figure 4.9: The hybrid automata describing the Simple-Vehicle System have no transition guard
restrictions, so the discrete location switching is done solely based on the invariants.
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4.2.3.2 System Assumptions
In order to apply our algorithm, we have two assumptions, which we outline and elaborate on in the
context of theSimple-VehicleSystem below.
Assumption 1: For any rectangular set of states H ⊆ S, for any continuous variable xi, there
exist functions dbminxi and db
max
xi , that bound the derivative of xi with respect to time in H. That
is, dbminxi (H) ≤ dxidt ≤ dbmaxxi (H), for every xi.
Assumption 2: We make a distinction between two types of derivative dependencies, explicit
ones directly extracted from the diﬀerential equations in each location of the hybrid automaton
(for example, w˙ = v would create an directed edge from the node corresponding to v to the node
corresponding to w), and implicit dependencies which arise because as time advances, the continuous
state may cause a change in hybrid-automaton locations which causes the diﬀerential equations of
variables to be changed. Assumption 2 restricts the systems we consider to those where the explicit
dependency graph of the state-variable derivatives does not have cycles, except for self-loops.
Example:In the context of theSimple-VehicleSystem, to meet Assumption 1, we must provide the
derivative bounds functions for each variable, x and v, which can be automatically extracted from
the hybrid automata. These functions takes as input a rectangle of the state space deﬁned by upper
and lower bounds on each variable, ([vlower, vupper]× [xlower, xupper]).
For the safety controller automaton, dbminx = v
lower, dbmaxx = v
upper,
dbminv =
 −5 if v
upper > vmin
0 otherwise
and
dbmaxv =
 5 if v
lower < vmax
0 otherwise
For the complex controller abstraction automaton, again, dbminx = v
lower, dbmaxx = v
upper, and
dbminv =

−5 if xupper > 0 ∧ vupper > vmin
0 if xupper > 0 ∧ vupper ≤ vmin
0 if xupper ≤ 0 ∧ vupper ≥ vmax
5 otherwise
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(a) Complex Controller Abstraction
x v
(b) Safety Controller
Figure 4.10: The derivative dependency graphs for the Simple-Vehicle System have explicit depen-
dencies (solid arrows) and implicit dependencies (dashed arrows).
and
dbmaxv =

5 if xlower ≤ 0 ∧ vlower < vmax
0 if xupper > 0 ∧ vupper ≤ vmin
0 if xupper ≤ 0 ∧ vupper ≥ vmax
−5 otherwise
In general, if the dynamics contain nonlinear equations, having the user provide a function to
meet Assumption 1 is nontrivial. This essentially because it is a general nonlinear optimization
problem. In order to soundly solve this problem, the standard mathematical technique of taking the
derivative in each of the dimensions and then checking if the derivative is zero in order to check for
minimums and maximums can be applied. In our tool implementation of the described algorithm,
in addition to providing a Matlab script to help symbolically compute the function for Assumption
1, we have also added an option to check if this was done incorrectly. If this check is enabled, the
tool will sample the derivative function within the rectangular set of states H, and if a derivative
lower or higher than what the user has indicated is observed, a warning is given to the user. Of
course, sampling is not guaranteed to detect errors if they exist, so this only serves as a way to
raise conﬁdence that the function has been provided correctly. Symbolically solving the diﬀerential
equations for the minimum and maximum is sound and, if it can be done either by hand or using
the Matlab script, will provide a correct answer to the global optimization problem.
To meet Assumption 2, we construct and check the derivative dependency graphs (shown in
Figure 4.10). For both controllers, in every location, the value of x˙, explicitly depends on v, and
the value of v˙ does not explicitly depend on any variables. However, due to the possibility of a
change in automaton location, there is an implicit dependence of v˙ on v in the complex controller
abstraction automaton. In the safety controller automaton, there are two implicit dependencies:
one implicit dependence of v˙ on v, and a second implicit dependence of v˙ on x. Since both of the
explicit dependency graphs (solid arrows) with self-loops removed are acyclic, the system meets the
second assumption.
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4.2.3.3 Algorithm for Overapproximating Reach and Reach≤∆
In this section, we outline our proposed algorithm for computing overapproximations of Reach and
Reach≤∆. We start by presenting the pseudocode of the algorithm, and then elaborate on each of
the functions.
The pseudocode uses the following notation: The expression D.i refers to the ith element of a
ﬁnite set D in an arbitrary ﬁxed ordering. The expression H/i refers to the projection of the ith
dimension of a hyperrectangle H. The minimum value in this one-dimensional projection is referred
to by Hmin/i and the maximum value is referred to by H
max
/i . The hybrid automaton has n continuous
variables, x1, x2, . . . , xn, which are ordered according to the topological sort of the explicit derivative
dependency graph with self-loops removed. The values qxi for each variable xi are quanta used in
the computation which are ﬁxed constants.
In the pseudocode, several functions are also used:
• getLocations takes a hyperrectangle state space as input and outputs a set of integers corre-
sponding to the set of locations in which the hybrid automaton may be.
• getFirstImplicitDerivativeDependency takes as input an integer corresponding to an au-
tomaton location, and returns the implicit derivative dependency of the node corresponding
to xi that comes ﬁrst in the topologically-sorted variable order.
• α is an abstraction function which takes as input a set of states, and outputs a set of abstract
states represented an integer for each variable. The α−1 function is the concretization function
which, given an abstract state, returns the set of corresponding concrete states of the system.
Formally, if the continuous state space is X = Rn and the abstract state space is Y = Zn, then
α : X −→ Y. α(x) = y1, y2, . . . , yn, where each yi = xi/qxi and xi refers to the ith coordinate
of a state x ∈ X . In the abstraction function, qxi are the constant quanta for each variable,
as mentioned above. As usual, α−1 : Y −→ 2X . In the pseudocode, we use the natural lifting
of these functions from a single input state to a set of input states.
The pseudocode for the reachability and time-bounded reachability algorithms is shown in Figure
4.11.
The top-level of the algorithm, the ComputeReach function (lines 1-22), starts by dividing the
state space into hyperrectangles based on a provided constant quantum size for each variable through
the abstaction function α (line 4). The ﬁxpoint computation loop for computing reachability occurs
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1 // outputs an overapproximation of r e a cha b i l i t y from an i n i t i a l s e t
2 ComputeReach (I}
3 {
4 declare D := α(I) ;
5 declare C := α−1(D) ;
6 declare m := |D| ; // number of abs t rac t s t a t e s
7 declare array[m] E ;
8 declare C′ := ∅ ;
9
10 for i = 1 to m
11 E[ i ] := α−1(D. i ) ; // i n i t i a l i z e the m exact reach s e t s
12
13 while (C 6= C′ ) // loop un t i l f i x p o i n t
14 C′ := C ;
15
16 for ( i = 1 ; i < m ; i := i + 1)
17 (H, E) := ComputeDeltaReach (E[ i ] ) ;
18 E[ i ] := E ; // update exact reach se t
19 C := C ∪H ; // accumulate r e a cha b i l i t y
20
21 return C ;
22 }
23
24 // outputs (Reach≤∆,Reach=∆ ) from an input hyperrectang le
25 ComputeDeltaReach (H)
26 {
27 declare E := H ;
28 declare L := getLocat ions (H) ;
29
30 for ( i = 1 ; i < n ; i = i + 1) // loop over every var i a b l e
31 declare l = MinReach (i,H) ;
32 declare u = MaxReach(i,H) ;
33
34 E/i := [l, u] ; // update exact de l t a reach
35 H/i := [ min (Hmin/i , l), max(Hmax/i , u)] ; // update de l t a reach
36
37 i f (L 6= getLocat ions (H) ) // need to backtrack
38 L := getLocat ions (H) ;
39 i := ge tF i r s t Imp l i c i tDer iva t iveDependency ( i ) − 1 ;
40
41 return (H , E )
42 }
43
44 // overapproximates the minimum value of xi reached a f t e r δ time
45 MinReach ( i , H)
46 {
47 return MinReachRecursive (H , i , δ , Hmin/i , dbminxi , t rue ) ;
48 }
49
50 // overapproximates the minimum value of xi reached
51 MinReachRecursive ( i , H , time , s ta r t , db , i s F i r s t I n t e r v a l )
52 {
53 H/i := [ s t a r t −qxi , s t a r t ] ; // consider the current i n t e r v a l
54 declare der := db(H) ;
55 declare nextIntervalTime := ( der = 0 ? time : −qxi/der ) ;
56
57 i f ( nextIntervalTime < 0) // switch d i r ec t i on
58 i f ( ! i s F i r s t I n t e r v a l ) // can not s a f e l y reverse d i r ec t i on ; be pe s s imi s t i c
59 return s t a r t ;
60 else
61 return MaxReachRecursive ( i , H , time , s ta r t , db , f a l s e ) ;
62 else i f ( nextIntervalTime ≥ time ) // time exp i res in t h i s i n t e r v a l
63 return s t a r t + nextIntervalTime ∗ der ;
64 else // continue to next i n t e r v a l
65 return MinReachRecursive ( i , H , time − nextIntervalTime , s t a r t −qxi , db , f a l s e ) ;
66 }
Figure 4.11: The two-step algorithm for computing reachability is divided into a top-level
(ComputeReach), middle-level (ComputeDeltaReach), and low-level function (MinReach/MaxReach).
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on lines 13-19. Starting from the hyperrectangle corresponding to every discrete state which contains
an unsafe state, we use the ComputeDeltaReach function to compute both the states reachable in
up to δ time, Reach≤∆, and the states reachable in exactly δ time, Reach=∆ (line 17). The Reach=∆
result is used as the initial set of states for the next iteration of the loop (line 18), while the Reach≤∆
result is added to the global reachable set (line 19). The intuition behind the correctness of this
function is that any state reachable in up to k < δ time will necessarily pass through a state reachable
in exactly δ time (speciﬁcally, after δ − k time). Therefore, we need not consider all of Reach≤∆
as the initial states in the next iteration. In terms of termination, notice that this algorithm will
clearly not terminate if the computed reach set is inﬁnite. If termination is desired, one can bound
the reachable state space with the hybrid automaton, and assure the the variable derivatives do not
asymptotically approach 0 (for example, by adding an  amount of overapproximation in the dbminxi
and dbmaxxi functions).
The ComputeDeltaReach function (lines 24-42) is used to overapproximate both Reach≤∆ and
Reach=∆. Starting from an input initial hyperrectangle, the sets of states are computed for each
variable in the order of the topological sort of the explicit derivative dependency graph with self-
loops removed (lines 30-39). This ensures that when the bounds is being computed for a particular
variable, all (non-self) dependent variables already have valid computed Reach≤∆ bounds, ensuring
correctness. After a Reach≤∆ bound for a variable is computed, this bound is used as input to the
derivative bounds function that is used to compute Reach≤∆ for the subsequent dependent variables
(because of the assignment on line 35). The Reach=∆ set is also maintained (line 34). After we have
computed Reach≤∆ for every variable, the cross product is an overapproximation of Reach≤∆ from
the initial state (which is iteratively constructed on line 35).
The proposed algorithm does allow models with cycles caused by implicit derivative dependencies,
restricting only that the explicit-only dependency graph of derivatives be acyclic except for self-loops.
After we compute the Reach≤∆ for a variable with an implicit derivative dependency which creates
a cycle in the combined explicit / implicit derivative dependency graph, we go back and check if we
may have entered a new state of the automaton (line 37). If we may have, the algorithm backtracks
and recomputes the reachability of all the variables that could have possibly been aﬀected (line 39).
Since there are only a ﬁnite number of discrete locations in the hybrid automaton, the backtrack
process can only happen a ﬁnite number of times, and the algorithm remains terminating.
Example:Consider computing Reach≤∆ in the Simple-Vehicle System with respect to the safety
controller / plant automaton (Figure 4.9b), starting from (x = [−2,−1], v = [4, 5]). We ﬁx the
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Figure 4.12: An estimate of Reach≤∆ in the computed using 10,000 simulations (light gray region)
for the Simple-Vehicle System is shown in comparison with the overapproximation computed with
proposed Reach≤∆ algorithm (solid gray line). This computation is done with respect to the sc
automaton. Here, δ is 0.5 and the initial state is the black square with the slanted pattern (x =
[−2,−1], v = [4, 5]).
quanta of both dimensions to be 1, ﬁx δ to be 0.5 time units, ﬁx vmax to be 10, and ﬁx amin = −5
and amax = 5. The algorithm will compute in the order of the explicit dependency graph, ﬁrst v
then x. First the reachability for v is computed using MinReach and MaxReach. These two functions
return 6.5 and 7.5, respectively. Due to the capping of the minimum value (line 35) the Reach≤∆
range is set as v = [4, 7.5]. Second, the reachability for x is computed to be x = [−2, 2.75]. The
algorithm can not terminate here, since the change in x may result in a change in hybrid-automaton
location (the condition on line 37 is true). The algorithm goes back and recomputes Reach≤∆ for
v to be v = [1.5, 7.5]. Next, the reachability of x is recomputed once again to be x = [−2, 2.75].
Although there is an implicit dependency, the set of possible discrete locations has not changed since
the last iteration (the condition on line 37 is false due to the prior assignment on line 38), and the
loop terminates. The result of the algorithm is an overapproximation of the actual Reach≤∆ states,
shown in Figure 4.12.
The MinReach and MinReachRecursive functions (lines 44-66) (and symmetric MaxReach and
MaxReachRecursive, not shown), overapproximate Reach=∆ for one variable, under the assumption
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that the passed-in hyperrectangle contains valid Reach≤∆ bounds for all dependent dimensions.
This is done by starting at the minimum value of the variable in the initial hyperrectangle (line
47), and proceeding at the minimum derivative for δ time, considering new derivatives as we enter
new intervals (line 53). Intuitively, this is correct because the all the bounds of the dependent
dimensions is correct are assumption so the call to db (line 54) will yield a correct bound on the
current variable's derivative. If the derivative is nondeterministic, we will still overapproximate
Reach=∆ by considering the minimum in each interval. Special care is taken if the derivative is zero
(line 55), or if the minimum derivative is positive (lines 58-61), which avoids inﬁnite loops caused
by Zeno behavior through the isFirstInterval variable.
Example:To help illustrate this algorithm, we compute Reach≤∆ from a state in the Simple-Vehicle
System, in the cc' automaton (Figure 4.9a). Now, we will compute Reach≤∆ from the hyperrectan-
gle (x = [1, 2], v = [8, 9]). The topological sort of the self-loop-removed derivative-dependency graph
(Figure 4.10a) is v, x, so we start with the v dimension. The inner loop of the algorithm, MinReach
and MaxReach, will compute the minimum and maximum values of v that can be reached after δ
time. In the functions, the variable time is used to keep track of the time elapsed in terms of the
execution of the system when computing these values.
Initially, time = δ = 0.5. To compute the minimum reachable velocity, we start by invoking
dbminv with the hyperrectangle (x = [1, 2], v = [7, 8]), which outputs the derivative bounds -5. At
the minimum derivative, -5, the next interval is reached in 0.2 time units. We update time to be
0.5− 0.2 = 0.3. The process then repeats for the next interval, v = [6, 7]. The minimum derivative
for v is again -5, and time is updated to 0.1. On the third iteration, time is less than the time it
would take to reach the next interval, and the minimum Reach≤∆ value is computed as v = 4.5 (line
63).
To compute the maximum velocity we again, initialize time to be δ = 0.5. First, dbmaxv with the
hyperrectangle (x = [1, 2], v = [9, 10]) outputs 5 as the maximum derivative for the v variable. The
time variable is updated to 0.3. On the second iteration, however, dbmaxv with the hyperrectangle
(x = [1, 2], v = [10, 11]) outputs 0 as the maximum derivative for the v variable, so the next interval
is unreachable in 0.3 time units. The maximum Reach=∆ value is therefore v = 10 (line 63). The
Reach=∆ values for v are [5, 10]
Now the ComputeDeltaReach function would proceed to compute the reachable values for the
next variable, x, using the values [5, 10] for the v-dimension of the hyperrectangle when calling
MinReach and MaxReach.
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Figure 4.13: An estimate of Reach≤∆ computed using 10,000 simulations (light gray region) for
the Simple-VehicleSystem is shown in comparison with the overapproximation computed with the
proposed Reach≤∆ algorithm (solid gray line). This computation is done with respect to the cc'
automaton. Here, δ is 0.5 and the initial state is the black square with the slanted pattern (x =
[1, 2], v = [8, 9]).
Computing the maximum value that can be reached for x, the states of the computation proceed
as:
(t = 0.5, x = [2, 3], dbmaxx (x = [2, 3], v = [5, 10]) = 10);
(t = 0.4, x = [3, 4], dbmaxx (x = [3, 4], v = [5, 10]) = 10);
(t = 0.3, x = [4, 5], dbmaxx (x = [4, 5], v = [5, 10]) = 10);
(t = 0.2, x = [5, 6], dbmaxx (x = [5, 6], v = [5, 10]) = 10);
(t = 0.1, x = [6, 7], dbmaxx (x = [6, 7], v = [5, 10]) = 10).
where t is the value of time. At this point, the next interval can not be entered in 0.1 time, and
the maximum Reach≤∆ value is x = 7.
Computing the minimum value x can reach, we start with t = 0.5 and invoke dbminx with the
hyperrectangle (x = [0, 1], v = [5, 10]). This returns a minimum derivative in the x dimension of
5, which is nonnegative, so we switch directions and call MaxReachRecursive (line 61), with the
dbminx function as a parameter. This will eventually reach a minimum Reach=∆ value of x = 6. The
Reach=∆ values are x = [6, 7]. This example is shown in Figure 4.13.
4.2.3.4 Accuracy Convergence
One important concern for using the proposed algorithm to compute the Simplex switching set is
the accuracy of the Reach≤∆ overapproximation, which in turn aﬀects the accuracy of the global-
reachability overapproximation that it computes. Here, we propose three strategies that can be
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used to reduce the error of the proposed algorithm. Then, an important accuracy theorem is stated
which allows us, under some reasonable assumptions, to reduce the computed Reach≤∆ error for
each variable to an arbitrarily small constant. Finally, through example, the proposed strategies are
shown to, in fact, reduce the computed error.
We propose three strategies to reduce the error of the Reach≤∆ region from an initial hyper-
rectangle, which we call the quantum rule, the reﬁne rule and the split rule. We later show that these,
when used in combination, can reduce the error in each variable of the Reach≤∆ overapproximation
to an arbitrary constant.
The quantum rule uses the fact that the inner loop (MinReach and MaxReach) of the algorithm
considers intervals one quantum in size. Since no restrictions are placed on the minimum size of
the quantum, the quantum rule, which evenly splits the size of this quantum for one variable,
is always safe to apply. Intuitively, this helps with accuracy by, at each time, providing a smaller
hyperrectangle to the derivative bounds function which allows it to output a more accurate derivative
bound.
The reﬁne rule is based on the fact that Reach≤∆ from an initial set, w, is equal to the union of
Reach≤∆ from multiple smaller sets, as long as the union of those smaller sets is equal to the initial
set w. This is sound because, formally, if w = w1 ∪w2 ∪ . . .∪wn, then Reach≤∆(w) = Reach≤∆(w1)
∪ Reach≤∆(w2) ∪ . . .∪Reach≤∆(wn). This allows us to reﬁne the initial hyperrectangle into smaller
hyperrectangles and still obtain a safe overapproximation by taking the union of the results. The
rule itself will be applied to a particular variable, and will split the initial hyperrectangle into equal-
sized hyperrectangles along that variable. As with the quantum rule, this intuitively helps with
accuracy by providing a smaller hyperrectangle to the derivative bounds function which allows it to
output a more accurate derivative bound.
The ﬁnal rule, the split rule, is based on the fact that Reach≤∆ can be decomposed in a way
similar to the way in which we described computing full reachability the ComputeReach function.
Formally, d1 +d2 + . . .+dn = δ implies that Reach≤∆(w) = Reach≤d1(w) ∪ Reach≤d2(Reach=d1(w))∪
Reach≤d3(Reach=d2(Reach=d1(w))) ∪ . . .. When we say this rule is applied n times, we split δ with
n equal constants, d1 = d2 = . . . = dn =
δ
n . Intuitively, this rule will improve accuracy by, when
computing the reachability for a particular variable, reducing the variable ranges of the dependent
dimensions. This provides the derivative bounds function with a smaller hyperrectangle, which
allows it to output a more accurate derivative bound.
The application of these three rules can be used to reduce the pessimism of the error in the
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Reach≤∆ overapproximation in each discrete mode to an arbitrarily small constant in each dimension.
This is reﬂected in the following statement:
Claim 1: By applying the quantum rule, the reﬁne rule and the split rule ﬁnitely many times, the
maximum error in each variable x of the computed Reach≤∆ overapproximation in a single mode,
for a ﬁxed δ and from an initial hyperrectangle α, can be reduced to below an arbitrary positive
constant ex.
For this to be true, two assumptions are necessary. First, the derivative bounds function should
not itself output errors of the actual derivative bounds, as the computed set relies on the accuracy
of this function. Second, the derivative function for each variable x, x˙ = f(y1, y2, . . . , yn) should
be a Lipschitz continuous function with respect to each input variable, and the derivative value x˙
should be bounded. This essentially means that we can bound the rate of change of the derivative
x˙ (and therefore indirectly the rate of change of the value of x) in a ﬁnite amount of time.
As an empirical demonstration of Claim 1, we show an example in the Simple-Vehicle System
using the safety controller / plant with an initial hyperrectangle of (x = [−2,−1], v = [4, 5]) with
a value of δ = 0.5. The original computed Reach≤∆ result, with no applied accuracy-increasing
strategies, was previously shown in Figure 4.12. By applying the accuracy-increasing strategies, we
can approach the actual Reach≤∆ set with arbitrary precision, as shown in Figure 4.14.
4.2.3.5 Case Study: Waypoint Tracking System
We now discuss the proposed sandboxing approach for an autonomous waypoint tracking system
(WTS) with a short case study. This system model is inspired by applications such as automated
lawn mowers or skid-steer loaders. The autonomous vehicle is required to follow a (predeﬁned)
sequence of waypoints while remaining within a ﬁxed safe distance of the line joining successive
waypoints.
The controller software periodically senses the position (x, y), the velocity v, and the heading
θ, of the vehicle and sets the acceleration (v˙) and the steering (θ˙) based on the current waypoint
(x∗, y∗) of the system. The vehicle models a skid-steer system which can turn in place, i.e., the
heading θ can change even when the velocity v is 0. The equations of motion for the vehicle's
position are given by the following nonlinear diﬀerential equations:
x˙ = v cos θ, y˙ = v sin θ
We assume that there is no information available for the complex controller (CC) we wish to
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(a) quantum rule (64 times), reﬁne rule (3 times),
split rule (3 times)
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split rule (8 times)
v
−2,4 
−2,5
−1,4
−1,5
(c) quantum rule (1024 times), reﬁne rule (48
times), split rule (32 times)
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Figure 4.14: An estimate of Reach≤∆ computed using 10,000 simulations (dark gray region) for
the Simple-VehicleSystem is shown in comparison with the overapproximation computed with the
Reach≤∆ algorithm (light gray region) with various amounts of accuracy-increasing strategies ap-
plied.
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sandbox, except that it operates within the physical limits of the actuator. That is, v˙ ∈ [amin, amax]
and θ˙ ∈ [φmin, φmax]. Recall that the safety requirement is to keep the vehicle within some distance
of the line joining the waypoints. Thus, a simple safety controller (SC) strategy is to slow down and
stop the vehicle as fast as possible.
The Embedded Safety Critical Programming Environment (ESCAPE) toolkit is a set of tools and
design methodology we are developing which is uses the Simplex Architecture to generate cyber-
physical system sandboxes. ESCAPE consists of two parts, (1) HyLink, and (2) SimplexGen. HyLink is
a translation tool which takes as its input a Simulink/Stateﬂow model and translates the model into
an hybrid system intermediate format. SimplexGen is an implementation of the algorithm described
in this paper which takes as its input, (1) the safety controller / plant model, (2) the abstract
complex controller / plant model, (3) the safety invariant to verify, and (4) computation constants
(the size of the quanta, the value of the control interval δ). ESCAPE uses these to generate code
implementing behavior of a veriﬁed decision module. ESCAPE provides a set of Simulink blocks for
deﬁning the safety invariant and computation constants, as shown in Figure 4.15a.
The complex controller and safety controller were modeled as hybrid systems using Mathwork's
Simulink environment (Figure 4.15b). HyLink is used to extract the hybrid automata from the
Simulink/Stateﬂow models and create an input format which SimplexGen can use. The SimplexGen
tool then uses the algorithm described above to generate the switching set. This switching set can
then be automatically encoded into a source code ﬁle to be used in the Simplex decision module
during operation.
For computing the backreach set, the algorithm requires the derivative bounds for each variable.
These bounds are obtained from the translated hybrid automata models of the complex controller
and safety controller as follows: given a rectangular set H of states, the derivative bounds of each
variable in H are determined from the trajectory deﬁnitions (diﬀerential equations) of the locations
of the hybrid automaton whose invariants intersect H. The diﬀerential equations for each variable
xi are of the form x˙i = f(x). We then maximize and minimize the function f(x) over the set H.
The size of the discrete state space for this example consisted of 1,536,000 states, and the
algorithm ran to termination in about 20 minutes. The switching set generated for the WTS is
a four-dimensional set (x, y, v, θ) which cannot be easily visualized. We can, however, analyze
the output set by ﬁxing two of the dimensions (for example, v and θ) and plotting the other two
dimensions. Figure 4.16 shows two plots of the switching set for two values of v and a ﬁxed θ. By
changing the values of v and θ, we can verify our intuition about the switching set: that going away
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(a) Custom ESCAPE blocks were created in Simulink
to provide the non-model input for SimplexGen.
(b) Simulink blocks are used to specify the system
dynamics.
Figure 4.15: The ESCAPE toolkit uses Simulink/Stateﬂow as a front end.
from the waypoint-connecting line segment at high velocity will more quickly switch to the safety
controller.
4.3 Related Work
System-Level Simplex
Previous research has been performed on reliable system design. One method proposed to ac-
complish this has been N-version programming [110]. In this method, multiple versions of software
are independently created from the same speciﬁcation. Then, all are run and the result given by the
majority of versions is taken as the output of the system. One drawback with this method is the lack
of statistical independence of bugs [111, 112]. Additionally, for a constant amount of development
eﬀort, N-version programming is actually less reliable than focusing on a single version over a wide
range of parameter values [18].
Another reliability mechanism is the recovery block concept [113]. In this approach, several
alternative methods are developed. We ﬁrst run the fully featured one and check if it is correct. If
it is, we use it. Otherwise, we try the simpler ones. The essential diﬀerence between recovery blocks
and the Simplex architecture is that the former is a backward recovery method while the latter is a
forward recovery method.
A common engineering practice to increase system reliability in spite of unreliable hardware
is triple modular redundancy (TMR) [96]. In this scheme, three versions of identical hardware
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Figure 4.16: The switching set of points output by our algorithm is shown projected onto ﬁxed v and
θ dimensions. Here, a single segment between two waypoints (crosses) is analyzed. The light gray
states indicate the unsafe regions, whereas the dark gray states are states where the safety controller
must be immediately used in order to maintain safety. The top ﬁgure is for v = 1000mm/s and
bottom ﬁgure is for v = −1500mm/s. In both ﬁgures, θ is ﬁxed at 0.
running an identical program are run with the same input. The output is then voted upon, such
that if any one of the outputs is incorrect (due to a hardware failure or random environmental
interference [114]), the overall system continues to function correctly. This technique, unlike the
System-Level Simplex Architecture, is powerless against errors in the logic of the program, since
all three modules will produce the identically incorrect output. However, it is eﬀective against
hardware failures and can be used in conjunction with the System-Level Simplex Architecture.
The resultant architecture prevents logical errors, transient faults, and hardware failure problems.
To use this combined scheme, we would have three modules each with their own hardware and
software portions running the System-Level Simplex Architecture with a reliable voter at the end
to accumulate the results. Variations of this also are possible, for example by replicating only the
safety-critical hardware subsystem and using a single microprocessor-based complex controller.
System-Level Simplex is most closely related to the original Application-Level Simplex Archi-
tecture [18, 115, 116]. In this design, two controllers are used in software to provide reliability in
spite of logical errors in the complex version. The System-Level Simplex is a novel architecture over
the Application-Level Simplex in several ways. The System-Level Simplex Architecture eliminates
a large body of common unveriﬁed dependencies between the safety and complex controllers, in-
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cluding the operating system, middleware, and microprocessor. Additionally, moving logic outside
of software allows us to handle additional failure modes previously unavailable to software running
within the Application-Level Simplex design, such as power and timing faults of the microprocessor-
based system. The System-Level Simplex also removes computation overhead from the processor,
which no longer has to run the simple controller and decision module (which could aﬀect real-time
schedulability). One drawback of the System-Level version of Simplex is that additional resources
are required to run the decision module and complex controller, such as the FPGA.
Simplex (both versions) should not be regarded as a one-size-ﬁts-all robustness approach. Even if
a veriﬁed descision module is produced, there is likely pessimism in the switching and the simplicity
of the safety controller can unnecessarily reduce system performance if it is used too often. This is
one trade-oﬀ a Simplex system makes in order to guarantee robustness and controllability.
Quantization-Based Discrete Abstractions
Finding ﬁnite state abstractions for hybrid automata is a problem of fundamental importance in
design and veriﬁcation of cyberphysical systems. This is because the availability of a bisimilar, ﬁnite-
state abstraction B for a hybrid system A, makes it possible to design and verify A by solving similar
problems for B. This is desirable because the latter problem can be attacked with powerful model
checking tools, such as Maude [108] or SMV [117]. Techniques for abstracting hybrid automata have
been sought after since the inception of the ﬁeld, and it was quickly found that ﬁnite-state, bisimilar
abstractions may not exist for general hybrid systems [103, 118, 119]. Nevertheless, restricted classes
of hybrid automata have been identiﬁed for which such abstractions exist and can be algorithmically
constructed [120, 121]. Unfortunately, the classes of hybrid automata that arise from the types of
vehicular systems we are interested, generally do not fall within these restricted classes.
Apart from bisimulation-based, ﬁnite-state abstractions, ordinary simulation-based abstractions
have been used [122, 123] for deductive veriﬁcation of hybrid systems. Most of these techniques
involve signiﬁcant manual work in ﬁnding the simulation relation that relates the concrete hybrid
automaton A with the (simpler) abstraction B.
Several related notions of abstractions based on approximate bisimulation relations have been
proposed [124, 125, 126]. One work particularly relevant to our paper [126] shares a similar goal
that of constructing ﬁnite abstractions for designing (or synthesizing) controllers with certain prop-
erties. One diﬀerence, however, is that we work with traditional simulation relations that give a
partition of the state space, instead of approximate simulations which give a covering of the con-
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tinuous state space. The general problem of synthesizing switching controllers that are correct by
construction has been looked at earlier, mostly for linear and piece-wise aﬃne systems [127, 128].
To the best of our knowledge, however, the existing work does not address diﬀerential inclusions
and periodically-switched controllers.
Earlier work has also used the notion of computing back reachability to construct correct-by-
design switched modules in Simplex-like systems [129]. However, the earlier proposed approaches
assumed control could instantly switch to the safety controller, rather than periodic sampling, and
therefore did not contain ∆-time bounded backreachability using the complex controller dynamics.
Two Step Approach for Reachability
There are several algorithms and tools for computing reachable states and approximate reachable
states for hybrid systems [130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135].
Work related to the PESSOA [136] tool for synthesizing embedded controllers is similar in spirit to
our work. PESSOA generates a ﬁnite state abstraction of a given system and uses these abstractions
for synthesizing controllers that are guaranteed certain restricted class of LTL properties such as
ϕ, ϕ, ϕ and ϕ ∧ϕ′. The controller synthesis uses earlier techniques [137, 138, 139, 140].
The ﬁnite state abstractions used in PESSOA are approximate simulations [141, 124] of the original
continuous system. In contrast, the ﬁnite state abstractions we use are simulations of the original
system in the classical sense. Furthermore, our algorithm (and tool) can handle plants which are
described with hybrid automata using a class of nonlinear diﬀerential equations. To the best of our
knowledge, PESSOA currently does not support such models.
Checkmate [142] is a tool for verifying control systems modeled as a hybrid automaton. Check-
mate computes the reach set for a linear and non-linear systems by using the ﬂow pipe approximation
technique [143] to approximate the reachable sets by a sequence of convex polyhedra. Checkmate
restricts the class of hybrid systems that can be veriﬁed to polyhedral-invariant hybrid systems.
Our approach, however, can verify hybrid systems without this restriction. Additionally, correctness
in Checkmate requires solving a global optimization problem, for which there is no general sound
solution.
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4.4 Conclusions
We have presented the System-Level Simplex Architecture which uses hardware/software co-design
to produce fault-tolerant systems. By leveraging on a simple safety controller and a decision module
implemented in hardware, several types of previously unhandlable errors can be safely managed.
These include failures in the complex software controller code, operating system, and microprocessor,
as well as real-time temporal faults.
An end-to-end design process has been created for the architecture, which leverages on an initial
AADL model to provide both an architectural and behavioral description. The output of the process
is a checkable System-Level Simplex architectural model, and the corresponding VHDL hardware
code.
We demonstrated the feasibility and robustness of the System-Level Simplex Architecture through
two case studies involving a pacemaker and a classic inverted pendulum. The architecture is also
currently being evaluated to improve the safety of autonomous tractor control, in collaboration with
John Deere.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
In this work, we have attempted to address two critical challenges in cyber-physical system design:
safety and aﬀordability. We ﬁrst considered the global coordination of the CPS task, and provided
a necessary and suﬃcient condition for predicates to be invariants of a system. This was done
assuming a realistic model of the communication, where packets can be delayed or dropped. This
model is applicable to both wireless communication, as well as communication performed over the
Internet. Next, we outlined challenges to aﬀordability in CPS systems. Speciﬁcally, using aﬀordable
commercial-oﬀ-the-shelf (COTS) components usually results in poor real-time performance which
is necessary for tasks which interact with the physical world. We addressed memory-access timing
issues with COTS components caused by I/O peripherals, and caused by multiple CPU cores con-
currently competing for memory access. Finally, we addressed safety for the individual nodes of a
distributed CPS by using the Simplex architecture. Here, we provided algorithmic ways, based on
reachability computations of hybrid automata, to generate the logic of the Simplex decision mod-
ule, which is responsible for switching to the backup safety controller before safety violations can
occur. The research presented here is ongoing, and we plan to expand on each of the areas we have
presented.
In terms of the global CPS safety, we have shown which conditions are necessary and suﬃcient for
safe system design. We plan to use this approach on a more complicated case study, where the safety
actions do not consist of disjoint paths, but rather involve nontrivial assumptions about the other
agents. One example of such a system is an intelligent intersection [25], where cars may continue to
proceed through the intersection if communication is delayed or lost. Another direction here would
be to ﬁnd algorithms which assume the same communication model, and check if computing the
proposed inﬁnite-time reachability condition if feasible for such systems.
As presented in this work, we have started to address the challenge of applying the PRedictable
Execution Model (PREM) to multicore systems. Here, the challenge is not necessary rearranging
memory access as we have already done, but rather scheduling access to memory in such a way
120
that system utilization remains high. We plan to mathematically analyze the M-LAX scheduling
algorithm which we have evaluated in simulation, and compare the formal guarantee to TDMA-
based Memory Centric Scheduling. Other approaches have also being recently developed for the
problem of memory interference in real-time systems, such as MemGuard which throttles memory
access from each core to prevent delays due to main memory saturation [144]. A comparison of the
this approach with mutli-core PREM is planned.
We have also started to generalize the presented algorithms for reachability for hybrid automata
into general non-linear systems which do not have restrictions on the dependency graph imposed
by the system's diﬀerential equations, using a technique similar to mixed face lifting [145]. This
approach has successfully computed unbounded reachability for low-dimension systems with nonlin-
ear coupled dynamics. We would also like to improve the scalability of the approach into a higher
number of dimensions, especially for well-behaved systems where the reach set is convergent or is
cyclic. Another direction is to have an explicit unsafe set, and use counter-example guided abstrac-
tion reﬁnement (CEGAR) to focus on the areas of the computation where a safety violation may
occur, and accept larger overapproximation errors in other areas of the state space where they do
not matter.
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